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ABSTRACT
A Resource View of Information Security Incident Response
Mark-David J. McLaughlin
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Janis L. Gogan, D.B.A.
Information and Process Management Department

This dissertation investigates managerial and strategic aspects of InfoSec incident
preparation and response. This dissertation is presented in four chapters:
•

Chapter 1:

an introduction

•

Chapter 2:

a systematic literature review

•

Chapter 3:

two field-based case studies of InfoSec incident response processes

•

Chapter 4:

a repertory grid study identifying characteristics of effective individual

incident responders.
Together these chapters demonstrate that the lenses of the Resource Based View, Theory of
Complementary Resources, and Accounting Control Theory, can be combined to classify and
analyze the resources organizations use during incident response. I find that incident response is
maturing as a discipline and organizations rely on both defined procedures and improvisation
when incidents occur. Most importantly there is no “one size fits all” approach to incident
response. Incident responder characteristics include general skills (good communicators and
problem solvers) and character attributes (such as an interest in “doing the right thing”).The
combination of characteristics that make an individual successful in a particular incident response
role is affected by other resources available to support InfoSec incident response.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Overview
My dissertation topic of InfoSec incident response is a strong fit with the work I do in my
full-time position as a Technical Lead in the Security Research and Operations group at Cisco.
Under the supervision of Bentley Professor of Information and Process Management Janis
Gogan, I have conducted a systematic thirteen-year review of 125 InfoSec studies published in
prominent information systems (IS) journals and another 13 studies that focused on InfoSec
incident preparation and response; made more than 30 presentations at academic and professional
conferences; published two teaching cases in JIT-C (JIT-Teaching Cases, a sister publication of
Journal of Information Technology); and submitted papers to MIS Quarterly (MISQ) and its sister
publication, MISQ-Executive (MISQ-E).
This three-paper dissertation is structured as follows:
•

Chapter 1:

foundational perspectives, dissertation overview,
directions for future research

•

Chapter 2:

systematic literature review

•

Chapter 3:

two field-based case studies of InfoSec incident response processes.

•

Chapter 4:

RepGrid study investigating characteristics of effective incident responders.

A version of the InfoSec literature review, focused on InfoSec methods and theories, was
presented at AMCIS (Americas Conference for Information Systems), and a version focused on
key findings and implications was presented at HICSS (Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences). A revision of this latter paper has been accepted at MISQ-E (McLaughlin and
Gogan 2018). A version that combines the AMCIS and HICSS papers is presented in Chapter 2.
My empirical research (two case studies described in Chapter 3, and two RepGrid studies
described in Chapter 4) shed light on some of the complex and interacting factors that influence
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effective InfoSec incident response, at the individual and organizational levels. Earlier versions of
these papers were presented at academic conferences, as follows.
The two discussion cases in Chapter 3 were presented at annual meetings of NACRA
(North American Case Research Association) before their revision and publication in JIT-TC;
they are now distributed via Harvard Business School Publishing (www.hbsp.harvard.edu). Two
papers based on these incident response case studies – presented at ECIS (European Conference
on Information Systems) and the Bled eConference – interpreted the cases in light of RBV and the
Theory of Resource Complements. Key findings of those case studies are discussed in this
chapter and also in the Chapter 3 introduction (which discusses them in light of accounting
control theory).
A pilot RepGrid study informed by RBV and the Theory of Resource Complements was
discussed at a HICSS doctorial consortium and also presented as a full research paper at HICSS.
A revision of that paper (see Chapter 4), received supportive reviews by two MISQ referees but
was rejected by the AE and Senior Editor based on the recommendation of a third referee. I am in
the process of revising that paper for submission to another influential journal: JMIS.
The remainder of this chapter introduces foundation perspectives that guided my research
on the important topic of InfoSec Incident Response, describes the three papers that comprise the
remainder of this dissertation, and lays out an agenda for future research on InfoSec Incident
Response 1.

1 This dissertation takes the “three papers” form (which requires three publishable papers). I have written this
introductory chapter (Chapter 1) to provide an overview of my studies and their most important findings, and to
discuss future research opportunities – rather than adding a 5th chapter which would be more typical of a
traditional dissertation.

2

Information Security Management: Background
I adopt the definition of Information Security provided in US Code 44 § 3542:
The protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access,
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide:
integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or
destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity;
confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary
information; and availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to
and use of information (“Coordination of Federal Information Policy” 2014)
InfoSec is a research topic of great importance; many high-profile security breaches in
recent years have brought the topic to the board room. As information assets (data, documents,
and the systems that create, store, and transport them) become both extensive and more valuable,
additional complexity in their design seems to increase their vulnerability. The flexibility,
configurability, and power of information systems bring both great business value and tough
challenges. One major challenge: attackers are racing to learn new ways to spot and exploit
vulnerabilities. Organizations in every industry are coping with theft of data, intellectual property,
and user credentials, and they are also struggling to catch the perpetrators. The greater the value
of an organization’s information assets, the greater the potential impact of security incidents. In
2016, a central bank in Bangladesh lost $100 million to hackers. Two Yahoo breaches, affecting
more than 1.5 billion accounts, put Yahoo’s planned 2017 $4.8 billion merger by Verizon in
jeopardy; and for almost 3 months in 2017, attackers were able to purloin copies of personal
information of 146 million US citizens (as well as more than 700,000 people in other countries)
from Equifax, resulting in the loss of a lucrative federal contract and incalculable reputational
damage. Data breaches are not the only InfoSec concern. High-profile ransomware campaigns
(such as WannaCry) hold systems worldwide hostage. Clearly, InfoSec incidents such as these
can cause great damage to an organization’s reputation, productivity, and financial health 2.
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visit to http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/ offers a
deep dive into other spectacular hacks, many of which propagate both within and across organizations.
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Organizations of all sizes, in all industries, need policies and procedures to ensure that
computing and networking hardware/software run reliably and that information assets are
protected from unauthorized disclosure and inadvertent destruction. Despite efforts to prevent
them, InfoSec incidents are frequent occurrences; in 2015, each of 10,000 large organizations
experienced an average of 160,000 daily occurrences of InfoSec incidents (Cunning et al. 2015).
Such incidents are costly and they can disrupt operations; harm employees, customers, or
business partners; degrade data quality; and damage a company’s reputation. Yet, a 2017 survey
of 9,500 executives in 122 countries indicated that only about half of organizations provide
employee security awareness training, and more than half do not have a defined incident response
process (Castelli et al. 2017).

InfoSec in the Basket (Chapter 2)
I conducted two systematic InfoSec literature reviews; the first was conducted in three
stages:
1. A meta-review of 85 empirical InfoSec studies, published from 2004-2013 in the AIS
Senior Scholars Basket of Eight prominent IS journals, was presented at AMCIS in
August 2014.
2. The review set was updated to 125 papers; now the time frame was 2004-2016. Key
findings from these studies were translated for practitioners and presented at HICSS in
January 2017.
3. The meta-review and an expanded substantive review of findings and implications from
the 125 empirical studies was updated and combined (in Dissertation Chapter 2).
As will be explained below, I observed in this literature review that very few of these 125
papers in the Basket directly addressed InfoSec incident response. So, I conducted a separate
focused review of peer-reviewed studies addressing this important topic, without the Basket-only
constraint.
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In Chapter 2, I report that some InfoSec research published in prominent journals
examined attempts to prevent incidents by addressing employee behavior as the “weakest link” in
the InfoSec chain, as well as by installing antivirus software, keeping other software up to date
with the latest security patches, and other techniques. Some studies aimed to learn how to better
predict and prepare for InfoSec incidents by understanding attacker behavior, quantifying related
risks, setting priorities, and preparing response plans. Other studies aimed to improve methods to
detect breaches and other InfoSec incidents, and a few studies addressed how organizations
respond to (or recover from) malicious InfoSec incidents.
Many studies in the Basket aimed to understand end-users’ attitudes toward InfoSec
policies and intentions to adopt or not adopt recommended practices, through theoretical
perspectives including the Theory of Reasoned Action, Deterrence Theory, and other conceptual
lenses. Other studies aimed to understand managerial challenges associated with investing in
InfoSec tools, setting and implementing organizations’ InfoSec policies and procedures, and
interacting with other organizations (such as software vendors) to resolve InfoSec issues. These
organization-focused studies drew heavily on theories from behavioral economics (such as game
theory) and management (such as control theory).
My review reveals that the InfoSec research stream is both wide and deep. Yet, many
research methods are underutilized in studying some InfoSec topics, and some important topics
(such as incident response) are understudied, and just a few studies focused on interorganizational challenges. I conclude that although the InfoSec research stream is maturing, there
are many opportunities to develop stronger evidence-based theories and to derive implications for
InfoSec practice. In particular, incident preparation and response activities and challenges need
more in-depth investigation.
Since my systematic review revealed that InfoSec Incident Response was an understudied
topic in the AIS Senior Scholars Basket, I conducted a separate literature review on this topic.
Key findings from this review, and open questions remaining, are discussed next.
5

A Focused Literature Review: InfoSec Incident Response
This second literature review focused narrowly on empirical InfoSec incident response
studies but drew on a broader set of journals than the AIS Senior Scholars Basket. Empirical
studies were identified through both manual and automated searches in the EBSCO and ProQuest
Central databases. After eliminating 156 papers because they were not based on empirical studies
or because InfoSec incident response was not their primary focus, I retained 13 empirical studies
in the review set (Table 1-1, below) Of these, 12 papers focused on organizational aspects of
incident response and one focused on the individual level of analysis.
Whereas most studies identified in the first Basket literature review (Chapter 2 of this
dissertation) aimed to help organizations prevent InfoSec problems, most of the studies in this
focused InfoSec Incident Response review investigated organizational challenges when incidents
occur – including financial issues, personnel challenges (skills, work practices, capabilities), and
whether and how organizations learn from InfoSec incidents. Four design science studies outlined
requirements for ideal integration of incident response tools and practices. Two studies relied on
response simulations, and one study created a mathematical model without running a simulation
on it. Six studies used qualitative methods: a study based on 16 interviews, an observational
study, a study which collected data in two model development workshops, an ethnographic action
research study, and two case studies.
The 13 studies were categorized as addressing three InfoSec Response sub-topics:
1. Tools (4 papers): use of InfoSec incident response tools or designs for improved tools
2. Work Practices (2 papers): what incident response teams do or how they operate
3. Response Capabilities (7 papers): Skills requirements; skills development;
individual or team response effectiveness (measured in terms of response time,
capacity and other metrics); response costs (per incident and ongoing costs of
employing incident response teams); learning from incidents (whether and how
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organizations use de-briefing; and other mechanisms to improve their response
capabilities).
Author

2005 Gal-Or and Ghos
2006 Mitropoulos et al.
2007 Mitropoulos et al.
2007 Sveen et al.
2010 Patsos et al.
2010 Werlinger et al.
2012 Ahmad et al.
2012 Montesino et al.
2012 Qian et al.
2012 Reddy et al.
2014 Chen et al.
2014 Sundaramurthy et al.
2015 Ahmad et al.

Partial Citation

Information Systems Research
16(2)
Computers & Security 25(5)
Info Mgt & Computer Sec 15(3)
Info Mgt & Computer Sec 15(5)
Info Mgt & Computer Sec 18(4)
Info Mgt & Computer Sec 18(1)
Computers & Security 31(5)
Info Mgt & Computer Sec 20(4)
Computers & Security 31(8)
Info Systems Frontiers 14(5)
IEEE Security & Privacy 12(5)
IEEE Security & Privacy 12(5)
Int’l J of Info Management 35(6)

Method

Focus

Topic

Design
Design
Model
Design
Qualitative
Case Study
Design
Case Study
Model
Qualitative
Action Rsh
Case Study

Org/Internal
Org/Internal
Org/Internal
Org/Internal
Ind’l/Internal
Org/Internal
Org/Internal
Org/Internal
Org/Internal
Org/External
Org/Internal
Org/Internal

Work Practices
Tools
Response Capabilities
Tools
Tools
Response Capabilities
Tools
Response Capabilities
Response Capabilities
Response Capabilities
Response Capabilities
Response Capabilities

Model

Org/External

Work Practices

Table 1-1: InfoSec Research Methods, Focus, and Topics
Here, I briefly review the seven studies on InfoSec response capabilities (identified by bold type
in Table 1-1).
Two quantitative studies considered operational requirements and costs of incident
response. (Sveen et al. 2007, p. 208) found that effective incident-reporting policies and better
incident detection tools can cause a team to become “a victim of its own success, as a growing
volume of reports put higher pressure on incident-handling resources”. When the number of
incidents rises, the only viable option for a response team is to automate many tasks, since adding
team members (with associated space and coordination requirements, and other costs) is
unsustainable. However, responding to many low-priority incidents places a significant strain on
response teams, causing their response effectiveness to decline and reducing their ability to learn
from incidents by identifying areas for improvement. Based on simulation results, Sveen et al.
(2007) proposed that an effective InfoSec response policy should encourage employees to report
high-priority incidents and discourage reporting of low-priority incidents. Another simulation
model (Reddy et al. 2012) used time-driven activity based costing (Kaplan and Anderson 2003)
to determine the optimal cost of implementing and maintaining an incident response team, given
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the different costs of responding to high, medium or low severity InfoSec incidents under varying
scenarios (based on costs of staff or equipment, tasks performed, efficiencies, etc.).
The five other incident response studies were based on qualitative research methods. (Chen
et al. 2014) analyzed 17 individual task-related behaviors and 21 cognitive task behaviors
performed by two incident response organizations. They conclude that responders need the
following five skills to successfully respond to routine incidents:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Investigative skills
Desire to acquire new knowledge and share this knowledge with others
Ability to problem-solve
Curiosity
Attention to detail

They propose that incident responders should also have the ability to:
1. Detect patterns in routine material or data
2. Perceive when something is wrong or is likely to go wrong
3. Rapidly compare data accurately, including comparisons to remembered examples
For responding to non-routine incidents, Chen et al. proposed three other necessary attributes:
1. Information-sharing skills
2. Collaboration skills
3. Preference for working with others
Sundaramurthy et al. (2014, p. 54), assert that incident response has “become so
sophisticated and expertise driven that understanding the process is nearly impossible without
doing the job.” In an ethnographic study, four graduate students spent almost 1,000 hours as
incident responders in a security operations center, in order to study how tacit and explicit
knowledge (Polanyi 1958) emerged and was shared within the group. The paper notes that the
incident response job is highly dynamic, as responders attempt to understand constantly evolving
threats:
The tasks performed in a CSIRT job are sophisticated, but there is no manual or
textbook to explain them. Even an experienced analyst may find it hard to explain
exactly how he discovers connections in an investigation (Sundaramurthy et al. 2014, p.
55).
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The study extends Nonaka’s knowledge conversion model (Nonaka 2002), which states
that explicit knowledge is created by combining or enhancing existing explicit knowledge, while
tacit knowledge is most typically created through socialization practices (essentially restricting it
to a specific group). Tacit knowledge can also be converted into explicit knowledge through
externalization activities such as documenting best practices and lessons learned, and explicit
knowledge can be converted into tacit knowledge through internalization activities.
Sundaramurthy et al. develop a tool-oriented knowledge conversion model to describe how
knowledge is created and converted in incident response programs: socialization occurs through
apprenticeships. The creation of new response tools is a form of externalization. Refinement of
tools, models, and algorithms is done through combination activities; and responders’ subsequent
adoption of these new techniques is a form of internalization.
Ahmad et al. (2012) conducted a case study to understand whether and how a large global
financial services organization learned from security incidents, and whether and how knowledge
from learning was integrated into new work practices. This study, which drew on guidance
provided in a report jointly prepared by SEI and the United States Air Force (Kossakowski et al.
1999), relied on a well-known organizational learning theory that distinguishes between singleloop (monitoring) and double-loop (evaluation) learning (Argyris 1991). Argyris explains that
single-loop learning is similar to a non-digital thermostat, which can be set to control heat within
a pre-defined range. In contrast, a “smart” thermostat could demonstrate double-loop learning by
questioning whether a pre-set range is appropriate, given specific contextual factors in effect at a
given time (i.e., should it be cooler when residents are sleeping? Warmer when they wake?
Cooler when many people are in the room or when humidity is high? etc.). For their case study
investigating firewall configuration practices, Ahmad et al. (2012) conceptualized a tactical
adjustment (e.g., altering a firewall configuration rule without conducting an in-depth root cause
analysis) as single-loop learning, whereas a root-cause analysis that examines and questions the
business requirements that initially justified the pre-set firewall rule would be double-loop
9

learning. The authors proposed that double-loop learning ensures more appropriate firewall rule
updates and helps prevent engineers from granting user requests that might expose an
organization to risks.
The case study revealed that the focal organization primarily relied on single-loop learning,
except for highly visible InfoSec incidents, when some double-loop learning was evident. A
second paper based on the same case study (Ahmad et al. 2015) examined the organization’s
InfoSec incident response practices per a “4I” organizational learning process: Intuit, Interpret,
Integrate, Institutionalize (Zietsma et al. 2002). This paper concluded that organizations fail to
learn from prior security incidents for two primary reasons: First, heightened levels of secrecy
about security incidents “deliberately excludes ‘outsiders’ from the critical early phases of
incident response to prevent ‘misunderstanding’ and ‘premature conclusions’ that can lead to
embarrassment” and thus limits the amount of information available to translate into new
knowledge. Second, “competing priorities between security learning and restoring service
availability at the lowest possible cost” prevent teams from conducting lengthy root-cause
analyses, particularly for low-impact incidents.
Based on a case study in the Norwegian Oil and Gas industry, Qian et al. (2012, p. 860)
warned: “A reactive approach to security risk management could trap enterprises into blindness
to minor incidents and a low incident response capability, which could finally result in severe
incidents.” Their proposed system dynamics-based Theory of Incident Response Capability
argues, first, that as a team’s response capability improves, the team also gets better at detecting
potential breaches. Furthermore,
As more incidents are detected, perceived information security risk rises, resulting in
more investment in incident response capability … [whereas] low investment in
incident response capability leads to less detection of incidents. People may
misperceive the system to be secure and safe, which, in turn, leads to less investment in
incident response capability. The latent incidents in the system may actually lead to
severe incidents with low incident response capability to control them. (p. 862)
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My literature review focusing on InfoSec incident response led me to conclude that
additional empirical studies are needed to examine how organizations prepare for and respond to
InfoSec incidents, and to identify factors and conditions associated with effective versus
ineffective InfoSec incident response. Building on the prior InfoSec incident response studies
described above, my empirical dissertation work focused on technical, organizational and
institutional resources deployed in an effective InfoSec incident response capability, to extend
Qian et al.’s Incident Response Capability theory. In conducting two case studies and two
RepGrid studies I relied on the Resource-Based View of strategic management (RBV) and the
related Theory of Resource Complementarity. Next, I explain these important resource theories.

Resource Theories (RBV, Complementary Resources)
The Resource Based View (RBV) initially contended that an organization’s valuable
assets and capabilities (“resources”) confer competitive advantage, to the extent that each
resource is rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney 1991; Margaret A. Peteraf 1993).
Effective configuration of resources that support an organization’s strategic and operational
requirements) is seen as a valuable, but unfortunately rare, capability. An important early IS
paper informed by RBV (Mata et al. 1995) contended that prior research paid insufficient
attention to leadership, collaboration, and other managerial capabilities:
The resource-based view of the firm suggests that the search for IT-based sources of
sustained competitive advantage must focus less on IT, per se, and more on the process
of organizing and managing IT within a firm. It is the ability of IT managers to work
with each other, with managers in other functional areas in a firm, and with managers
in other firms that is most likely to separate those firms that are able to gain sustained
competitive advantages from their IT and those that are only able to gain competitive
parity from their IT. (p. 500)
RBV applies at individual, group, organizational, and industry levels of analysis (Ibrahim
et al. 2012), and these levels are nested. For example, a resource bundle at the group level may
include specialized expertise of one member of an InfoSec incident response team. That
individual expertise presumably contributes to the group’s InfoSec response capability, which in
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turn may contribute to an organizational InfoSec response capability. Resource bundles are more
likely to confer advantages than single resources; few resources are sufficiently valuable on their
own to confer competitive advantage (ownership of an exceptionally valuable patent is an
example of a single valuable asset that might confer competitive advantage, and control of the
market for a rare mineral is an example of a single valuable capability that might confer
competitive advantage).
RBV researchers theorize that capabilities (which usually rely on bundles comprised of
assets and lower-level capabilities) are more likely to confer advantage because they are more
complex and thus more difficult for competitors to imitate (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). At an
organizational level, IT management overall (Bharadwaj 2000), supply chain management (Rai et
al. 2006), and information management (Mithas et al. 2011) are important high-level IT-related
capabilities.
Dynamic capabilities are particularly valuable because (by definition) they adapt to
changing conditions in an organization’s broader environment – except under conditions of
extreme environmental turbulence (Daniel and Wilson 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Li et
al. 2010; Lindgren et al. 2008). Knowledge (usually conceptualized as an intangible asset, but
sometimes conceptualized as a capability) is important to dynamic capabilities (Prieto and
Easterby-Smith 2006), and the Theory of Complementary Resources points to an explanation.
Teece (1986) proposed that bundles of complementary resources offer greater value than single
resources, and he further specified three types of complementary resources, for which I offer
contemporary IT examples:
•

A generic resource does not require modification in order to be complementary. For
example, a server would complement a variety of software applications without
modification.

•

A specialized resource has a ‘unilateral dependence’ on another resource. An iPhone app
may be written to take advantage of a proprietary hardware feature such as ‘3D touch,’
making it costly or impossible to port this app to another platform. So, the app depends
on Apple, but the iPhone does not depend on the app.
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•

A co-specialized resource arises out of ‘bilateral dependence.’ For example, a desktop
docking station or power cord fits a particular laptop model; the laptop cannot work
without the cord (or an aftermarket adapter) and the cord cannot work on other laptops
(again, in the absence of an aftermarket adapter)
Teece’s theory of complementary resources 3 contends that value is unleashed when

separate resources (whether assets or capabilities, or both) have complementary effects; this
theory has influenced many studies, including strategic IS management research (Banker et al.
2006; Hess and Rothaermel 2011; Melville et al. 2004; Mittal and Nault 2009; Rai and Tang
2010; Tanriverdi and Venkatraman 2005; Wade and Hulland 2004). Note also that the theory
predicts its opposite: if necessary resources do not complement other necessary resources, they do
not confer optimal value. Thus, this theory predicts that a necessary information system that does
not complement the business processes it is purported to support (group or organizational level
capabilities) will deliver lower than expected value (Karahanna et al. 2006; Ray et al. 2005).
Managerial skill is an important resource that can complement IT resources. For example, a
supply chain study concluded that a technological resource alone
“does not hold the answer to IT value creation. In fact, managerial skills, which enable
adaptations on supply chain processes and corporate strategy to accommodate the use
of IT, play the strongest role in IT value creation.” (Dong et al. 2009, p. 18)
More generally, an IS or IT manager’s (and, by extension, an InfoSec manager’s) ability to
communicate well and collaborate with others within and beyond organizational boundaries is an
individual capability that may be as important as the IT tools he/she uses, and that sometimes
enhance the tools’ value (through complementarity). Thus, I proposed (in a paper presented at the
Bled eConference) that effective resource bundles combine technical, organizational, and
institutional resources (McLaughlin and Gogan 2013). Assembling bundles of complementary
InfoSec resources that in turn complement general business practices (and vice-versa) continues
to be problematic for many organizations (ISACA 2016).

3

Mata et al. (1995) offer an argument that implies the Theory of Complementary Resources, but they do not
name it.
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An important challenge that confronts IS researchers and the organizations they study is
the rapid pace of technology innovation, with the ever-present threat of disruption. A
“competence-destroying technological discontinuity” that depends on specialized and/or cospecialized complementary resources might become a disruptive innovation that benefits some
players in an industry and hurts others (Rothaermel and Hill 2005). Also, complementarity is
contextually-defined, a resource or group of resources is not inherently complementary (Porter
and Siggelkow 2008). Thus, a resource that is complementary in one context may have no
discernable effect in another context – whether the “context” is the resource bundle in which it is
embedded, the broader context of its use by individuals, groups, or organizations, or at a different
moment in the life cycle of a technology or an organization.
A resource that offers similar functionality as another resource is generally considered a
substitute rather than a complement. However, as I discuss in Chapter 2, substitution can provide
helpful downstream redundancy in an InfoSec process (if an upstream resource fails, a
downstream substitute resource may nevertheless offer protection). Even though the downstream
control is not complementary, it can be valuable. Therefore, a valuable substitute is neutral with
respect to complementarity.
To summarize the contributions of the RBV and Theory of Complementary Resources:
merely assembling a bundle of valuable resources does not guarantee that benefits will be derived
from them; the resources need to work effectively in conjunction with one another (i.e., be
complementary or neutral with respect to complementarity). Since InfoSec management is a
subset of IS (or IT) management, it follows that bundles of effective technical, organizational,
and institutional resources (assets and individual or group capabilities) should contribute to a
valuable and rare organizational InfoSec incident response capability, provided they complement
each other and the organization’s strategic and operational InfoSec practices. I propose that both
complementary and substitutive resources can strengthen an organization’s InfoSec incident
response capability (McLaughlin and Gogan 2013).
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I next provide an overview of the two InfoSec incident response case studies I conducted
(thus far, these have been published as teaching cases, as explained in Chapter 3).

Two Incident Response Cases (Chapter 3)
In two field-based case studies at academic institutions, I investigated organizational
challenges in protecting the security and reliability of software, data, networks, and IT-supported
processes, with a focus on how each organization prepared for and responded to a specific
InfoSec incident. After conducting each study, I produced a discussion case and accompanying
teaching note, and wrote case analysis papers for presentation at conferences, laying a foundation
for a future journal publication that will be based on a multiple-case comparison.
The first case study investigated the response to a rather common incident – the theft of a
mobile device. The second case study focused on a response to a more complex incident, in
which an attacker compromised a high-profile multi-institution research network. Both field case
studies drew on multiple forms of evidence – including documents from the affected
organizations, interviews I conducted with key informants (interviews were recorded and
transcribed), and other relevant information available in the public domain. The two teaching
cases were published in JIT-TC (a sister publication of JIT, one of the eight prominent IS journals
in the AIS Senior Scholars Basket) and are distributed by Harvard Business School Publishing
(www.hbsp.harvard.edu). Both cases support discussion of incident response practices – a topic
that is currently underrepresented in major teaching case collections. Submitting authors are
required to also submit to JIT-TC both the teaching case and an accompanying teaching note,
which is also peer-reviewed, but not published (this policy intends to minimize students’ ability
to locate teaching notes; thus, it would be inappropriate to publish my teaching notes in this
dissertation). The introduction to Chapter 3 of this dissertation is adapted from the two teaching
notes and discusses relevant Theoretical Foundations that informed these case studies. Here, we
briefly describe the two case situations.
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In Snowfall and a Stolen Laptop, a business school Dean discovers that his laptop has been
stolen from his home. This event occurs at a time when the University is still dealing with a prior
costly incident that involved the potential disclosure of thousands of U.S. Social Security
numbers. The Dean notifies his IT staff, and the case then describes the immediate response to
this incident (primarily manual and IT-enabled investigation activities that aimed to ascertain
whether and to what extent sensitive information was stored on the laptop). Analysis of this case
through the lens of the Resource Based View reveals that incident responders recognized that
valuable information resources had been placed in jeopardy with the theft of the laptop. The
laptop itself was a valuable resource, in that it contained documents and data the Dean needed to
effectively perform his duties, and the responders also recognized it might have contained legally
sensitive personally-identifiable information (PII) which, they hoped, a thief would not exploit.
Because of the prior incident, the responders were acutely aware that a PII breach would necessitate
costly credit monitoring and could also expose the university to various penalties and hits to its
reputation. One employee remarked in an interview that “… the idea was [to] protect the data.”
The incident responders relied on some special-purpose InfoSec tools, but also made use of
many everyday end-user support tools, such as software for full disk encryption (part of the
operating system) that aimed to protect data from unauthorized access. The COB incident
responders were able to quickly restore most (not all) of the Dean’s data from a previous backup
that had been performed during a routine maintenance procedure. The contents were accurate and
complete as of the last backup, which took place more than a month before. Staff used LANDesk to
retrieve the machine’s model and serial numbers (LANDesk is asset management software that
helps an organization keep track of its computer equipment. IT organizations often use it to deliver
software updates), and an automated check was run for possible Social Security numbers. A staff
member also explained how the university’s password policies were enforced through tools
embedded in the Windows operating system. Once the staff had examined the restored data and
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queried the Dean about possible other sensitive information on the machine, their investigation was
closed. An employee recalled: “We bought [the Dean] a new laptop and moved on.”
We observed that the responders deployed a reasonable set of special-purpose and everyday
tools to discover whether sensitive data might have been compromised. This finding suggests that
InfoSec incident response can be supported to some extent with existing IT management assets and
capabilities, as long as staff members are sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled to repurpose some
IT assets as necessary. We also observed that this incident response process was not optimally
systematic and thorough. While responders recognized the importance of data resources, the steps
they took to identify whether there was sensitive information on the laptop were incomplete and did
not fully conform to the university’s InfoSec policies. Also, data protection/restoration is just one
facet of effective InfoSec incident response, but in this case, the responders focused almost
exclusively on that aspect.
An InfoSec policy document or an InfoSec response checklist is an administrative asset
that is part of an organization’s bundle of relevant resources. The reader will likely not be
surprised to consider that value is not derived from these documents if they are not used. In the
laptop theft incident, I learned that when the staff interviewed the Dean, they did not rely on the
University’s precise definitions for four separate levels of information sensitivity, which were
laid out in a document: private (using the official New York State definition of personallyidentifiable information, PII), confidential, internal, and public. The staff member who
interviewed the Dean about data that might be on his laptop did appropriately refer to PII but used
other terms loosely (such as “proprietary” which could apply to either “confidential” or “internal”
information). Had the staff member been referring to the university document, the interview
might have yielded a different outcome.
An InfoSec response checklist cannot anticipate every possible scenario without becoming
overly cumbersome. So, the checklist might go hand in hand with some degree of improvisation. I
learned in this case study that when a device is stolen, the responders are advised to call local
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pawn shops; this was done in response to this incident. In addition, an alert staff member called
local computer supply stores to see if anyone had purchased a power cord matching the stolen
device (the dean had mentioned discovering that the computer was gone but the power cord still
dangled from the plug on the wall). As it turned out, this step did not yield useful information, yet
I see it as an example of the potential for improvisation to be helpful during incident response,
particularly if done in conjunction with checklists. I subsequently learned (through my literature
review) that evidence reported in a case study at a bank in Africa led the researchers to assert that
improvisation can help bridge “unavoidable gaps between formal standards/ procedures and
emergent events” (Njenga and Brown 2012, p. 594). Future studies could investigate why and
under what conditions effective response teams rely on checklists versus improvisation.
In A High Performance Computing Cluster under Attack: Responding to the Titan Incident
– the head of a Norwegian University InfoSec incident response team learns from the university’s
IT operations team about suspicious activity on a high-performance computing cluster for
scientific research. The incident response leader supervised the technical investigation. The
response leader recalled: “We were two people ... It was in the middle of summer vacation – we
had hoped nothing major would happen.” Once the incident was discovered she “made it clear,
quite quickly, that [they] were very short staffed.” Fortunately, an institutional agreement
governing operational cooperation between high-performance Norwegian computing facilities
caused a security officer at a partner institution to notice that the incident response team had taken
the system off-line; he reached out with an offer of help. The response team was able to use tools
in his shop to analyze malware samples collected from the compromised cluster. While that was a
positive aspect of inter-organizational coordination, there were also challenging aspects. For
example, after discovering that the attack had affected systems owned by partner organizations in
several countries, the response leader confronted some thorny political issues; some of her staff
reported that they experienced a great deal of difficulty getting some institutions to cooperate
with the investigation.
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Similar to the stolen laptop case, we observed in the Titan incident that some everyday IT
support resources were successfully deployed during incident response. While responders in the
stolen laptop incident helped get a single individual, the Dean, back up and running; responders
in the Titan incident focused on restoring the computing cluster so that the many scientists on the
network, employed by many different universities, could get back to their work. Responders in
the stolen laptop incident focused on protecting PII of the university’s students and employees,
whereas the Titan incident responders focused on technical details of the investigation (verifying
that a breach had occurred and trying to identify the perpetrator and the weak link through which
the attacker gained access to the system). This case study revealed challenges in protecting
complex IT systems, with multiple departments supporting different operations. It also revealed
inter-organizational collaboration opportunities (e.g., sharing specialized resources) and interorganizational challenges (lack of cooperation, which impeded response effectiveness).
Here, we have discussed these cases in light of the resource based view of the firm (RBV).
I noted above that in Chapter 3 my case studies are translated into teaching cases (designed for
learning through discussion). In a business class, the instructor might prefer to lead student
discussion in light of Accounting Control Theory (ACT), which explains how preventive,
corrective, and detective controls help protect systems in general and also protect specific
information quality attributes. The teaching notes that accompany these cases address ACT, along
with practical incident response models from ISACA, the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering
Institute, and other relevant sources.

Characteristics of Effective InfoSec Incident Responders (Chapter 4)
Chapter 4 reports on a study that examined knowledge, skills and attributes (KSAs) of
effective individual incident responders. Even though many large corporations employ InfoSec
incident response teams (Cunning et al. 2015), there is currently a lack of consensus as to the
KSAs each team member needs to effectively perform his/her job in general, and specialized
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KSAs that need to be represented on the response team. To investigate this question, I conducted
two Repertory Grid (RepGrid) studies.
Drawing on the RBV, I conceptualized individual incident responders as possessing
valuable intangible assets (knowledge, character attributes) and capabilities (skills). I first
conducted a pilot RepGrid study in a single organization; the results were presented at HICSS.
Next, I conducted a multi-organization RepGrid study. In both studies I identified useful KSA
clusters that describe effective individual InfoSec incident responders. I did so by conducting a
specialized type of structured interview (prescribed for repertory grid studies) with industry
experts. Each expert identified several specific incident responders with whom they had worked
and described KSAs of each individual through a technique in which they compared individuals
(I would ask, “How are two of these people alike but different from the third?”).
Once the data were collected, I used several analytic techniques to identify clusters of
incident responders who share similar attributes, and through a systematic qualitative process, I
interpreted the data, yielding a manageable set of KSAs and four archetypes of effective incident
responders: balanced high performer, technical leader, project manager, and security specialist.
Interestingly, while technical breadth, oral communication, collaboration, and attention to detail
were the most-mentioned KSAs in the RepGrid interviews, analysis revealed that cognitive (e.g.
threat hunting, distilling information, lateral thinking) and character attributes (e.g. doing the right
thing, level headed, passion for security) were most likely to describe highly effective incident
responders. Surprisingly, no single archetype was more effective than all others (although
“security specialist” was ranked less effective than “balanced high performer”). This result is
consistent with the argument that different incident responder assets and capabilities are needed
to effectively respond to different types of incidents. Some InfoSec incidents occur frequently
(such as patching a system for known vulnerabilities, or – unfortunately – responding to the theft
of an employee laptop), while others occur very infrequently (such as responding to a breach that
affects many systems in multiple countries). Some of the KSAs needed for effective response to
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incidents of low versus high complexity are likely to differ. Certainly, specialized skills are more
likely needed in response to complex and infrequent incidents.
The RepGrid studies explored one category of human resource – the InfoSec incident
responder. The study findings led us to propose that different KSA bundles (archetypes)
complement different type of incidents and response roles. We also propose that responders who
fit different responder archetypes are likely to interact differently with various technical,
organizational, and institutional resources that are available to the InfoSec team. Thus, on an
InfoSec incident response team:
1. Each of an individual responder’s personal resources (in his or her personal KSA
“bundle”) should complement the type of incident or be neutral with respect to
complementarity.
2. Overall, an individual responder’s personal resource bundle should complement the
type or types of incidents to which s/he is assigned.
3. Each team should include some members whose separate personal resources
complement others or can substitute for others; other personal resources can be neutral
with respect to complementarity.
4. The combined bundle of all team members’ resources should complement the type or
types of incidents to which they are assigned.
5. Some teams need to include some members whose personal resources include

specialized skills needed for some low-frequency and/or high-complexity incidents.
By identifying KSAs that every responder should possess, and some specialized skills that
are needed in the team but not needed by every team member, my RepGrid study findings are
consistent with the Theory of Complementary Resources and potentially useful for InfoSec
incident response team managers.
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Future InfoSec Incident Response Research that Builds on Prior Findings
My literature reviews, case studies, and RepGrid studies point to more questions than they
answer; many more studies are needed to produce an evidence base that can imply useful and
comprehensive guidance about effective InfoSec incident response in the context of continual
change in information and communication technologies. To place future InfoSec research in
perspective, it helps to consider the evolution of information and communication technologies
over the past 40 years, and the attendant rise in InfoSec threats.
Many experts point to the August 1981 introduction of the IBM PC as a watershed moment
which ushered in the era of business end-user computing (Porter and Gogan 1988). Equipped
with the first electronic spreadsheet products (VisiCalc, then Lotus 123 and eventually Microsoft
Excel), as well as word processing, database management, and presentation software, the PC
spread rapidly to every business function in nearly every industry. Later, email turned the
“personal” computer into a must-own device for interpersonal connectivity. Over time, end-user
computing revolutionized how managers and employees work and interact with customers,
business partners, and other stakeholders (Blinder 2000; O’Reilly 2011). However, the PC (and
subsequent generations of user devices and software) also introduced new InfoSec risks, such as
computer viruses. A watershed InfoSec moment was November 2, 1988 – the day Robert Tappan
Morris unleashed the so-called Morris Worm, which caused (he claims inadvertently) the first
widespread denial-of-service attack.
Today, 89% of U.S. families have a computer in their household (Nielsen Scarborough
2015) and 28% of the worldwide population own one or more device/s capable of accessing the
Internet (Kende 2016). By 2008, more devices connected to the Internet than there were people
on earth (Cisco 2016). This trend of interconnectivity continues, as “smart connected products”
increase exponentially (Porter and Heppelmann 2015). By 2016 the amount of data generated by
devices communicating with one another had reportedly exceeded human-generated data (Cisco
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2016; Moran 2016). In many industries, inter-connected devices are already critical to business
operations. Vehicles send mileage information back to dealership systems so that email reminders
can be sent for service. Robots build cars, and self-driving cars are being tested on public roads.
Many devices report their own performance metrics back to data warehouses, and equipment –
ranging from photo copiers to elevators to medical devices – now can order their own service
calls. Such ubiquitous connectivity brings many new InfoSec challenges. Much of the data
flowing across devices and systems is confidential and needs to be protected. When data is
modified due to mistakes or malicious activity, unnecessary expenses are incurred, due to
unnecessary service calls or costly product failures. When data is unavailable when needed, an
outage may occur or a critical service may not be performed. Securing systems and IT-embedded
devices has never been more important for individuals, businesses, or society. The pervasiveness
of the Internet of Things and distributed content delivery systems means that managers must
consider new threats to their business operations (Arruti 2009) and be prepared to respond to
security-related incidents when they occur.
This dissertation builds a foundation, based on RBV, on which future empirical research on
InfoSec incident preparation and response can be conducted. To date, RBV has not been
extensively applied to InfoSec research (Weishäupl et al. 2015). We next outline some future case
studies that, drawing on RBV and the Theory of Complementary Resources, would examine
intra- and inter-organizational InfoSec response coordination and clarify the role of improvisation
in incident response.
Next Steps and Directions for Future Case Studies
Bundling, boundary conditions, compatibility, and substitutability need further
investigation in the context of InfoSec, and a program of case research can contribute well to this
domain. In terms of theory-building, each separate case study is similar to a single experiment
(Yin 2009); to build theory from multiple cases it is necessary to set clear criteria for selecting
additional cases, based on theoretically-important differences or similarities. One approach,
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which categorized resources as Institutional, Organizational, and Technical, proved useful for
analyzing resource bundles in healthcare (Gogan et al. 2013) and InfoSec incident response
(McLaughlin and Gogan 2013). By categorizing incident response assets and capabilities in light
of Teece’s proposed taxonomy (generic, specialized and co-specialized resources), and
considering our ideas about the potential value of substitute resources, a future study could
examine how bundles of complementary, substitutive, neutral, and non-complementary technical,
organizational and institutional assets and capabilities (further categorized as generic, specialized
and co-specialized) affect organizations’ ability to respond to InfoSec incidents of different types
(on a continuum from simple to complex), and to collaborate with other organizations as they
respond to widespread InfoSec incidents.
An immediate next step from this dissertation will be to develop a systematic comparison
of the two incident response case studies presented in Chapter 3. The cases share some
similarities (e.g., each is set in an academic institution) yet the focal incidents differ in level of
complexity and scope of impact. By closely comparing these cases along the lines discussed
above, we hope to shed light on effective deployment of generic, specialized and co-specialized
resources at the individual and team levels, to theorize more deeply about resource
complementarity, and to probe deeper into the contexts and scenarios appropriate for
improvisation versus adherence to highly structured checklists and other scripts. Other case
studies can fruitfully explore how resources are deployed for InfoSec incident response in
different industrial, cultural, and other contexts. For example, both national culture and an
organization’s operational security maturity likely affect how resources are configured and
whether they contribute to an effective InfoSec incident response capability. Thus, future case
sites could be selected according to these (and other) criteria.
Case studies are also an appropriate methodology for further examining improvisation
challenges and opportunities in InfoSec incident response, at the team and company levels of
analysis. At the individual and team levels, early evidence suggests that checklists are useful for
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routine events, but improvisation may be helpful for responding to non-routine incidents (Njenga
and Brown 2012). At the industry level, prior studies have yielded contradictory results regarding
the benefits of adhering to industry standards. In Chapter 2, we note that while organizational
adherence to standard practices is generally beneficial, predictability and interdependency
provide clues about common weaknesses, which attackers can exploit (Hui et al. 2012). More
case studies would be helpful for exploring when it is beneficial to follow protocols and
standards, versus when improvisation by knowledgeable responders is appropriate and helpful.
Case studies are also suitable for investigating issues in inter-organizational collaboration
for InfoSec incident response. Many organizations are reluctant to share information about
InfoSec incidents (Safa and Von Solms 2016; Zietsma et al. 2002). However, organizations face
common problems, and many leaders appear to be reaching the conclusion that collaboration is
the way forward. The need is urgent, because malicious government agencies and other attackers
have infiltrated supply chains, modified hardware components in transit, and injected
vulnerabilities in commonly used open-source libraries. In order to mitigate these threats,
organizations have demanded increased transparency from their vendors, required detailed bills of
material itemizing third party software usage, and demanded increased reporting of security and
validity checks. Likewise, vulnerabilities in standards and protocols such as the Key
Reinstallation Attack against the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) protocol, have led
vendors to collaborate, to modify defective standards while retaining interoperability. The
Industry Consortium for the Advancement of Security on the Internet (ICASI) is one forum that
has established multi-lateral NDA’s so that these discussions can take place. ICASI an dother
organizations recognize that vulnerabilities in third-party software (branded with names such as
Heartbleed, shell shock, ghost, etc.) put all organizations at risk when they are exploited.
My case study on the Titan incident revealed opportunities and challenges in interorganizational collaboration during InfoSec incident response. Future incident response studies
could further investigate how general-purpose and special-purpose technical and human resources
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interact in InfoSec incident contexts of varying levels of complexity, and identify whether and
how inter-organizational collaboration in these incidents is similar to or different from
collaboration under other conditions (such as when organizations collaborate to respond to natural
disasters, collaborate to develop an innovative technology, or collaborate on other initiatives).
Many organizations share best practices and attack trend data through Information Sharing
and Analysis Centers (ISACs). An organization that fails to participate in these forums place
itself and its customers at risk. The 2017 Equifax data breach, for example, exploited a
vulnerability in the Apache struts framework, which was fixed seven months before Equifax
reported the incident (Chirgwin 2017).
In the Titan incident, multiple organizations collaborated to diagnose whether a breach had
occurred and (once this was confirmed) to recover from it. For our case study, we were granted
access to only a few individuals for interviews, so we were not able to take a comprehensive look
at all of the assets and capabilities that were marshaled in response to that incident. Future studies
of inter-organizational collaboration in InfoSec incident response should seek to gather
longitudinal data and from a variety of stakeholder perspectives. Inter-organizational issues
explored in richer detail should yield a deeper understanding of how resources confer value singly
and in bundles and at the individual, team, organization, and inter-organizational levels.
Beyond RepGrid: Future Studies of Incident Responder KSAs
In the Rep Grid studies presented in Chapter 4, each of an individual’s skills and personal
characteristics were conceptualized as assets or capabilities, and we examined bundles of these
resources to identify archetypes of effective responders. Since the effectiveness of an incident
response team is heavily influenced by the skills of its individual members, more research is
needed into incident responder roles and resource bundles that are (or are not) activated and
effectively (or ineffectively) used during actual incident response. Also, future studies could
closely examine institutional, organizational, and technical resources that responders use during
incident response, and such studies should provide more insight into how and why incident
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response is embodied in practice. Overall, a deeper understanding of assets and capabilities (alone
and in combination, and with complementary, substitutive, neutral or non-complementary
effects), will allow firms to better manage complex threats to InfoSec. Other future research
directions are laid out in Chapter 4.

Increase InfoSec Research Methods Diversity
I argue in Chapter 2 that to achieve greater methodological diversity in InfoSec research
studies can make greater use of heretofore underutilized research methods. RepGrid is one such
method; it is heavily used in some other disciplines but only lightly used in IS research. In
Chapter 4, I describe my RepGrid study, including demonstrating how qualitatively coded data
and advanced machine learning analysis provide complementary perspectives to reveal new
insights. My RepGrid studies answer the need for greater methodological diversity in IS research,
confirm previous studies that claimed incident response role is becoming a specialized role, shed
light on characteristics of individuals who perform this important role, and lay a foundation for
future studies. As a follow-on to this dissertation, I plan to prepare a paper that can serve as a
tutorial for conducting RepGrid studies supported by automated tools.
Vignette-based experiments also have not been used extensively in InfoSec incident
response research. In a vignette-based experiment, subjects (who could be organizational leaders,
InfoSec response team leaders, or individual contributors) would be presented with scenarios of
incidents, using a simple 2x2 experimental design to control for independent variables of (for
example) incident severity (high, low) and scope (organizational, inter-organizational). In an
experiment, individual contributors or InfoSec team leaders could have virtual access to a variety
of resources from which they would be prompted to select a set number of resources (from lists
that include generic, specialized and co-specialized resources and/or technical, administrative and
institutional resources) they would want to utilize for responding to each type of incident. This
design would reveal how these employees perceive the usefulness of various tangible and
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intangible assets and capabilities, under different contextual conditions. Vignette-based
experiments with senior managers could manipulate variables such as whether an NDA is in place
to govern information sharing, whether there is public awareness of a particular vulnerability; and
whether a vulnerability has already been actively exploited by attackers. Other experiments could
examine individuals’ propensity to improvise vs. adherence to checklists in responding to routine
vs non-routine events and events of high vs low urgency.
Studies based on critical incident technique (CIT, in which subjects recall episodes with
extremely positive or extremely negative outcomes) could also be helpful. CIT is suitable for
examining behavior and attitudes. Some CIT studies rely on direct observations of individual
behavior, and others rely on retrospective accounts of subjects’ own or others’ behavior, elicited
through structured interviews or surveys. A CIT study has three main elements: elicit critical
incident reports, select reports for analysis (based on strict criteria, laid out in Gogan et al.
(2014)), conduct analysis. Selection of incident reports involves applying a filter, so as to retain
those reports which offer a complete description with clear evidence of a direct positive or
negative outcome. Interpretive or positivist analysis codes CI reports from many respondents into
themes and sub-themes (open coding for interpretive analysis; hypothesis-based coding for
positivist analysis). Incident responders could be asked to describe specific “critical” InfoSec
incidents – ones in which the responder believes the outcome was particularly effective or
particularly ineffective. A theory-testing positivist CIT study could articulate hypotheses and
gather evidence about responders’ use of checklists vs improvisation in routine versus nonroutine InfoSec incidents. An interpretive CIT study might elicit rich descriptions of remediation
activities and resource utilization in responding to high-profile vulnerabilities (such as Heartbleed
or the WannaCry ransomware campaign).
While attitudinal surveys are heavily used in InfoSec research in general, six of the thirteen
incident response studies used qualitative methods. One plausible explanation for this is that
incident response involves a complex interplay of multiple factors, which cannot be easily
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explained via surveys or experiments (Sundaramurthy et al. 2014). However, there is room for
further survey-based research directed at investigating incident response resource choices and
challenges. For example, in Chapter 4, I suggest that some archetypes may be better suited for
specific incident response roles. A survey could help investigate this relationship. Another survey
could build on Chen et. al (2014) and Njenga and Brown (2012), who indicate that structured
checklists are useful for routine events, whereas non-routine incidents benefit from a higher level
of improvisation. In order to better understand how different archetypes of incident responders
(resource bundles based on knowledge, skills and attributes) interact with other technical,
organizational or institutional resources, it would be helpful to flesh out the questions:
•

Do particular incident response roles complement particular archetypes?

•

Is a particular incident response role more likely to rely on improvisation?

•

Is a particular archetype more likely to rely on improvisation?

A survey of incident responders employed in many companies would attempt to answer
these questions. First, the survey would ask the respondent to think of a peer (to eliminate self
presentation bias) who is also an InfoSec incident responder, and then to rate how well each
characteristic defined in chapter 4 describes that peer. Answers to these questions would allow
me to identify the extent to which each peer fits my archetypes (or other archetypes not yet
revealed). The survey would also ask if the peer fills a particular role (such as forensics analyst,
reverse engineer, project manager, SOC analyst, high-profile incident responder, or general
manager). Last, the survey would ask the respondent to report on whether and to what extent the
peer they described tends to follow a checklist, improvise, or both when performing particular
response tasks (such as diagnosing whether a breach has occurred, and the scope of the breach) in
particular response situations (such as routine versus non-routine incidents).
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Conclusion
Each of the three chapters that follow has a distinct goal, but the studies described are
interrelated and complementary. The InfoSec literature review in Chapter 2 demonstrates a need
for greater methodological diversity in InfoSec research, and reveals that InfoSec incident
response is a promising but nascent topic, both in prominent IS journals (the AIS Senior Scholars
Basket of Eight Journals) and in other IS journals. Two incident response case studies (which I
explained above in light of resource theories at the organizational level of analysis) are translated
in Chapter 3 into teaching cases that can support student learning. In Chapter 4, I apply RBV and
the Theory of Complementary Resources to the individual level, by investigating separate
knowledge, skills and attributes and identifying sets of these resources that characterize several
different types of responders (InfoSec responder archetypes). By closely examining human
resources (a subset of organizational resources) in incident response, I laid a foundation on which
further studies can build, by examining how incident responders’ characteristics complement one
another and whether and how they complement other technical, organizational and institutional
resources.
Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation shed light on effective InfoSec incident
response, demonstrate the value of studies informed by RBV and the Theory of Complementary
Resources, and provide a useful foundation for future studies that aim to contribute to an
extended Theory of InfoSec Response Capability.
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CHAPTER 2 AN INFOSEC LITERATURE REVIEW IN THE BASKET
Versions of this chapter appear in the following conferences proceedings or journals:
McLaughlin, M., Gogan, J. L. (2014). “InfoSec in a Basket, 2004-2013.” 20th Americas
Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), Savannah, GA.
McLaughlin, M., Gogan, J. L. (2017). “How does InfoSec Research Published in Prominent IS
Journals Help the CIO and Board of Directors?” Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences (HICSS), Waikoloa, HI.
McLaughlin, M., and Gogan, J. L. (2018). “Challenges and Best Practices in Information
Security Management,” MIS Quarterly Executive (17:3).
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Introduction
Eight prominent journals make up the AIS Senior Scholars Basket (EJIS, JAIS, JIT, JMIS,
JSIS, ISJ, ISR, MISQ). IS scholars read these journals, along with specialty journals relevant to
their interests (e.g., Computers & Security, Decision Support Systems, International Journal of
Electronic Commerce). Scholars also follow citation trails back to seminal works, skim papers
presented at IS conferences like AMCIS, ECIS, PACIS, HICSS, and ICIS, and stay abreast of
relevant work in reference disciplines such as computer science, management or sociology.
Topical and methodological diversity are key strengths of information systems (IS)
research. To the extent that an IS sub-field (such as InfoSec) employs varied methods to examine
various topics, it can claim strength through diversity. This systematic review of 125 InfoSec
studies, published in the Basket from 2004-2016, summarizes key practitioner-relevant findings,
topics, theories tested or proposed, and methods used. Specifically, I aimed to answer the
following research questions:
RQ1.

What key findings from InfoSec academic research are relevant to practitioners?

RQ2.

What InfoSec topics were addressed?

RQ3.

What methods (quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods) did the studies use?

RQ4.

To what extent do Basket journals vary in terms of InfoSec topics and methods?

The studies in my review yielded findings relevant to InfoSec management across several
interrelated tasks: InfoSec prevention, preparation, detection, and response. It also reveals that
InfoSec researchers have employed a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods to study a
variety of topics, yet there are opportunities to apply underutilized methods to study some topics.
For example, topics related to organizational/managerial and inter-organizational InfoSec
opportunities and challenges are understudied. I conclude that InfoSec research is maturing, yet
abundant opportunities still exist for new studies that will build stronger theories with helpful
implications for InfoSec practice.
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This chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss prior reviews and explain why a new
systematic review is needed. I then explain my method for finding, classifying, and analyzing
relevant research. I answer the four research questions noted above and discuss implications. In
the final section, I offer suggestions for investigating understudied InfoSec topics and making use
of underutilized empirical methods.

Early InfoSec Research and Prior InfoSec Literature Reviews
Foundational studies on InfoSec were largely focused on the organizational use of controls
(or, countermeasures) to influence user behavior – specifically to prevent the abuse or misuse of
computing resources from organizational insiders (Boss 2007; Straub 1990). Drawing a parallel
between computer abuse and crime, early researchers turned to theories of criminology in an
attempt to understand how users are influenced to comply with rules governing computer use.
Specifically, the rational choice perspective (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cornish and Clarke 1986)
offered a view where users weigh the benefits or rewards they receive from misusing computing
resources with the risks of getting caught. Drawing on classical deterrence theory, researchers
focused on the consequences of getting caught and proposed that users are more likely not to
misuse IS resources if punishment for violations is severe, certain, and dispensed soon after the
violation occurs (Straub and Collins 1990; Straub and Welke 1998). These deterrence-based
studies have been extended and continue to yield conflicting results (D’Arcy and Herath 2011).
More recent work that has used deterrence theory in the InfoSec domain has also considered the
role of informal sanctions (e.g., shame, moral beliefs) in deterring illicit computing behavior
(D’Arcy and Devaraj 2012; Siponen and Vance 2010).
Many of the early deterrence studies in InfoSec were conducted before dedicated
information security policies were common. Recent studies have largely focused on policy
compliance (Cram et al. 2017), moving away from a perspective that views users as criminals to a
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view of users as organizational members who need to be steered toward compliant security
behavior.
After reviewing seminal articles in InfoSec, the first step of my review was to identify
prior InfoSec literature reviews published in the Basket since 2000. Four reviews were identified;
none restricted its scope to the Basket. No review specified a detailed method or study selection
criteria, so it was difficult to ascertain whether these reviews were complete in their coverage.
Two InfoSec reviews (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; Siponen 2005) concluded with calls
for interpretive field studies. Dhillon and Backhouse classified 11 studies based on a framework
(Burrell and Morgan 1979) which pits a “subjective-objective” dimension versus a “regulationradical change” dimension, yielding four classes of research methodologies:
•

Functionalist: concerned with regulation and control of all organizational affairs

•

Interpretive: considering “social reality as a network of assumptions and intersubjectively shared meanings”

•

Radical Humanist: exploring “structural conflicts and modes of domination”

•

Radical Structuralist: focused on “transformation of structures”
That review reported that InfoSec research had thus far emphasized functionalist methods,

and some studies used interpretive methods. It concluded that prior studies (dating back to 1976)
were overly focused on “formalized rule structures in designing security,” and had given
insufficient attention to human interactions, patterns of behavior and meanings associated with
the actions of individuals. According to Dhillon and Backhouse (2001):
… traditional evaluation methods can be useful in assessing the extent of security, but a
corporate strategy to prevent the occurrence of negative events cannot be based on the
highly structured security evaluation criteria. … A socio-organizational perspective is
the way forward if security of information systems is to be achieved. (p. 147)
Siponen (2005), similarly asserting that prior InfoSec research had yielded insufficient
evidence of the efficacy of traditional formal methods such as checklists, standards, maturity
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criteria, and risk management, called for “rigorous qualitative and quantitative empirical studies,
which explore the usability and relevance of the traditional ISS methods in practice. (p. 313)”
Two more-recent reviews focused on employee InfoSec attitudes and behavior. D’Arcy
and Herath (2011), in EJIS, offered several explanations for why deterrence theory has received
mixed support in an extensive body of research. They called for further investigations of five
potential moderating variables; argued that methodological consistency would be helpful; and
proposed that researchers relying on deterrence theory needed to consider employee perceptions
of beneficial aspects of non-compliant employee behavior (e.g., convenience or efficiency).
Willison and Warkentin (2013), also considering deterrence theory, concluded that researchers
“need to consider the thought processes of the potential offender and how these are influenced by
the organizational context prior to deterrence. (p. 14)” They proposed that new studies should
focus on intentional or malicious employee computer abuse and be informed by theories of
organizational justice and neutralization.
Thus far, no published InfoSec review has claimed thorough coverage of the mostprominent IS journals. This need is answered in this comprehensive review of 125 InfoSec papers
published between 2004 and 2016 in the Basket.

Review Method
It is important to use an explicit process to conduct a literature review, but it is not
necessary to claim that all extant studies have been found (Levy and Ellis 2006). The objective of
my review was to fully capture InfoSec studies published in the Basket in the past thirteen years
(between 2004 and 2016 4). This systematic review identified 125 papers via both manual and
automated searches conducted in two phases. First, I read the abstracts of every paper published
in the Scholars Basket from 2004 to 2013, identifying 95 papers. I also conducted an automated

4

I started my literature review in 2014, and similar to many other reviews, chose to focus on a ten-year time span
(2004 – 2013). Since then, I added coverage of research produced in 2014, 2015 and 2016.
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search for the word fragments “secur”, “attack”, “hack”, “vulnerabilit”, “insider”, “threat”,
“protection”, and “abuse.” This yielded 121 additional papers, I read their abstracts and found
that 111 papers reported on studies of “social security”, “financial security exchanges”, “insider
trading”, or other aspects that were obviously not InfoSec related; these papers were eliminated.
Prior literature reviews (discussed above) were not included in the count, nor were editorials or
commentaries.
After reporting initial review findings at AMCIS (McLaughlin and Gogan 2014), I updated
the review set, to identify additional empirical studies published between 2013 and 2016; this
yielded 30 papers. The chair of my dissertation committee and I then separately assessed all
papers in the set and recorded our findings for subsequent reconciliation and discussion. A
candidate paper was not eliminated from the review database unless both of us marked it
independently for deletion or came to a consensus when one thought it should be removed. In this
way, false positives were identified and removed (e.g., August and Tunca (ISR, 2013) included
the word “security” in a footnote explaining support services but did not otherwise directly
address an InfoSec topic. Dinev et al. (JSIS, 2008) used the word “security” to mean “safety” and
in the context of “Homeland Security” but did not otherwise directly address InfoSec topics). We
then judged 20 candidate papers which mentioned InfoSec topics in the context of other topics,
such as online trust or privacy concerns. Through discussion, we reached consensus about each of
these papers, applying the criterion that if an InfoSec construct is but one of many independent
variables or treated as a mediator, moderator, or control variable, it was classified as treating
InfoSec as a “secondary” topic. We further checked author-supplied keywords for these papers.
Of these 20 candidate papers, three (Kim 2008; Pavlou et al. 2007; Wakefield 2013) included
“security” in the list of keywords, but after extensive discussion, we agreed that InfoSec was a
secondary topic. We list these 20 “InfoSec is Secondary” papers in Appendix 2-1. The 125 papers
in the final review set (see Appendix 2-2) focused exclusively on InfoSec issues and/or treated
InfoSec constructs as dependent variables.
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Each paper was classified according to its primary research topic, using the following
categories:
1. Individual: Papers primarily focused on individual InfoSec attitudes, intentions, or
behavior. This category is further subdivided into “Inside” (per Willison and Backhouse
(2006) and D’Arcy et al. (2009) who define an “insider” as an employee, contractor or
other party who has authorized access to an organization’s systems and data), and “User”
(all other studies that focused on individual attitudes, intentions or behavior, including
consumers shopping online or “users” not precisely defined).
2. Organizational: Studies focused on managerial issues such as InfoSec policies, tactics,
and incident response.
3. Inter-organizational: Studies focused on security standards-setting, inter-organizational
coordination during incident response, security issues related to inter-organizational
information sharing, etc.
4. Economic: Papers that self-identified as in the information economics stream of research
or that focused on quantitative data more heavily than on managerial behavior when
addressing questions such as optimal InfoSec investment levels for a firm or market
reactions to events such as security breaches or vulnerability disclosures.
5. Technical: Studies examining the design of, or factors related to, effectiveness of
security tools (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection systems), or technical aspects of
incorporating security features in software applications.
6. Other: Papers addressing InfoSec issues at a societal, philosophic, ontological or other
perspective that could not otherwise be classified into the prior categories.
The chair of my dissertation committee and I independently coded the papers per the above
criteria. Some studies focused on multiple categories; however, it was usually possible to identify
a primary focus by considering the study’s dependent variables. Paper Introduction sections
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usually discussed why InfoSec is an important topic, but we did not use the “so what?” research
justification to identify a study’s focal topic. A paper’s Conclusions section might also tie a study
to broader security concerns, but this, too, is not a reliable indicator of a study’s primary focus.
With those considerations in mind, our independent reviews reached identical conclusions for 115
of the 125 papers. We discussed the remaining 10 papers until we reached agreement.
Next, we classified each study by research method, using an approach adapted from
Galliers (1991); see Table 2-1.
Method

Subjective Argument
Design Science
Action Research
Case
Qual
Survey
Model
Experiment
Quant
Mixed Methods

Description

offer propositions based on a critical literature review, but stop short of providing either a
mathematical model or empirical data
studies reporting on the design of a prototype InfoSec system
studies in which the researcher was a participant
critical, ethnographic, interpretive or positivist case study (single case, embedded cases, or
multiple cases)
other qualitative methods, such as field interviews not associated with case studies,
discourse analysis, critical incident technique, or textual classification
attitude surveys administered to employees, IS professionals, managers, or computer users
in general
theorem proofs, simulations using synthetic data, models using synthetic or real data.
lab, field, or natural experiment
other quantitative method (e.g. event studies, analysis of field data, etc.)
While some authors argue that a study should not be considered mixed methods unless it
combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches, we took a more liberal view and
included any combination of the above-listed research methods in a single study.

Table 2-1: Descriptions of Methods
Another useful classification scheme was adopted from ACT to describe each study’s
practical relevance. This framework is discussed in the next section.

Key Findings: A Practitioner Relevant Framework
Prevent, Prepare, Detect, Respond
Figure 2-1 illustrates five interconnected aspects of InfoSec governance and control. Every
organization needs policies and controls that aim to prevent InfoSec incidents of various kinds,
and every organization needs to prepare for the InfoSec incidents that will nonetheless occur;
100% prevention is impossible. Controls and policies are needed to rapidly detect potentiallyharmful InfoSec incidents, and people in various roles need to know how to quickly respond
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when incidents do occur. In designing strong response processes, the aim is to minimize negative
impacts to operations, employees, customers, and business partners in the immediate aftermath of
an incident (McLaughlin and Gogan 2017). The term “response” does not connote continuous
improvement of an organization’s security posture. In an important, separate post-response
learning process, the response team and key stakeholders may participate in a debriefing exercise
to share what was learned about likely causes of the incident, strengths and weaknesses of the
response process itself, and how to design better systems and processes to avoid or cope with
future such incidents

Figure 2-1: Interconnected InfoSec Policies and Controls
In the next section, my discussion starts with the rightmost small/shallow research streams
(InfoSec Incident Detection and Response). I do this to guard against the possibility that deeper
dives into the two larger research streams – Preparation and Prevention – would otherwise cause
some readers to overlook the important implications emerging from these smaller/shallower
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research streams. And, by saving InfoSec Incident Preparation for last, I am able to conclude with
strong managerial implications.

Lit Review Findings: How do Organizations Respond to InfoSec Incidents?
Many experts advocate the use of checklists that specify every step incident responders
should take in response to specific triggering events. However, a case study (Njenga and Brown
2012) instead found that although responders did followed guidelines, they also improvised to a
great extent. The challenge for the CIO is to decide, for his/her company, in its particular industry
context: What is the right balance of adherence to protocol versus improvisation? How do various
IT tools and policies enforce adherence to protocol, and in what ways do they constrain
responders from doing the right thing? When is improvisation adaptive, and under what
conditions is it maladaptive? Thus far, no other study in my review set has addressed these
questions. This reveals a large gap in the literature; further research is needed to chronicle actual
response procedures and challenges and to identify contextual and other variables that affect
response effectiveness. We turn next to research on InfoSec incident detection.

How do Organizations Detect InfoSec Incidents?
How to accurately, completely, and cost-effectively detect breaches early enough to limit
harm from them? In my review set this, too, was a small research stream.
Research Focused on InfoSec Incident Detection
Main Focus

Main Lessons Learned

Improve breach detection tools.
Configure the InfoSec defense architecture.
Use a layered defense-in-depth approach.

Table 2-2: Research Focus in Incident Detection Papers
Fake web sites lure gullible users who willingly supply passwords and personal
information. Statistical learning theory has been applied to software for detecting fake web sites
(Abbasi et al. 2010). Other approaches use linguistic analysis to recognize genre-specific patterns
(Abbasi et al. 2015; Zahedi et al. 2015) and “language action cues” (Lee et al. 2016). This young
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stream of research has not yet yielded definitive guidance on best practices for detecting fake web
sites.
Given that anti-malware software (which detects software viruses and other forms of
malicious code) is an important tool in an organization’s detection arsenal, it is important for
managers to consider whether the developers use best practices to create and maintain highquality anti-malware software. In general, prior software development experience is a useful
foundation for producing high-quality anti-viral software that rapidly detects malware. Prior
experience with a variety of software products helps a developer produce malware detection
products for general consumption, while deep within-family experience helps a developer
produce software that accurately detects targeted attacks (Kim and Kim 2014).
Accurate anti-malware is important because false alarms are expensive and disruptive.
Thus, organizations seek an optimal balance of rapid detection and high accuracy (Yue et al.
2007, p. 350). New work is underway to design “artificial immune systems” (Wong et al. 2012)
that fend off attacks, and other studies consider incident detection in light of an organization’s
broader InfoSec defense posture. Since no single detective control is perfect, a layered “defensein-depth” security configuration is advised. This approach relies on helpful redundancy: if an
upstream control fails to detect a threat, a control further downstream should block it. Some
research suggests this approach does improve detection (Kumar et al. 2008). From a resource
perspective (discussed above in Chapter 1), a redundant downstream control is a valuable
substitute resource.
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How do Organizations Prevent InfoSec Incidents?
Two broad sub-streams address InfoSec incident prevention: those that focus on unsafe
user behavior, and those that focus on technical solutions.
Research Focused on InfoSec Incident Prevention
Main Focus

Main Lessons Learned

Persuade “weak link” employees to comply with safe computing policies.
Design more secure software, databases, and new InfoSec tools.
Reward good InfoSec behavior, punish very bad behavior
Clearly specify which InfoSec policies and practices are mandatory
Train and educate employees and appeal to higher values
Beyond encryption: stay up-to-date on quantitative techniques to protect data
Use layered-defense-in-depth controls, but don’t rely too heavily on them.
Use checklists/models to guide secure development (e.g., SIS, SSCIOBP, SARC).
Encourage employee participation

Table 2-3: Research Focus in Incident Prevention Papers
Employees are the “weakest link,” due to their unsafe and (sometimes) malicious behavior
(Arce 2003). Why do users behave in ways that threaten their own and their organizations’
information security? How can managers get employees and business partners to comply with
InfoSec policies, rules, and guidelines (use of strong passwords, access controls, rules about
sharing confidential data, etc.), and how can employees be deterred from engaging in prohibited
behaviors? Studies addressing this last question have roots in a criminology theory of
“deterrence,” which claims that if an individual recognizes that wrong-doing will be certainly,
quickly, and harshly punished, he will not engage in prohibited behaviors. Unfortunately, some
employees, partners and customers are not deterred (D’Arcy and Herath 2011; Willison and
Warkentin 2013). Even well-intended users take short cuts. Misinformed or gullible users might
believe they are complying with strict InfoSec policies, yet fall prey to phishing or other
malicious social engineering attack.
“Mandatory” InfoSec rules, combined with surveillance, might improve user compliance to
some extent (Boss et al. 2009), yet this approach may clash with an organization’s cultural norms
and expectations. Beliefs about fairness (or procedural, interpersonal, informational, and
distributive justice) (Adams 1965) might affect employees’ InfoSec policy compliance more
strongly than threatened penalties (Li et al. 2014). Some users react negatively to orders that
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threaten their sense of freedom or autonomy (Lowry et al. 2015; Lowry and Moody 2015). Users
might comply with InfoSec rules if they know audit logs can track their online behavior (Vance et
al. 2013), and if they feel pressure to justify their attitudes and behaviors to authority figures
(Tetlock 1983). Visible managerial support for InfoSec rules might improve employee
compliance, particularly if reinforced via four system features: user identifiability, awareness of
monitoring, expectation of being evaluated, and social presence (awareness that our behavior can
be observed) (Vance et al. 2015).
Employees who understand how to correctly use a protective tool are more likely to use it,
and well-written InfoSec policies are more effective than ambiguous ones (Goel and ChengalurSmith 2010). Awareness training that is seen as personally relevant and fits one’s learning style
and existing knowledge is more effective (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010) and informal peer
training improves users’ ability to use protective tools and their willingness to comply with
InfoSec policies (Karjalainen and Siponen 2011; Warkentin et al. 2011). Men and women differ
in their InfoSec attitudes (Foth 2016) and might be influenced by different patterns of reward,
punishment, and education.
An individual encountering a risky situation engages in two thought processes: threat
appraisal (How severe is this threat? How likely is it to occur?) and coping appraisal (ability to
use each countermeasure) (Foth 2016). Perceived ease of use and ability to cope apparently
contribute to an individual’s acceptance and use of productivity software (e.g. spreadsheets), but
not necessarily to acceptance and use of protective security software (e.g., anti-virus software)
(Dinev and Hu 2007). One theory suggests that a user needs to first judge the probability of a
particular threat (e.g., software virus, ransomware, or other potentially unwanted program (PUP))
before considering whether s/he can effectively cope with it by using anti-viral or anti-spyware
software (Liang and Xue 2009, 2010), email authentication (Herath et al. 2014), or other
protective tools. Thus, although coping appraisal does seem to influence user compliance with
InfoSec rules, merely being aware of particular InfoSec risks (threat appraisals) does not
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guarantee correct user behavior (Herath and Rao 2009). Industry norms also play a role; senior
managers with strong IS expertise and working in an IT-related industry are more aware of
malware threats and more likely to know how to use anti-malware software (Lee and Larsen
2009).
Users generally respond more positively to messages emphasizing positive outcomes of
InfoSec policy compliance, rather than emphasizing penalties for non-compliance (Anderson and
Agarwal 2010). Whether or not such messages are conveyed, people judge strong password use
and other protective practices along three dimensions: compliance difficulty, criticality, and
common sense (Posey et al. 2013). Rewards can improve InfoSec policy compliance (Bulgurcu et
al. 2010; Liang et al. 2013). However, since rewards can be costly, a combination of penalties and
rewards (“carrot” and “stick”) might be necessary. Policies and sanctions, combined with positive
social influence and training for improved self-efficacy, do succeed in some contexts (Chen et al.
2012; Guo et al. 2011; Johnston and Warkentin 2010). Fear deters some bad behavior (Boss et al.
2015) – both fear of InfoSec attacks (especially “dreadful” threats; (Wang, Xiao, et al. 2015) and
fear of being punished for non-compliance (Johnston et al. 2015).
Some people are more susceptible to phishing than others; why? Attacker influence
techniques include “liking,” social proof, scarcity, and reciprocity (Wright et al. 2014). A
confident computer user who has experienced computer attacks in the past is aware of specific
InfoSec threats, and is also generally suspicious may resist “phishy” e-mails; however, being
aware of attack likelihood is not much help (Wright and Marett 2010). Employee commitment to
the organization might influence their ability to recognize relevant InfoSec threats (Posey et al.
2015). Two personality “meta-traits” – Stability and Plasticity – are said to influence compliance
(Johnston et al. 2016), but more studies are needed to reach conclusions about this. Psychologists
agree on only a very few stable personality traits; specific situations likely influence users’
specific attitudes and behaviors more than personality.
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Why don’t employees just do the “right” thing? Apparently, moral values have only a weak
influence on users’ InfoSec attitudes (Chatterjee et al. 2014; Myyry et al. 2009); I do not yet
know how to reliably ensure that a given employee will fully comply with an InfoSec policy. If,
in a given context, most people view non-compliance as morally acceptable, a particular user
might be deterred if he believes he will get caught. If non-compliance is considered reprehensible
by many employees, then a given user may be more heavily influenced by the prospect of severe
penalties than by the likelihood of getting caught (D’Arcy et al. 2009). If expected benefits of
non-compliance are high, some users will engage in risky behavior (Tow et al. 2010). Both local
social norms and national culture also reportedly influence user compliance a great deal (Chen
and Zahedi 2016; Dinev et al. 2009).
Criminologists report that wrongdoers rationalize their bad behavior (“neutralize” it) via
five cognitive techniques: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim,
condemnation of condemners, appeals to higher loyalties (Siponen and Vance 2010; Sykes and
Matza 1957). If a specific InfoSec policy conflicts with an employee’s deeply-held values, that
individual is more likely to violate that policy (D’Arcy, Herath, et al. 2014). And, beware of
disgruntled employees; they are more likely to both violate InfoSec policies and rationalize their
bad behavior (Wang, Gupta, et al. 2015).
Case studies exploring InfoSec attitudes and behaviors at work have yielded intriguing but
varied findings. At a company in North America, InfoSec training was more effective when
customized for particular work groups (Vaast 2007). At a Taiwanese firm, some work practices
and routines encouraged compliance, while other practices discouraged it (Hsu 2009). At the UK
National Health Service (Stahl et al. 2012), senior managers encouraged creation of InfoSec
policies, but users interpreted them variously (similar to Vaast 2007), which limited their
effectiveness for guiding or controlling behavior. In Korea (Hsu et al. 2012) and Taiwan (Hsu et
al. 2015) effective managers influenced informal InfoSec norms, but in Greece, conflicting
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InfoSec priorities led to a weaker security posture (Tsohou et al. 2015). These studies reveal that
successful InfoSec management is not easily achieved.
Another managerial challenge is how to clearly communicate strong ethical values related
to information privacy and security. Analysis of the TJ Maxx data breach led (Culnan and
Williams 2009) to advise managers to make it a priority to create a culture of privacy, ensure
accountability, and avoid decoupling InfoSec practices and policies. Other studies reveal that
InfoSec controls may be more effective if users help to prioritize, analyze, design, implement,
test, and monitor them (Spears and Barki 2010), and that explicitly linking user values to best
practices may work better than strict rules and penalties (Hedström et al. 2011). A Value-Based
Compliance Assessment method advises managers to take stock of employee attitudes towards
existing policies before introducing new ones (Kolkowska et al. 2016).
Although our attitudes and behavior are greatly influenced by people with whom we
interact, users also interact with, and respond directly to, specific InfoSec tools. For example, it is
clear that, given a choice most people will avoid using a strong password because it is difficult to
recall (Zhang et al. 2009). Passphrases (sentences) are demonstrably easier to remember and use
(Keith et al. 2009), but unfortunately, typing a sentence is problematic on many mobile devices.
Users who thus experience frustrating login failures soon replace strong passwords with weaker
ones (Steinbart et al. 2016).
New methods are allowing behavioral researchers to triangulate more strongly on
supporting evidence and to open new paths of inquiry. For example, a small new stream of neuro
IS research tells us that users’ stated InfoSec attitudes are consistent with physiological evidence
(Vance et al. 2014), and that some individuals are “wired” (neurologically speaking) for lower
versus higher InfoSec self-control (Hu et al. 2014). Studies also suggest that some “fear appeals”
(messages describing cyber-attacks and their consequences) do not actually elicit fear (Warkentin
et al. 2016), and that sending a variety of warning messages will capture a user’s attention better
than simply repeating the same message (Anderson et al. 2016).
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Since no silver bullet fully controls unpredictable human beings, other InfoSec researchers
are working to prevent InfoSec incidents by designing more secure tools and methods. Attackers
know how to reconstruct personally-identifiable information from redacted data sets, so
researchers are working to securely de-identify data while retaining statistical properties for
unrestricted analysis. In a small specialized research stream, various statistical obfuscation
techniques have been developed to swap data values (Garfinkel et al. 2007; Li and Sarkar 2006,
2011, 2014; Melville and McQuaid 2012).
Other research is working on how best to incorporate security into software applications
during their initial design. Secure Information Systems (SIS) design theory (Siponen et al. 2006)
specifies six requirements:
1. Develop security features that resist … threats …;
2. Reflect customer’s security requirements;
3. Provide abstract representation and operations for specifying three essential elements –
threats, objects and security features – for three levels of abstraction: organizational,
conceptual, technical;
4. Integrate SIS into normal information systems development;
5. Enable the autonomy of developers; and
6. Adapt to forthcoming information systems development methods.
Similar methods have been devised to incorporate security into databases (e.g., a UMLbased Access Control and Audit model for secure multidimensional data warehouses); see
(Fernández-Medina et al. 2007). Inter-organizational data sharing may benefit from a Semantic
Approach to Secure Collaborative Inter-Organizational eBusiness Processes (SSCIOBP);
(D’Aubeterre et al. 2008a) and a Secure Activity Resource Coordination model (SARC);
(D’Aubeterre et al. 2008b). A systematic “privacy by design” problem representation structure
purportedly supports analysis of shared-data privacy requirements.
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To summarize prior research on InfoSec Incident Prevention: employees remain the weak
link in the InfoSec chain. Organizations cannot reliably deter problematic user behavior merely
by imposing penalties, and managers should not count on fallible human users. It seems the best
policy is to require and reward compliance and punish significant acts of non-compliance.
Appeals to higher values might also help, and well-written policies and customized educational
campaigns can reduce InfoSec violations and prevent breaches or mistakes – particularly if
training aligns with work practices, formal and informal norms, and employees’ prior knowledge.
New tools and methods protect data and systems and help organizations design security elements
into software and databases. Each technical element in an organization’s InfoSec architecture –
such as a firewall – should be assessed, both on its own and in conjunction with each other
element, so as to avoid either over-investing or under-investing in InfoSec capabilities and tools
(Cavusoglu et al. 2009). The good news is that investments in prevention do significantly reduce
data breaches (Kwon and Johnson 2014). The bad news? No study has ever been able to identify
a silver bullet that guarantees full prevention.

How do Organizations Prepare to Handle InfoSec Incidents?
With attacks on the rise, the CIO needs to frequently inform the CEO and Board about
incidents and near-misses that occur, and organizations need to prepare for the InfoSec incidents
that will continue to occur. In the InfoSec Incident Preparation stream, studies investigate:
•

What motivates attackers?

•

How do investors react to news about InfoSec investments and incidents?

•

How much should organizations spend on InfoSec preparedness?

•

What is known about InfoSec preparedness planning?

The review reveals that no one-size-fits-all rule helps organizations decide how much to
spend on InfoSec. In fact, guidance is confusing; managerial implications suggested by one study
are contradicted by other ones.
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Research on How Organizations Prepare to Handle InfoSec Incidents
Main Focus

Main Lessons Learned

Identify and quantify InfoSec threats, to justify InfoSec investments and priorities
Plan response tactics
(employees, hackers, cyber-criminals, cyber-terrorists, cyber-spies, cyber-warfare)
Develop and rehearse response procedures
Buy cyber-insurance
Write better contracts with MSSPs

Table 2-4: Research Focus in Incident Preparation Papers
Risk assessment, an important element in preparation, involves identifying and quantifying
likely threats and their impacts. However, managers often find themselves in the position where
there are insufficient resources to prepare for every conceivable threat. A common approach to
prioritizing preparation activities is to focus on the probability that a particular event may occur
(its likelihood) and the potential financial and other impacts of that event. The CIO should
prioritize efforts on preparing for the most probable events with the highest potential damages.
This is shown in Figure 2-2 below:

Figure 2-2: Prioritization Matrix for Preparation Activities
In discussing incident prevention above, I focused on deterring employees from engaging
in unsafe practices. How to deter attackers? This is a contentious issue. Incident disclosures do
not necessarily deter attackers (Wang et al. 2013). Some attackers apparently target those
organizations that under-spend on protective controls (Cremonini and Nizovtsev 2010), leading to
suggestions that high-value firms should spend more heavily on InfoSec, and that enforcement
agencies should focus more on high-value targets (Png and Wang 2009). However, a recent study
reported that disclosures of InfoSec investments are actually associated with “a higher risk of
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data breach incidents, within both a state and an industry…” (Sen and Borle 2015, p. 314). While
severe criminal or civil penalties deter some attackers (Cavusoglu et al. 2008), other attackers
quickly learn where penalties are severe, and shift their operations to countries that impose lighter
penalties or have lower cybercrime conviction rates (Png et al. 2008). Thus, risk assessment
should distinguish between different kinds of attacks (e.g., data breach, ransomware, phishing,
etc.) and different kinds of attackers (e.g., script kiddies, cyber-criminals, cyber-terrorists, and
others who threaten organizations’ information assets – including nations that apparently have
escalated from cyber-espionage to cyber-warfare and state-sponsored criminal acts). Different
attackers are driven by different motivations, and their tactics and impacts also vary. This implies
that how (and to what extent) an organization responds to attacks or categories of attacker will
also vary.
Many attackers continuously scan for potential vulnerabilities, expecting their automated
systems will encounter sites that are misconfigured, poorly maintained or inadequately defended.
These opportunistic attackers do not attempt to determine whether a particular target has very
strong or weak protection (Mookerjee et al. 2011). Other, strategic attackers conduct
comprehensive reconnaissance before strategically choosing targets (Ransbotham and Mitra
2009). Strategic attackers might be influenced by InfoSec investment disclosures. Some attackers
target those organizations that have installed high market-share software products, which contain
known vulnerabilities (Galbreth and Shor 2010). Strategic attackers may be deterred when an
organization discloses its investments in InfoSec tools and controls (Cavusoglu et al. 2005) –
especially a disclosure about layered “defense in depth” controls (Kumar et al. 2008), which
signal that an organization is committed to protecting its information assets. However, it has also
been suggested that added protection may signal to an attacker there is something valuable worth
protecting and multiple protection mechanisms may lessen an organizations security posture if
there is a negative interaction between them (Wolff 2016). Lastly, a “cyber-terrorist” aims to
destroy specific IS targets for political reasons rather than personal gain; this category of attacker
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may spend years researching targets. Unfortunately, neither disclosure of investments in
preventive InfoSec controls nor severe criminal penalties will deter the committed cyber-terrorist
(Hua and Bapna 2013).
Another important aspect of preparation is to recognize vulnerabilities in purchased
software or services and install patches when they become available. It has been suggested that
some software producers under-spend on security (by for example, delaying when they will fix
certain security vulnerabilities and release patches), because these companies choose to allocate
scarce resources to new functionality that will differentiate their products. Large vendors and
open-source vendors release patches faster than smaller vendors, and patches are released more
quickly for those vulnerabilities that represent higher threat severity. Public disclosure by third
parties leads vendors to release patches more quickly (Arora et al. 2010). Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS) providers seem to patch less often than other cloud services providers (Choudhary and
Zhang 2015). Also, “CIA” (Parker 1983) analysis of patch release behavior reveals that patches
that address confidentiality or integrity risks are released faster than patches addressing
availability (Temizkan et al. 2012). Legislative pressure might induce vendors to release patches
more quickly, and release timing also depends on whether a vendor normally distributes fixes in
new software releases or in more frequent updates. Vulnerabilities disclosed through a market
mechanism take longer to be exploited (versus open disclosure) and are exploited less often
(Ransbotham et al. 2012). Full disclosure does lead to earlier attacks, and attacks are more likely
to occur at times when many vulnerabilities are being addressed (Mitra and Ransbotham 2015).
Smartphones and other mobile devices bring new InfoSec issues, giving rise to a new
research stream on mobile InfoSec. A study that analyzed more than 400,000 searches in file
sharing networks demonstrated that mobile device use increases the risk that a firm’s confidential
data will be compromised, and that large, highly visible firms with many retail accounts are at
highest risk (Johnson 2008).
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Leaders also need to be aware that their organizations send signals (whether deliberately or
not) to investors and other stakeholders. How do investors react to news about InfoSec
investments and incidents? Disclosures of InfoSec expenditures positively impact firms’ stock
prices, especially e-commerce stocks (Yayla and Hu 2011), but incident disclosures published in
annual reports do not hurt stock prices in the long run (after an initial hit, the stock usually
rebounds pretty quickly) (Gordon et al. 2010). There may even be a form of investor incident
fatigue; as incident frequency increases, market reaction intensity declines (Yayla and Hu 2011).
Also, corporate disclosures are not isolated events: what a company reveals today (and how a
disclosure is phrased) may be interpreted variously by market participants, and this interpretation
is affected by information a company previously disclosed (Wang et al. 2013).
How much should organizations spend on InfoSec preparedness? Risk analysis studies
support InfoSec planning and resource allocation decisions by quantifying the likelihood and
impacts of InfoSec incidents. Some techniques use Bayes Theorem, including an evidential
reasoning approach for a cost-benefit risk analysis that accounts for uncertainty (Sun et al. 2006);
risk assessments based on Bayesian real options models (Herath and Herath 2008); and an
approach that combines financial metrics (labor cost, lost profit, information asset value, business
process cost, stock price) with qualitative risks (systems, systems security, information, business,
shareholders) (Salmela 2008). Rare, high-cost incidents distort managers’ subsequent loss
estimates, so combining daily loss data with extreme-value analysis may produce a more accurate
loss estimate (Wang et al. 2008). Other studies reveal that incidents that shut down systems or
render data unavailable cause greater financial losses than those which merely compromise data
quality (Goldstein et al. 2011).
Many potential business customers under-invest in security products (Dey et al. 2012), and
outsourcing gives rise to unique InfoSec risks. For example, use of a managed security service
provider (MSSP) leads to “system interdependency risks” (Hui et al. 2012), if the MSSP
configures its software to conform to standards and best practices. This tactic leads to correlated
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failure risk, which increases as an MSSP’s customer base grows. Analysis of a proportional
hazard model reveals that vendors that provide both on-premises and cloud-based services spend
more on security than do providers based only in the cloud (August et al. 2014).
Taken together, these studies suggest that a CIO might spend a little less on prevention,
and a little more on practices and tools for mitigating the impacts of incidents that do occur. What
is known about how organizations actually do InfoSec preparedness planning? Some
preparedness studies focus narrowly on specific technical challenges. For example, one study
concluded that wireless network security mechanisms should be coupled with workflow changes
and policies for acceptable wireless systems use (Katos and Adams 2005). Other research yields
broad general guidance on InfoSec oversight – such as nine “value-focused” objectives for
InfoSec management (Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006):
1. Enhance management development practices;
2. Strengthen human resource management practices;
3. Develop and sustain an ethical environment;
4. Maximize access controls;
5. Promote individual work ethic;
6. Maximize data integrity;
7. Enhance integrity of business processes;
8. Maximize privacy;
9. Maximize organizational integrity.
Three tactics may reduce malware attack impacts: preselected immunization strategies,
countermeasure dissemination strategies, and security awareness programs (Guo et al. 2016).
Some industry regulations and international standards mandate specific InfoSec practices.
The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act required companies to establish new security policies and practices
and to use various technologies (Hu et al. 2007). Similar risk management requirements laid out
in the Basel II Accord led banks to adopt new InfoSec practices (Hsu et al. 2014). Studies
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examined the development, adoption, and updating of InfoSec standards – such as BS7799, the
first security standard proposed by the UK Department of Trade and Industry (Backhouse et al.
2006). Consensus was required to publish BS7799 and those organizations with extensive
political capital played especially strong roles. In New South Wales, agencies’ perceptions about
the legitimacy of their central government and compatibility of ISO InfoSec standard 27001:2006
with their existing work practices affected their adoption of it. Limited resources, low senior
management involvement, conflicting group norms, and cultural biases also constrain adoption
(Smith et al. 2010). When a government standard contains many detailed guidelines and is
difficult to implement, adopting organizations might also end up with a less strong security
posture (Lee et al. 2016).
Does InfoSec compliance maturity (judged in part by adherence to standards) matter?
Managers at hospitals with mature certified security programs express stronger interest in
protecting data and are more likely to view breaches as signifying weak InfoSec preparation
(Kwon and Johnson 2013). However, one analysis of the U.S. national vulnerability database
reveals that adoption of security standards or best practices might increase risk. The argument
here is that when many organizations adopt a standard configuration, they then share common
vulnerabilities, leading to “correlated failures” (an attacker that identifies a weakness in one
organization’s standard implementation can then exploit it in others’ systems, compromising an
entire network (Chen et al. 2011).
Big organizations in highly competitive industries might benefit from joining consortia to
share information about InfoSec vulnerabilities, threats, and tactics (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005).
This advice is, unfortunately, not practical for small organizations, due to high start-up costs,
inability to reach economies of scale, transparency issues, and other factors (Gupta and Zhdanov
2012).
Use of an MSSP might give rise to a double moral hazard (lack of caution when risk is
transferred to another party), particularly if the MSSP is not transparent about its security
54

practices or if it under-invests in security. One view favors contracts that specify both rewards
and penalties (Ji et al. 2016). Should a client insist that an MSSP offer multilateral contracts
(specifying that if any one client experiences a breach, the MSSP will compensate all clients, as
suggested by Lee et al. (2013))? Others suggest that cyber-insurance might reduce risk better than
transferring risk to an MSSP or entering into a risk pooling arrangement (Zhao et al. 2013).
To summarize research on InfoSec Preparedness: InfoSec technologies and offensive and
defensive tactics continue to evolve, with the result that InfoSec risk assessment and preparation
are also constantly moving targets. The CIO needs to keep the Board up to date on traditional and
emerging InfoSec risks, and about the organization’s level of protection. Use of new risk
assessment techniques, combined with improved knowledge about attacker behavior and new
tools and tactics for mitigating the effects of InfoSec incidents can help the CIO justify additional
investments in protective resources.
Effective complementary tools, policies, procedures, and human, financial, and technical
resources need to be in place. Organizations aim to avoid under- or over-investing in redundant
InfoSec protection. The CIO and CISO need to ensure that directors and C-level executives
understand how correlated security failures can arise, why inter-organizational collaboration is
needed, and the vital importance of employee training, participation, and vigilance. A team effort
is needed to achieve and sustain a system of effective internal controls and rewards and to instill a
culture of accountability and shared respect for the confidentiality, integrity and controlled access
to information.

Is InfoSec Research in the Basket Diverse?
In addition to reporting key findings from empirical InfoSec studies, this systematic review
identified InfoSec topics addressed; methods used; and to what extent topics and methods vary by
journal. Prior general IS research reviews identified core topics and research questions that define
the IS field (Benbasat and Zmud 2003) and celebrated topical and methodological diversity as a
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key strength (Bernroider et al. 2013; Venkatesh et al. 2013). Given that both topical and
methodological diversity are valued and expected in general, it is important to consider whether
IS sub-fields are diverse in terms of sub-topics, methods, theories, and other aspects. I thus
propose that to the extent that InfoSec researchers employ varied methods to examine various
topics, they collectively add value to this sub-field.
Table 2-5 summarizes the methods used in the 125 InfoSec studies in my review set,
including five papers classified as Subjective Argument, a non-empirical method. The top three
empirical methods were mixed methods (23 papers), quantitative models (29 papers) and attitude
surveys (28 papers). Some journals emphasized some methods over others, as shown in Table
2-5. ISR and JMIS heavily feature papers based on quantitative models, while ISR published the
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greatest number of mixed methods InfoSec papers.
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Table 2-5: InfoSec in IS Scholars Basket Journals, 2004-2016: Methods Employed
Some topics were examined more extensively with particular research methods. InfoSec
economics were most commonly examined with quantitative models, and many technical papers
relied on mixed methods. Some particular methods were heavily utilized to study particular
InfoSec research topics. For instance, experiments were exclusively used in studies that focused
on individuals. While specific topics lend themselves more readily to particular research methods,
alternative methods do exist and senior scholars have argued that greater methodological diversity
is needed to provide a deeper understanding of IS issues (Galliers and Markus 2007). Table 2-6
summarizes the findings regarding methods used to study various InfoSec topics.
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Table 2-6: InfoSec Topics in the Basket, 2004-2016 by Methods Employed
When methods used in mixed-methods studies are separately counted, action research is the least
utilized empirical strategy, while models and surveys are the most heavily used (see Table 2-7).
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Table 2-7: InfoSec in the IS Scholars Basket, 2004-2016: Mixed-Methods Papers
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4
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Thus, in descending order, the list below summarizes InfoSec research methods in the Basket:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

39 surveys
38 models
17 experiments
17 case studies
12 other qualitative methods
11 design science
4 action research
In terms of InfoSec topics in Basket papers, Table 2-8 reveals that research continues to be

heavily weighted toward understanding user behavior; 53 studies (30 + 23) examined factors that
influence user attitude, intention or behavior. Papers from the InfoSec economics stream are also
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Table 2-8: InfoSec in the IS Scholars Basket, 2004-2016: Topics Addressed

Implications for Research
This review of 13 years’ worth of InfoSec papers in the Basket reveals a vibrant and
diverse set of studies. InfoSec researchers have answered Siponen’s (2005) call for more
empirical InfoSec studies using qualitative or quantitative methods and calls for methodological
diversity in IS research by Bernroider et al. (2013) and Venkatesh et al. (2013). However, we see
that InfoSec study methods are not uniformly distributed among either topics or journals, and that
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there are many opportunities to contribute to the literature and to strengthen applicable theories,
by conducting more lab or field experiments, case studies, and action research/design science
studies, as well as to make greater use of underutilized qualitative methods (such as critical
incident technique, repertory grid technique, and discourse analysis).
Some specific topics seem strongly associated with specific methods; for example, many
studies addressed user attitudes, intentions, and behavior via surveys. InfoSec research continues
to rely heavily on just a few quantitative methods (such as economic modeling and attitudinal
surveys), in spite of the increasing availability of secondary InfoSec-related data sources
(D’Arcy, Gupta, et al. 2014). There is cause for some concern, because studies in the econometric
and survey-research traditions tend to rely on proxy variables rather than directly measuring
variables of greatest interest. For example, studies that take the individual as the unit of analysis
ultimately aim to understand user behavior, yet rely heavily on measures of attitudes and
behavioral intentions. This means that some heavily used dependent variable measures are one or
more steps removed from actual user behavior “in the wild.” To be clear: surveys used in the
Individual InfoSec were well designed, but additional complementary studies, using other
methods – such as observation, ethnography, diaries, screen capture and other ways to measure
actual behavior – are needed. Longitudinal studies using actual data from activity logs and
security devices would be beneficial. Although researchers are often denied access to this
sensitive information (Crossler et al. 2012; Kotulic and Clark 2004), information about IT misuse
and data breaches can be obtained from other sources, such as SEC filings, legal cases, and the
CERT Insider Threat Center (D’Arcy, Gupta, et al. 2014). As regulations increase the amount of
information that organizations must disclose about breaches, these data sources offer excellent
potential for new studies.
Research is a slow process; many studies must be conducted before sufficiently strong
evidence accumulates to yield practical guidance. One well-designed study can disprove a theory,
but the opposite is not true; theory confirmation requires many well-designed studies, utilizing
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many methods. Each research team makes choices that affect the relevance, reliability and
generalizability of their study results. A case study that captures the rich complexity of real
organizational life may be criticized as offering low generalizability and an imprecise
contribution to theory, while a survey or experiment that carefully specifies the effect of a few
independent variables on a particular dependent variable might produce generalizable results that
are nevertheless not immediately helpful or relevant. Many types of studies need to be conducted,
and until many studies are published, the findings do not reveal a clear picture. Thus, a word of
caution: The evidence reviewed here lead me to offer some helpful practical guidance, yet many
open questions demand further study.
Some journals – particularly ISR and MISQ – attracted and published mixed-methods
InfoSec studies. Of the 23 studies classified as mixed-methods, 13 paired a quantitative method
with a qualitative method (action research, case study or other qualitative). This implies that in
some journals, the way to get qualitative research published is to include it in a mixed-methods
study. Yet, the opposite is not true: many papers based solely on surveys were published, even
though every survey based on Likert scaled answers brings limitations that could be addressed by
pairing it with relevant qualitative data. In this review set, ISR published no InfoSec papers based
solely on a qualitative method, and MISQ included just two qualitative papers (case studies) in 25
InfoSec papers published 2004-2016.
This chapter used a systematic literature review method which explicitly aimed to discover
all InfoSec papers in the IS Senior Scholar’s Basket for a defined period (2004-2016), and with a
clear focus on delineating the sub-topics examined, research methods, and practitioner-relevant
findings. A benefit of this systematic review is that others can readily verify the validity of my
findings. A limitation is that it did not include papers published before 2004 or after 2016.
While the focus on papers published in the Basket is justified, I note that InfoSec
researchers also participate in non-AIS conferences and publish important work in other journals.
Clearly, a literature review focused outside the Basket is also warranted, and comparison of a
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sample of Non-Basket studies published in the same time period with the current sample might
reveal interesting similarities and differences and shed further light on the development of the
InfoSec research stream (In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I partially answered this call, by
reviewing studies that focused on my central topic, InfoSec Incident Response). A future study
could closely examine authorship data to identify clusters of collaborators and co-citation patterns
and shed light on how InfoSec findings propagate and why some InfoSec studies have not (as yet)
spawned further work.

Implications for Practice
Behavioral research has yielded a consensus that some combination of “carrot” (rewards)
and “stick” (punishment) helps prevent some InfoSec incidents, by inducing users to engage in
safe computing practices. Visible senior management support, user participation, and training
(both formal and informal) are helpful, so long as generic policies and programs for addressing
the “weakest link” problem are adapted/customized to take into account each organization’s
culture and norms, industry and regulatory requirements, employees’ educational and skill levels,
and other factors – all of which need to be aligned with that organization’s business practices and
strategy. It is necessary to recognize that what works for one occupational group or in one
industry might not work for other types of employees, customers, or business partners.
Research that yielded broadly applicable design frameworks for incorporating security
elements into new software and for secure information sharing should be of immediate value to
the CIO – including some study findings that can help a CIO persuade other executives and
directors to authorize investments in new tools, techniques, and expertise. Specialized studies
(such as those that yield tools for better intrusion detection, techniques for securely sharing
anonymized data, and Bayesian-based risk assessment techniques) are also helpful, but a CIO or
CISO will likely need to consult directly with experts in order to stay abreast of best practices for
these specialized InfoSec issues, and to accurately translate what they imply for their company.
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This review reveals the need for each organization to adapt generic InfoSec policies and
best practices to its unique capabilities and strategic requirements. Oversight, planning,
governance, and control are team sports that play out differently across companies and industries.
This news should not come as a surprise; after all, strategic IT alignment is understood to be a
team sport involving players from multiple business functions and multiple IT functions.
Strategic IT planning requires a company’s leaders to take stock of their organization’s valuable
assets, capabilities, and weaknesses, in light of externally-driven opportunities, risks, and
pressures (competitive, socio-political, technical, other forces). So too, strategic InfoSec planning
requires executives to take stock of their organization’s information assets and InfoSec
capabilities (which also vary across companies and industries).
Where strategic IT management and strategic InfoSec management differ is in the related
areas of information sharing, cooperation and collaboration. For competitive and regulatory
reasons, companies do not share their strategic plans with one another, nor do they willingly share
details of their most valuable IT capabilities. Yet, those same companies do need to join forces to
combat worldwide InfoSec threats, because destructive code easily travels indiscriminately from
system to system. A few studies examined these inter-organizational information sharing
challenges, and a few studies examined other issues related to inter-organizational dependence
(such as correlated software failures). Additional field-based studies could investigate how
industry structure, competitive and cross-cultural dynamics, leadership styles, and other facets
interact to increase or decrease organizations’ vulnerability to ongoing InfoSec threats, and their
ability to effectively respond to different kinds of InfoSec incidents.
Effective CIOs protect valuable information assets. At a minimum, the Board of Directors
will regularly ask the CIO two key questions (similar to Nolan and McFarlan (2005)):
•

How strong is our InfoSec prevention?

•

Are we prepared for incidents that will surely occur, and do our employees and
partners know what to do when an InfoSec incident does occur?
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The CIO and other executives can help academia generate new knowledge about specific
policies and practices that strengthen InfoSec prevention, preparation, and response, by opening
their doors to researchers who ask them to participate in case studies or to fill out surveys. Having
reviewed 125 papers published in influential IS journals, I observe that many studies aimed to
prevent InfoSec incidents by establishing policies, incentives, and sanctions to persuade
employees to comply with safe computing practices. Incident detection studies have yielded
better tools, and studies in the preparation stream of research have helped to quantify InfoSec
risks. However, to date few studies have examined preparation activities such as contingency
planning, communication plans, or “fire drills” involving employees, customers and business
partners, and only one study in the review set examined InfoSec incident response (Njenga and
Brown 2012). Many more practice-based studies are needed on InfoSec incident preparation and
response, since InfoSec incidents continue to occur, despite preventive controls.
Effective response practices can increase customer, business partner, and employee loyalty
and minimize financial and other damage. Yet, we know very little about the characteristics of
effective individual incident responders or effective incident response teams. We also know little
about incident response leadership and coordination. We have an idea of what should be included
in an ideal incident response plan, but how does that compare with reality on the ground? We
know that security education, training and awareness programs are important, but how often do
employees really know who to tell if they suspect a breach has occurred? Do employees know
what to do if a breach shuts down critical systems such as email? Do they know who will be in
charge or the roles each individual should play during and immediately following an incident?
Studies aiming to understand how and to what extent organizations and their employees learn (or
don’t learn) from “near-miss” episodes – such as a breach that affects some but not all companies
in a particular competitive sphere – could be very useful. Do responders and other employees
refer to and follow the contingency plan? If not, why not? Under what conditions and to what
extent do they improvise their responses versus referring to checklists? What specific employee
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responses minimize harm to customers, supply chain partners, employees, and valuable financial,
IT, and data assets? What specific behaviors impede effective response? Leaders would greatly
benefit from learning how employees actually respond during simulated and real incidents.
High-impact breaches at Target (2013), Yahoo (2013 and 2014), Equifax (2017), and
elsewhere are important cautionary tales, and we also stand to learn a great deal from studying
lower-profile incidents. Case studies, action research, and design science studies are especially
needed, to closely examine whether and how organizations prepare for InfoSec incidents;
chronicle to what extent members of formal incident response teams work effectively with others
in and beyond the organization, to protect resources, preserve valuable relationships with
customers and business partners; reveal best practices and cautionary tales, and invent new
methods and tools.
Scholars are beginning to study InfoSec challenges associated with the Internet of Things,
social media use, cognitive computing, smart cars, smart cities, and other emerging applications
that are creating both new opportunities and new threats. The bad guys are racing to master all
those technologies and invent new attack modes; Organizations need to race a little faster to fend
them off. New practice-based studies, by scholars in collaboration with CIOs and other IT
managers, can continue to help organizations stay ahead of the bad guys.
To the extent that IS study findings translate into improved system and InfoSec practices
and tools, IS researchers can claim to have a valuable impact on practice. InfoSec economic
studies have called attention to contextual influences surrounding security concerns, impacts of
breaches and other InfoSec events, and optimal investments in security resources. Studies aimed
at the individual level have shed light on factors that shape users’ attitudes toward InfoSec
practices and policies. Studies directed at the organizational level have begun to provide
managerial guidance on effective policies, tactics, and security incident response. Yet, cyberattacks and other security breaches are increasing in size, frequency, impact, and cost. Thus, more
research aiming at both the organizational level and at inter-organizational issues is sorely
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needed. Therefore, based on this review of 125 papers in the Basket, I echo Siponen’s earlier call
that “there is a need for rigorous qualitative and quantitative empirical studies, which explore the
usability and relevance of … ISS methods in practice” (2005, p. 313) – with the added
clarification that more studies need to aim to understand InfoSec management at the group,
organizational and inter-organizational levels.
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CHAPTER 3 TWO CASES ON INCIDENT RESPONSE

Citations (also available at www.hbsp.harvard.edu):
McLaughlin, MD., Hansen, S., Cram, W., and Gogan J. 2015. Snowfall and a Stolen Laptop.
Journal of Information Technology - Teaching Cases. 5:2.
(HBSP ID: JIT082-PDF-ENG)
McLaughlin, MD., Cram, W., and Gogan, J. 2015. A High-Performance Computing Cluster
Under Attack: The Titan Incident. Journal of Information Technology - Teaching Cases. 5:1.
(HBSP ID: JIT071-PDF-ENG)
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Introduction
A well-designed case study can, on its own or as part of a case-comparison, be published
as a grounded-theory, interpretive, or positivist theory-testing paper. The same case study can
also be written up as a discussion case for use in business classes. I conducted two InfoSec case
studies, from which (thus far) I have produced two discussion cases for use in MBA or
undergraduate classes. Both cases have been published in JIT-Teaching Cases and both are
available from Harvard Business School Publishing (www.hbsp.harvard.edu). Each of their
teaching notes (which are available to qualified faculty and accompanied the cases during their
reviews) has a Theoretical Foundations section, which lays the groundwork for future journal
papers based on the case studies.
The first publications from these case studies were discussion cases (aka “teaching” cases)
because there is a dearth of useful discussion cases on the topic of InfoSec incident response,
combined with a high need to discuss this subject in business school classes. In an August 2015
survey of 58 U.S. companies by the Poneman Institute, every company experienced an InfoSecrelated incident in 2014. Of these, 21 companies reported incidents involving stolen devices (the
topic of one of my two case studies), and 30 companies reported malicious code installed in their
environment (the topic of the other case study). In November 2017, a search of discussion cases
distributed by Harvard Business School Publishing (www.hbsp.harvard.edu) revealed few cases
describing organizational responses to InfoSec incidents such as these. Most published InfoSec
discussion cases focused on high profile data breaches such as TJX (2005), ChoicePoint (2006),
Sony (2011), and Target (2013). Although these cases describe the aftermath of these breaches
and changes that managers made to InfoSec policies or controls, none of them closely examined
incident response activities (i.e., steps that staff took to immediately respond to the attacks,
including hunting for the cause and the perpetrator, protecting related systems and processes,
etc.). Only four incident response cases were available at HBS Publishing in fall 2017:

68

•

iPremier (Austin et al. 2001) – three-part fictional case informed by real denial-of-service
attacks [HBSP ID: 601114-PDF-ENG; 601115-PDF-ENG; and 601116-PDF-ENG]

•

MafiaBoy (Neufeld 2010) –describes the prosecution of teenager Michael Calce; primarily
focuses on the punishment of computer crime [HBSP ID: 910E20-PDF-ENG]

•

Snowfall and a Stolen Laptop (McLaughlin, Hansen, et al. 2015) – only case discussing
stolen devices (based on real events); [HBSP ID: JIT082-PDF-ENG]

•

The Titan Incident (McLaughlin, Cram, et al. 2015) – only case focused on malicious code
and interorganizational incident response (also based on real events);
[HBSP ID: JIT071-PDF-ENG]
I am lead author on these last two cases, which are included in this chapter.
Snowfall and a Stolen Laptop and The Titan Incident expose two different (yet common)

InfoSec risks that organizations face. Together, they are part of a package that helps students
examine incident response activities in various contexts. The cases are similar, in that: they both
describe breaches that occurred in educational organizations; these organizations had similar
support structures for incident response activities and well-designed InfoSec policies; and both
incidents had the potential to negatively affect the organizations’ reputations. Yet, the cases also
exhibit important differences, including:
•

time to detect: The stolen laptop incident was immediately detected, whereas the system
in the second case was compromised for several months before the attack was detected.

•

level of complexity: Response to the stolen laptop incident was straightforward, whereas
the second case required extensive investigation of malware.

•

scope: The stolen laptop incident primarily affected one high-profile individual and people
with whom he came into contact in his work (students, faculty, alumni), whereas the other
case involved multiple users in multiple organizations, in several nations, giving rise to
much broader implications.
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•

focus and depth of technical expertise of the responders: The response to the Dean’s
stolen laptop focused on support and business practices, while in the second case,
engineers were focused on technical artifacts.

•

tools used: The response to the Dean’s stolen laptop involved using repurposed general IT
tools, whereas the second incident response relied more heavily on specialized tools.
In spite of these differences, at a high level, the incident response processes were similar.

Once notified of incidents, responders performed basic triage activities: taking inventory about
what was known about the incident, assessing the potential impact, determining what questions
needed to be answered. While the follow-on investigations were very different, the incident
responders focused on two main goals: determining the potential impact to the organization and
returning users to a state of normality.
The teaching note included with each case discussed applicable InfoSec theories and
frameworks. Next, I briefly summarize each case and then discuss these theoretical frameworks
and how they apply to the cases.

Research Method
A case study is appropriate for investigating the interplay among issues, technologies, and
policies within their organizational contexts (Yin 2009). A case study should be interesting,
display sufficient evidence of the phenomenon examined, and completely describe the events that
occurred (Myers 2013). The two cases in this chapter examined technical, organizational
(including human) and institutional resources used during incident response activities, with an
aim “to enhance generalizability or transferability to other contexts” and “deepen understanding
and explanation” (Miles et al. 2013, p. 101) of how resource bundles are configured and deployed
during used InfoSec incident response. A focus on the organizational level was necessary in order
to identify and understand the assets and capabilities deployed by each focal organization, and
specific resources staff members chose to use during the responses to the two incidents.
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This first case was prepared based on information obtained via in-person interviews
(conducted by me and a co-author) with the RIT Saunders College of Business Dean and the two
College of Business IT professionals who managed the College’s response to the incident (David
Ballard and Nick Francesco). Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Information from the
interviews was triangulated against evidence available in archival sources (e.g. news stories, RIT
web pages, other RIT documentation) to establish an accurate timeline of events.
The interview data and other materials were further analyzed with NVivo using a grounded
theory approach. Seventeen initial coding categories provided in Table 3-1 were used to consider
topics that might be relevant to how and why RIT responds to information security incidents.
Before analyzing the data, these 17 broad initial coding categories were developed based on
author derived proposals. During the analysis, open coding was allowed to capture important
aspects of the case which were relevant to the research questions, but not previously covered in
the initial coding table (Corbin and Strauss 2008).
In order to ensure completeness and consistency, I made three iterations through the data,
using frequency tables of different event and matrices that contained evidence of important and
emerging codes as suggested by Yin (2009), before settling on the final coding scheme. At the
end of the coding exercise, I recorded 414 empirical observations in 25 categories. The codes and
coding frequency for the final scheme is provided in Table 3-2 below.
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Code

Definition

Change

Changes instituted in the past to address.

Coordination

Cooperation between groups or organizations

Cost

Reactive impacts to the organization, time, resources, or
finances (consequences).

Data
Protection
Ethical
Incident

Methods to protect confidential or sensitive information

Investment

Proactive measures used to reduce the exposure or impact
of a security event
Statuary, standards, or de jure regulations related to
protecting data or responding to security events
Actions or processes used to prevent or remediate a
vulnerability
Documented processes and procedures

Capability

Legal
Mitigation
Policies
Power

Ability to identify vulnerabilities and respond to threats.

Moral or Value statements related a need to protect data
A negative impact to the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability or IS systems or data.

Reputation

Conflict or statements related to political situations, influence,
or conflict between groups
Opinions others might have about that

Resource

Artifacts used to protect the data and IS systems

Static

Lacking the ability to change

Threat

The risk of a vulnerability being exploited.

Vulnerability

A weakness in a software system or process that can be
exploited by a malicious agent.

Example of evidence and code

“We perform Security Audits on all systems”
“we have mandatory security training”
“We had to institute a policy to secure the data.” “We
needed to address the legal concerns at that time”
“We had to work with law enforcement.” “I needed to
reach out to XXX in [another organization]”
“Students who had their information lost filed a
lawsuit”
“It took us three days to discover what happened”
Encryption, Data Loss
“We have an obligation to secure…”
“Someone broke in and stole a laptop”
“Our servers were hacked and the attacker
downloaded personal information for our students”
“We have purchased software to analyze log files”
Reference to Legal cases, or litigation
“Data encryption is mandatory”
“We have a policy addressing [retention/protection] of
data.” “That is documented by XXXX”
“We can’t make that policy decision because [it
contradicts or XXX won’t allow it]
“If we don’t protect information, we won’t be taken
seriously as a research institution.”
“IDS and Firewalls are in place to prevent
unauthorized access”
“We need too much training to support that option.”
“People won’t do it.”
“Burglars have broken into the building and stolen
equipment in the past”
” If someone accessed faculty records, they would
have a list social security numbers for students in the
class”
“Passwords are written down on sticky notes”
“Data is stored unencrypted on hard drives”

Ease of Use
Effectiveness
Feeling Safe
Incident
Investment

16
3
2
40
20

16
17
18
19
20

Legal
Policies
Politics
Privacy
Protectivis
m
Recovery
Reputation
Resource
Response
Risk

21
22
23
24
25

20
58
23
6
19
5
0
21
18
29

Frequency

11
12
13
14
15

Frequency

6
41
14
8
14

Code

Background
Capability
Change
Cost
Data Protection

Code

6
7
8
9
10

Frequency

1
2
3
4
5

Code

Table 3-1: Initial Coding of RIT Data

Static Approach
Technology (general)
Threat
Usability
Vulnerability

8
19
12
9
3

N = 25

414

Table 3-2: Final Coding Scheme and Frequency of 414 Code Chunks
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The second case was based on information obtained via phone interviews with individuals
familiar with the security incident at UiO in Norway. Interviews were again recorded and
transcribed and information from the interviews was triangulated against evidence available in
archival sources such as public event logs and conference presentations. The first interview, with
the manager of the CERT team, focused on technical and political details related to how the
incident was reported, investigated, and resolved. This perspective was helpful in understanding
the perception of how UiO perceived the cooperativeness of external stakeholders. The second
interview, with a security officer at a partner institution, provided a technical perspective on the
investigation and insight into how UiO was perceived by outsiders. Two other interviews, with
industry experts, focused on the motivations of attackers, especially in the educational and grid
context. These interviewees also provided a broader perspective on the security industry and
insight into best practices followed by the UiO staff.
I again used NVivo to code assets and capabilities described by interviewees as they
discussed incident response activities. This scheme is based on a literature review by Robey et al.
(2008) which reported that successful enterprise or inter-enterprise systems implementation
required complementary technical, organizational, and extra-organizational resources. I substitute
“institutional” for “extra-organizational” resource because an organization’s implementation of
IT systems can be affected by institutional pressures such as national or state laws, professional
regulations, and informal professional norms. The six coding categories provided in Table 3-3
were used to investigate the types of the resources used by the incident response team.
Similar to the analysis of the RIT case, these 7 broad initial coding categories were
developed before analyzing the data. However, these codes were retained (shown in Table 3-4)
during the analysis, but open coding was again allowed to capture important aspects of the case
which were relevant to the research questions.
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Code

Definition

Asset: IT

IT assets

Asset: Org

Organizational assets

Capability:
Inst.
Capability: IT

Institutional capabilities

Capability:
Org

Organizational capabilities

Asset: Inst

Institutional assets

IT capabilities

Example of evidence and code

funding agencies, laws or regulations
“In the grid community, we have something called NorGrid which is all
the high performance computing facilities in Norway”
hardware, software, data, network
“all three front end nodes are logging everything”
reputation, cash resources, faculty population
“I knew I could trust him right away. That was a great advantage
everything went much faster.”
professionally sanctioned methodologies
“Titan network is blocked to assess the damage done”
change management, software development
“We searched for suid binaries in the file system”” “every time there is
an issue they are pretty quick about it and they send a plan to us on
when and where they are going to upgrade and patch.”
training, governance, collaboration track record
“Titan operations and UiO-CERT have regular workshops”

Table 3-3: Initial Coding or UiO Data based on Robey et al. (2008)
The same method of making three iterations through the data and using frequency tables
was used before settling on a secondary coding scheme. At the end of the coding exercise, I
recorded 139 empirical observations in 32 categories. The codes and coding frequency for the
final scheme is provided in Table 3-5 below.
Assets

Code

Capabilities

Institutional
IT
Organizational
Institutional
IT
Organizational
n=6

Frequency
14
18
5
6
19
13
75

Table 3-4: Final Coding Scheme and Frequency of Code Chunks
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Code

1
Attack Details
2
Backups
3
Collaboration
4
Communication
5
Complex Environment
6
Cross Boundary Use
7
Detection
8
Disk Images
9
Division of Labor
10 Email
11 Governance
12 Industry Involvement
13 Investigative Skills
14 Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
15 National Data Grid Foundation (NDGF)
16 Network Logs
17 Network Mitigations
18 Penetration Testing
19 People (external)
20 Poor Security Posture
21 Power
22 Press Release
23 Root Cause
24 Sandbox
25 Similar Job Functions
26 Sleuthkit
27 System Logs
28 System Maintenance
29 Trojan Code
30 Trouble Tickets
31 Trust
32 Vulnerability Reports
n=32

Frequency
22
1
2
14
6
2
1
2
2
2
4
5
15
1
3
2
1
1
5
5
5
1
1
2
2
1
4
9
4
2
8
4
139

Table 3-5: Final Coding Scheme and Frequency of Code Chunks
Next, I briefly summarize each case and then discuss these theoretical frameworks and
how they apply to the cases.

Case Summaries and Links to Theoretical Frameworks
Case 1 Summary: “Snowfall and a Stolen Laptop”
A business school Dean discovers that his laptop has been stolen from his home; he
notifies a member of his IT staff of the theft. The incident responder, recalling two recent
incidents at the university, in which laptops containing thousands of U.S. Social Security numbers
were stolen from campus, hopes the Dean’s laptop does not contain personally identifiable
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information such as Social Security numbers. If so, the incident would need to be reported to the
state Attorney General’s Office and the University would be required to pay for a credit
monitoring service for individuals whose identity may have been compromised.
The case examines the response processes that were triggered when this incident occurred
and how the theft of a computing device exposes an organization to risks of inadvertent
disclosure of sensitive information (e.g., private, confidential, internal). The case further
describes the InfoSec policies, procedures and tools that were marshaled to protect information
resources. During the investigation, the incident response team attempted to recover the device,
used previously backed up data to learn whether legally protected personally identifiable
information was on it, and considered other ramifications, given that the laptop was issued to a
high-level manager. This case represents a fairly routine situation (it is not unusual for a user
device to be lost or stolen), with the additional issue of the device in question being used by a
high-level manager who relies heavily on the software and data on his laptop and also serves as a
highly public face of the organization. The response process exhibited both strengths and
weaknesses, which gives students an opportunity to identify ways to improve the organization’s
InfoSec incident response policies and procedures.

Case 2 Summary: “A High-Performance Computing Cluster under Attack: The
Titan Incident”
This case is a useful counter-example to the previous one, because it involves a more
complex attack and more complex stakeholder ramifications. The IT operations team at another
university notifies the University’s incident response team of suspicious activity recorded in
system logs of a high-profile grid computing system that supports scientists at five institutions in
three countries. Although system breaches are not unusual, this case represents a complex
scenario, given the number and variety of stakeholders involved. The case describes investigation
activities of the various teams as they attempt to determine what happened and by whom. As soon
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as the incident response manager learns of the attack, she orders that the system be disconnected
from the Internet, to contain the damage. Next, she launches an investigation. Over a few days,
the investigators piece together logs from previous weeks to identify suspicious activity and to
locate the attack vector. Students are challenged to consider how, whether and when to restore the
grid computing system to its prior safe condition, and the instructor can lead them in discussion
of further steps this organization can take prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to similar
incidents in the future.
In preparing the teaching notes for these cases, the authors began discussing the incidents
in light of general managerial theories (RBV, Theory of Complementary Resources, and ACT)
and theories that focus more narrowly on risk management, security, or several theoretical
foundations that are grounded in InfoSec (e.g., CIA Triad, Risk Management and IT
Governance). These various theoretical foundations are discussed next.

Theories Applied to the Incident Response Cases
Resource Theories
In Chapter 1 we provided an overview of resource theories, which we briefly summarize
here. The RBV views an organization as a bundle of human, financial, and other assets and
capabilities; that is, “resources” (Penrose 1951; Barney 1991; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).
When preparing for and responding to InfoSec incidents, managers make use of a variety
resources, including tangible assets (e.g., computers, networks), intangible assets (data, software,
specialized knowledge), and capabilities (e.g., an engineer’s ability to quickly detect a security
violation and formulate a response plan). The Theory of Complementary Resources (Bauer and
Matzler 2014; Harrison et al. 1991; Nevo and Wade 2010) proposes that when assets and
capabilities supporting a particular function in a particular organizational unit support or improve
the effectiveness of the function, related functions, and other resources that are supporting the
function, they are complementary; the whole resource bundle is greater than the sum of its parts.
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We classify resources as technical, organizational, or institutional (McLaughlin and Gogan
2013). Each category of resource will consist of multiple assets and capabilities, each designed
for a specific purpose. If assembled deliberately, the intent is for these resources to have
complementary effects that contribute to an overall effective InfoSec incident response capability.
However, resources can also have unintended effects through their interactions.
Technical InfoSec resources are used by individual InfoSec managers, incident
responders and InfoSec teams. Hardware, software, networks, and data are applicable technical
assets, as are vulnerability reports or reverse engineering tools that are used in incident response.
A team’s abilities to automate tasks, perform backups, and maintain chain-of-custody records
would be examples of technical capabilities.
Organizational InfoSec resources include intangible assets (such as product brand
awareness or organization reputation), tangible assets (such as cash reserves), and human assets
(knowledge, skills). A company’s user InfoSec training programs and InfoSec policies are
specialized organizational resources, as is the organizational structure of its incident response
team (such as its centralized versus distributed functions or differential structures for routine
versus high-urgency incidents).
Institutional InfoSec resources are produced by national or state laws, professional
regulations, and professional norms. Examples are laws regarding cybercrime, InfoSec standards
(e.g., ISO 27001 or BS7799), and industry groups such as FIRST (Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams) or ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers), as well as
professionally sanctioned methodologies and certifications such as Global Information Assurance
Certification of forensic exams.

Accounting Control Theory (ACT)
Accounting controls, which already protect financial systems and related data – such as
accounts payable – can be adapted to protect other IT assets (equipment, software, data), non-
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transactional processes and systems (e.g., team collaboration, knowledge management), and
capabilities (e.g., new product design). Techniques and controls based on ACT (ISACA 1996;
Kaplan et al. 1998), have previously been shown to reduce risks in non-financial systems and
processes, such as patient safety practices in hospitals (Gogan et al. 2013) and preparedness for
natural disasters (Junglas and Ives 2007). Both existing and new controls can be applied to
InfoSec management, as I explain next.
ACT already guides audits of transaction processing systems and processes (Dunn et al.
2003; Kiger and Rose 2004; Walker et al. 2001), helping auditors gauge whether financial
statements are likely to be correct. ACT guides auditors in spotting and analyzing threats to
specific information quality characteristics (such as validity, accuracy and completeness of
accounting data) and evaluating the effectiveness of specific preventive, detective and corrective
controls over systems, related processes, and data. 5 An effective control portfolio (Davila et al.
2009) includes a mix of manual and automated preventive, detective and corrective controls.
Preventive accounting controls aim to reduce the likelihood of adverse events (such as an
employee inadvertently entering “100” when intending to enter “10,” or an employee or outsider
maliciously creating a false transaction). These and other adverse events threaten the quality of
financial information and the integrity of financial processes. Detective accounting controls aim
to rapidly discover adverse events that occur despite preventive controls – such as by spotting an
employee error in a spreadsheet or data entry form, or spotting evidence of a fake transaction,
skimming or other malicious adverse event. Corrective controls help the organization carry on,
despite the occurrence of an adverse event, while minimizing the impacts of the event on people

5 In Chapter 2, corrective aspects of InfoSec tasks were further divided into two components: response and
preparation. This was done to illustrate the feedback loop created by corrective tasks in InfoSec incident response
cycle. To closer align with ACT, that distinction is not made in this chapter; both response and preparation are
discussed as corrective controls.
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and processes. These same categories of prevention, detection and correction can be applied to
InfoSec controls as I summarize next:
Preventive InfoSec controls aim to reduce the likelihood of adverse InfoSec events,
including data breaches caused by hacker attacks, laptop theft or unauthorized employee access to
certain software and data. An example of a preventive control is a company policy that bans
employees outside the sales department from storing customer information on their laptops or
from having access to the customer database, except under clearly specified conditions (such as
sign-off from the Marketing VP).
Detective InfoSec controls aim to rapidly discover a breach (that occurs despite
preventive controls). An automatic detective control configured into a router can block additional
incoming messages from a particular IP address that is suddenly sending repeated messages.
Some detective controls are bundled with (and presumably complement) preventive controls. For
example, one automated detective control governs access to particular protected databases; if a
user’s information is not stored in an online authorization matrix (which specifies which users
have authorized access to which files), that user is denied access to the protected database/files
(preventive). A database administrator might be notified of unauthorized attempts (detective).
Corrective InfoSec controls aim to prepare for and rapidly respond to a breach, in ways
that protect human, data and other resources and processes from disruption or harm. Contingency
plans generally contain multiple automatic corrective controls, including system failover
mechanisms and specified triggers and processes for restoring data from a recently-created
backup file. Manual corrective controls include specifying who will serve as spokesperson for the
organization during the response; triggers and processes for reverting to non-computerized
processes; and other controls that help prevent harm to people, resources, and processes. Some
corrective InfoSec controls are bundled with detective and/or preventive controls. For example,
the use of automatic full backups prevents data loss, helps managers discover whether employees
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are storing personally-identifiable information such as social security numbers on their devices
(detect), and helps affected employees quickly get back up and running at work (correct).

InfoSec Theories and Frameworks
In Chapter 1, I defined Information Security consistent with the Coordination of Federal
Information Policy:
The protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access,
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide:
integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or
destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity;
confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary
information; and availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to
and use of information (“Coordination of Federal Information Policy” 2014).
Embedded in this definition is the CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability,
information characteristics considered foundational for many security models. ACT addresses the
CIA triad as well as other information qualities important to transaction processing (such as
information timeliness). Below, I discuss three common InfoSec models (starting with the most
general and concluding with the most specific to Incident Response) and then apply ACT to them.

Risk Management and IT Governance (ISACA 2012)

Figure 3-1: COBIT Value Creation Governance Objective
ISACA defined a risk management model based on IT governance objectives as part of the
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) framework. COBIT covers
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a wide range of principles that aim to align IT goals with their business drivers. The first
principle, Meeting Stakeholder Needs, creates value for stakeholders by balancing risks and
rewards. In COBIT’s value creation governance model, benefits, risks and resource optimization
are defined as:
Benefits realization, the primary goal of which is “bringing about of new benefits for the
enterprise, the maintenance and extension of existing forms of benefits, and the elimination of
those initiatives and assets that are not creating sufficient value” (ISACA 2012, p. 89). An
example in an InfoSec context would be providing users with high availability systems or
securely processing payment transactions.
Risk optimization includes transparency around costs, benefits and likelihood that a control
or policy will be violated. A key risk optimization goal is to minimize the probability that an
InfoSec incident (such as unauthorized access to confidential data) will occur.
Resource optimization: Consistent with RBV, COBIT considers how to bundle human,
financial, technical and other assets and capabilities. ISACA promotes “IT agility” and selection
of competent personnel as particularly important ways to optimize resources.

Model of Information Security Process (Andress 2014)
Starting in version 5, COBIT specifically addressed InfoSec principles; the framework
provides very detailed guidance on the governance and management of IT systems. However,
COBIT’s implementation is based on top-down controls designed to satisfy stakeholder
requirements. In The Basics of Information Security, Andress presents a 5-phase approach to
InfoSec, based on the U.S. Department of Defense OPSEC process, 6 which is designed to help
employees assess risk and limit the potential impact of a data loss incident. As a counter example

6

http://www.dodea.edu/Offices/Safety/OPSEC.cfm
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to COBIT, the OPSEC model is designed to help data custodians (system administrators and
users) protect information. This model is reproduced below in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2: Information Security Process
In this model, the process of establishing specific information security countermeasures/
controls entails the following steps:
Identify critical information that needs to be protected (e.g., confidential research data,
user credentials). The criticality of each category of information should be determined, to support
prioritizing controls.
Analyze threats to critical information, by asking questions (e.g. What damage might
occur if this information is lost or exposed?). For example, a data breach can damage an
organization’s reputation, create an obligation to pay fines, and require the organization to pay for
credit monitoring for affected users.
Analyze vulnerabilities (specific weaknesses that may be exploited by attackers).
Vulnerabilities include weak passwords, password reuse, software that is out of date, and other
exploitable flaws.
Assess risks including the likelihood of someone exploiting particular threats and the
likely impact(s) of such events (measured qualitatively and/or quantitatively).
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Apply countermeasures: Controls (such as intrusion detection systems) need to be
designed and implemented. Each control should be evaluated for its efficiency and costeffectiveness (if the cost to protect a resource exceeds the value of the resource, the control
probably should not be implemented).

Incident Response and Management Processes (Alberts et al. 2004)
While COBIT is a general model of IT governance and OPSEC focuses on protecting data,
the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute (SEI) process was designed
specifically to guide InfoSec incident response. This model contains five complementary
processes in three parallel workflows (Figure 3-3).

Figure 3-3: SEI Incident Response Model
The five key incident response processes are:
Prepare for events that will inevitably occur; this is formalized as an IR capability.
Preparation includes creating policies and procedures that define how incidents should be
handled; training staff members; allocating tools and other resources that may be needed to
respond to an incident.
Protect by ensuring that critical systems and data have adequate safeguards in place.
Protection includes performing security scans, patching vulnerable software, keeping rules on
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anti-virus and IDS systems up to date, implementing procedures for users to report suspicious
activities, etc.
Detect a breach or an event that could potentially lead to a breach. Detection can be
supported by automated alerts and by questions or reports from stakeholders (e.g. users,
managers, business partners). Once an event is detected by an automated system such as an IDS
or reported by a user, the goal is to initiate triage as soon as possible. An incident may stay in a
backlog until resources become available to conduct triage.
Triage by sorting, categorizing, correlating, and prioritizing reported and verified events.
Triage usually combines automated and manual tasks to filter and correlate events. The
prioritization process and rules should be well defined.
Respond in order to resolve, mitigate, or dismiss incident reports and events. Response
activities include deploying technical remediation, eliminating false positives, and accepting
vulnerability risks that cannot be fully mitigated.

Applying ACT to the Three InfoSec Models
RBV and ACT can support the COBIT, OPSEC, and SEI models described above, by first
classifying resources (assets and capabilities) used during incident response activities, and then
summarizing the preventive, detective, and corrective (response) aspects of each resource (see
Table 3-1).
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Prevent
Risk Management & IT Governance
Analyze stakeholder needs: Periodic
evaluation of stakeholder needs and
risks associated with failing to meet
those needs can encourage an
increased focus on areas of security
vulnerability.
Educate staff and end users: No
security program is complete without
good security policies and education
of support staff and end users. In most
computing systems, end users are the
weakest part of the security chain.
OPSEC
Principle of least privilege: End users
are given privileges only to resources
they need.
Block access to unnecessary ports:
Tools such as firewalls can help
prevent attackers from accessing
ports used by insecure services or
those not needed for normal
operations.
Authentication: Require strong
passwords and/or two factors (e.g.
password, physical token), which
should be synchronized across
multiple systems, for all administrator
access or access to sensitive
systems.
Security Scans and Penetration Tests:
Perform automated security scans
and manually verify results of
penetration tests.
Incident Response & Management
Policy and procedure creation:
Establish guidelines for a process to
quickly respond to security incidents.
Evaluate incident management
capability: Understand the extent of
incident response that is possible
under funding and staff restrictions, to
ensure resources are available.

Detect

Respond

Analyze stakeholder needs: Periodic
evaluation of stakeholder needs and
risks associated with failing to meet
those needs can encourage an
increased focus on areas of security
vulnerability.
Educate staff and end users: No
security program is complete without
good security policies and education
of support staff and end users. In most
computing systems, end users are the
weakest part of the security chain.

Analyze stakeholder needs: Periodic
evaluation of stakeholder needs and
risks associated with failing to meet
those needs can encourage an
increased focus on areas of security
vulnerability.
Educate staff and end users: No
security program is complete without
good security policies and education
of support staff and end users. In most
computing systems, end users are the
weakest part of the security chain.

Network Intrusion Detection and
Prevention Systems:
Network based IDS/IPS normally rely
on signatures to detect exploits and
attacks as they traverse a network.
Detect these activities and block
attackers.
File system integrity checks:
Specialized software tools provide
system administrators a way to
calculate hashes (type of ‘digital
fingerprint’) of critical system files in
order to detect any changes.
Statistical network anomaly detection:
Systems that create statistical
samples of the timing, location, and
volume of data can help detect
situations where network traffic falls
significantly outside of an expected
confidence interval, indicating a
breach.

Review of logs: System logs and
accounting records should be
examined in order to determine what
happened and when.
Forensic analysis: Forensic tools like
The Sleuth Kit can be used on copies
of disk images to find traces left
behind by an attacker.
Binary analysis:
Tools like IDAPro on viruses and
Trojan software may provide a lead or
information about the source of
malware.
Malware examination:
Malware can be placed into an
isolated network or sandbox, in order
to examine its behavior.

Proactive detection: Establishing
monitoring activities that regularly
occur prior to an incident (e.g. network
monitoring, antivirus alerts, etc.).
Reactive detection: Establishing
activities that are conducted following
the detection of an incident (e.g. webform reporting, help desk monitoring).

Investigate and respond:
Includes technical (e.g. reviewing log
files), managerial (e.g. stakeholder
notification), and legal (e.g. law
enforcement notification) response.
Incident reporting: Establish
guidelines for incident reports,
analysis, improvement proposals,
reports to stakeholders.

Table 3-6: ACT applied to Three InfoSec Models

By reviewing applicable theories and models such as these, the Theoretical Foundations section
of a teaching note is an important first step that can lead to a theory-building paper based on one
or more case studies, and also lead to subsequent studies using other empirical research methods.
As previously discussed, the two incidents were selected because their contexts (educational
institutions) were similar in some ways yet differed in important ways. I thus theorized that the
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InfoSec response processes in the two cases would contain both similarities and differences. A
rigorous cross-case comparison (drawing on the entire set of data that were gathered; not just the
descriptions provided in the discussion cases, which are crafted to support student discussion)
would be useful. Such a paper would compare the two organizations, their leaders, the InfoSec
response workflows of the two teams, issues that arose in each response effort, and other aspects,
to theorize about how different resource configurations fit different contexts and affect InfoSec
response practices and their effectiveness.
In Chapter 1, I outlined several avenues for further research that will build on these cases,
and I also sketched out studies that could build on what I learned from these two cases as well as
from the RepGrid study that is described in Chapter 4. In this dissertation, I have provided initial
support for the propositions that RBV, the Theory of Complementary Resources, and ACT are
useful frameworks that can inform future research on InfoSec incident response. Many more case
studies (as well as studies based on other empirical research methods) are needed to get a
complete picture of how managers configure resources in various contexts and cultures, and how
different resource configurations contribute to or impede effective InfoSec response.
The teaching cases based on my two case studies are presented next.
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CASE 1:
SNOWFALL AND A STOLEN LAPTOP
Snow Falling on Rochester
The vanity plates on the Lexus pulling up to the curb at Rochester New York International
Airport in February might have seemed cryptic to a casual onlooker: EPS COB. The acronym
stood for E. Phillip Saunders College of Business, one of eight colleges of the Rochester Institute
of Technology (RIT). In the driver’s seat was the EPS COB Dean. He said goodbye to his wife,
who would board a US Airways flight to Boston, where she worked.
Their home sat on a corner lot in a quiet residential Rochester neighborhood. The Dean
was grateful that his snow tires retained their grip; it had again been snowing all day. Driving
down Villanova Street, he clicked the remote control to raise the garage door and pulled into his
driveway. The snow looked to be four or five inches deep. With his jacket and gloves already on
and the snow tapering off, this was as good a time as any to get a little exercise, so he grabbed a
shovel from the garage wall and set to work. It was light, fluffy snow and he completed the job in
ten or fifteen minutes. He walked around to the front of the house (facing Carleton Road) to
shovel the front steps and walk. A few minutes later, after depositing the shovel in the garage, he
headed into the house through the back door, wiping his snowy boots on the doormat.
And that’s when he noticed a trail of wet boot prints. “What the …?” At first he could not
make sense of what he saw, but he soon realized those were not his wet boot prints; someone had
been in his house! He stepped into the kitchen and through to the den, where he had planned to
spend the evening answering emails and reviewing some materials in preparation for several
upcoming meetings. The intruder’s trail led through the den and into the front hall. He felt a cold
wind blowing through the front door—why was it open? Then he felt another chill: from the
sudden realization that his laptop, which he’d left on the couch in the den before taking his wife
to the airport, was no longer there. After shutting and locking the front door, he raced through the
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house to verify that the laptop was not in another room. Nothing else seemed amiss, but the
laptop was definitely gone. Its power cord dangled from the wall.
The Saunders College Dean realized he’d better call the police—and Dave Ballard.

URGENT: Laptop Stolen
Dave Ballard, Network Administrator at the Saunders College of Business, was relaxing at
home on a typically snowy Sunday in a suburb of Rochester when he noticed a new email from
the Dean, with an ominous subject line: URGENT: Laptop Stolen.
“Oh, no,” he thought. “Not again.” Two incidents in recent memory had also involved
stolen laptops at RIT (although, thankfully, not at the College of Business). Personally
identifiable information (PII) was stored in various files on those laptops, exposing many people
to a risk of identity theft. New York law required that incidents involving such risk had to be
disclosed to the State Attorney General’s Office. Since it had not been possible to verify whether
PII had or had not been compromised, it became necessary for RIT to offer a large number of
student applicants and current students free access to an expensive credit monitoring service
(when personal information is compromised in a data breach, a credit monitoring service gives
victims copies of their credit reports, and monitors credit activity—such as inquiries necessary to
open a new credit card account on a regular basis for a period of time. Most credit monitoring
services also provide identity theft insurance covering costs associated with an incident, and
professional assistance to help resolve issues that might arise from identity theft). RIT’s Chief
Financial Officer, highly displeased with the unexpected credit monitoring expenditures (Exhibit
1 and 2) had tasked RIT’s central IT office and each College IT unit to improve the security of
RIT-owned devices, data, and intellectual property stored on them.

RIT and the Saunders College of Business
RIT was one of the largest private universities in the United States, with 15,000+
undergraduate students, about 3000 graduate students, and a curriculum that emphasized career89

oriented experiential learning. RIT’s cooperative education program, in partnership with more
than 2000 employers, placed students in 5000 or more co-op assignments each year. The
Institute’s 1000+ full-time faculty, nearly 500 adjunct faculty, and more than 2200 staff were
distributed across eight colleges:
•

College of Applied Science and Technology

•

E. Philip Saunders College of Business

•

Golisano College of Computing and Information Sciences

•

Kate Gleason College of Engineering

•

College of Imaging Arts and Sciences

•

College of Liberal Arts

•

National Technical Institute for the Deaf

•

College of Science

The Saunders College had a full-time faculty of 50, about 800 undergraduates, and about
350 graduate students. Dave Ballard started working at RIT eleven years ago, while completing
his undergraduate degree in Information Technology (he also earned an MS in IT degree from
RIT). He had seen a few deans come and go from the College of Business. The current Dean, a
native of India, had moved to the United States after completing undergraduate studies in
electrical engineering at the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology. After earning his PhD,
The Dean worked in industry for several years—including a stint as Director of Business Systems
at a large company—before becoming a business professor whose research focused on operations
and quality management. While a professor, he also founded a small software firm.
The Dean had helped the faculty to revise the COB vision and mission, based on extensive
conversations with faculty, business leaders, and the broader RIT community. A key concern was
that Rochester’s economic growth had been stagnant as a result of over-reliance for years on the
fortunes of companies that once drove the local economy: Bausch and Lomb, Eastman Kodak,
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and Xerox. Kodak in particular had failed to successfully transition to products and services
based on digital technologies. Xerox had shifted some operations away from Rochester, and
Bausch and Lomb had also experienced challenges. The result: traumatic layoffs and few new
jobs. The Dean wanted the Saunders College to play a role in revitalizing Rochester and the
surrounding region. He argued for a business curriculum and research portfolio that would take
full advantage of RIT’s strengths in science, technology, and design, by emphasizing the
entrepreneurial and managerial aspects of technology-based innovation. The COB Vision,
endorsed by the faculty, was:
The Saunders College of Business wants to be the gateway to the technology
strengths of the Institute for building innovative commercial enterprises.
The COB Mission stated:
The Saunders College of Business and RIT deliver experienced-based managerially
relevant education dealing with the commercialization of technology and the
strategic and innovative uses of technology to create a distinctive competitive
edge…
Saunders faculty were hard at work developing new courses, revising existing ones, and
experimenting with instructional technologies and social media to help achieve their new vision.
With the curriculum effort well underway, the Dean was focused on strengthening the existing
faculty’s research capabilities, hiring new faculty with strong backgrounds at the intersection of
technology and business, improving student retention, reaching out to alumni, strengthening ties
with influential business leaders, and fund raising. His monthly Rochester Business Journal
columns on building an innovation economy generated positive buzz and complemented RIT
President William Destler’s message that RIT was “The Innovation University.”

IT Governance and Structure at RIT
The Saunders College of Business was one of three RIT colleges with their own dedicated
IT support office; the other five colleges relied on the university’s Information & Technology
Services (ITS) business unit for technical support services to students, faculty, and staff. ITS
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managed RIT user accounts and also supported the security software on RIT laptops and assisted
end users with issues related to computer hardware, software, and networking. After a security
incident, ITS would help users reset their university account passwords and configure
replacement devices. ITS was directed by RIT’s Chief Information Officer, who reported to the
Treasurer and Senior Vice President of Finance & Administration (see Figure 3-4). Although the
Saunders College IT support group did not report to ITS, it did rely on ITS for infrastructural
support (e.g., networking and telecommunications) and some data center services.
Senior Vice President &
Treasurer

Saunders College

Finance &
Administration

Budget and
Financial Planning

Global Risk
Management
Service

Information and
Technology Services

Legal Affairs

Capital Budget

Business
Continuity

Business
Services

Legal Affairs

Operating
Budget

Environmental
Health and
Saftey

Operations and
Architecture

Facilities
Accounting

Information
Security

Project
Managment

Financial
Planning and
Analysis

Public Saftey

Service
Strategies

Global Programs
Analysis

Risk
Management
and Insurance

Support and
Development

IT Support

Print and Postal

Figure 3-4: Partial RIT Administrative Organization Chart
Another Institute-wide business unit, the Information Security Office (ISO), was
responsible for publishing information security alerts and advisories, managing security
vulnerabilities in the RIT network, performing forensics after security incidents, and maintaining
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(and enforcing) university wide security policies and standards. ISO was directed by the
Institute’s Information Security Officer, within the Global Risk Management Services unit—a
separate arm of Finance & Administration from ITS. In the wake of earlier information breaches,
ISO spearheaded a Private Information Management Initiative (PIMI) which required faculty and
staff to regularly scan their computing devices for private information (e.g., Social Security
numbers, credit card numbers, and security codes) and to remove information which could
identify an individual. New York State defined private information (PI) as:
Any personal information concerning a natural person combined with one or more
of the following data elements: Social Security number (SSN), driver's license
number, account number, or credit or debit card number in combination with any
required security code. These combinations of information are often used in identity
theft.
New York’s Breach and Notification Act required that RIT notify affected individuals if
their private information may have been compromised. Other special-purpose laws protected
specific categories of information. For example, the US Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA) governed access to educational records; the US Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA)
governed record-keeping and protection of student financial records (such as financial aid
applications); and the US Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA) mandated
practices for protecting individuals’ medical information.
Information security was considered a critical priority at RIT. RIT’s Information Security
Council included the Institute’s Chief Information Officer, all members of the ISO,
representatives from ITS and the Global Risk Management Service unit, representatives from
each college and various administrative offices such as (in alphabetical order) Academic Affairs,
Academic Senate, Alumni Relations and Fundraising, Enrollment Management, Human
Resources, Student Affairs, and Student Government.
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Dave Ballard’s Response
The Dean’s email was short and to the point: “My house was broken into and my laptop
stolen. Call me.” Ballard dialed the Dean’s number, but could not get through, so he emailed a
reply: “Are you okay? Safety first.” An answer came a few minutes later: “Yes, fine. I notified the
Rochester police—they will be here shortly. How soon can you get me a new laptop?” As
Manager of Technical Services for the College, Nick Francesco would need to authorize
assignment of a new device, but Ballard knew that would not be a problem; obviously the Dean
needed a new laptop ASAP. He replied, “Don’t worry; I’ll drop by your office tomorrow around
9:30—okay? I’ve already enabled our asset management system to alert me if the device attempts
to connect to our servers.” Next, Ballard sent notes to Francesco and to RIT Public Safety. He
sighed and turned to his wife. “I’ll head to work earlier than usual tomorrow. There are a few
things to do before I see the Dean.”
The next morning Ballard located a laptop of the same model that the Dean used. In order
to minimize support issues, Saunders IT Support maintained a standardized pool of laptops,
refreshed on a five-year basis. IT Support had administrative control over laptops used by faculty
and staff. Although faculty and managers could apply for administrative rights on individual
devices, IT Support installed and updated most programs, scanned for malware, and performed
other device maintenance activities. LANDesk, an asset management application, helped
maintain a record of each authorized user’s configuration (e.g., specific software packages
installed on each machine). Referring to LANDesk, Ballard configured the new machine to
reflect the Dean’s preferences.
Having configured the new device, Ballard had a few minutes to spare before meeting with
the Dean—a fortunate fact, because his email to Public Safety had generated a flurry of activity.
Public Safety let him know that both ISO and ITS had been notified; each office had been in
contact with Ballard as well. Nick Francesco was in the loop now, too. In fact, heading up to the
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Dean’s office at 9:30, Ballard encountered Francesco, who was also on his way there. “Let’s hope
he didn’t have student PII on there,” said Francesco. “I hear you,” replied Ballard. “RIT doesn’t
need another round of credit monitoring for hundreds of students!”
Several RIT policies and standards covered information security (Exhibits 3, 4, 5). Data
was classified into four categories: private, confidential, internal, public. As part of the
information protection standard, every department was required to identify and maintain an
inventory of all private, confidential, and internal data it maintained. Francesco did not know of
any specific protected data on the Dean’s laptop, but from years of working with end-users, he
commented to Dave Ballard that it was likely that the Dean did have some sensitive data on his
laptop.
The Dean routinely started his day by 7:00 am, so he was anxiously waiting for them in his
office. He thanked Ballard and Francesco for the laptop, which he booted up as he described what
happened—driving back from the airport, shoveling snow, discovering footprints and an open
door, the sickening realization that his laptop was gone. “It didn’t occur to me to lock my doors
when I’m in the yard. From now on, I will.”
From previous experience, Francesco and Ballard knew that once a laptop was gone, it was
unlikely to be recovered. While they waited for the new laptop to boot, Francesco asked the Dean
about information that might have been on the stolen laptop. Francesco asked “What student
records did you have on your laptop?” The Dean quickly replied “None.” Francesco clarified:
“Until recently we used Social Security numbers to identify our students. Are you sure you didn’t
have any old class rosters, exams or other records on there?”
The Dean took a few seconds to deeply consider what he was asked. “No. I am not
teaching this semester, and I deleted everything from previous semesters.” Francesco continued:
“Think about this carefully, because it has implications much bigger than you and me. What
proprietary Saunders data did you have on that laptop?” The Dean replied, “I really didn’t have
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anything too important. It was committee notes, faculty salary information, stuff like that. It may
have been confidential, but not really proprietary.”
Seeing that his new machine was up and running, the Dean welcomed the opportunity to
move on. He clicked on Outlook to verify that his emails were synched with his phone—they
were. Then he said, “We can simply look to see what I had… What about my data—where is it?”
Francesco replied, “As you know, RIT users are responsible for their own backups.” Noting a
look of puzzlement on the Dean’s face—or was it irritation? Dave Ballard interrupted, “The Dean
does have a backup system.” He added:
I remember that when you came here, you were surprised that we don’t do full
backups for everyone, because your previous employer did that for all faculty. Not to
worry; I’ll restore your machine from the last backup.
The expression on the Dean’s face again puzzled Ballard: a flash of relief, then a hand to
the forehead and a muttered expletive. The Dean’s backup system did not run automatically; he
had to manually initiate it, at a moment when the machine wasn’t needed (since it took some
minutes to complete a backup). “I’m not sure when I ran the backup last.” said the Dean. Ballard
attempted to reassure him:
When we were troubleshooting your machine before the holiday, we performed a
backup; I’ll restore your machine from that. You may still be missing some things,
since that backup was almost two months ago, but this is better than nothing.
As they headed back to their offices Francesco asked Ballard to retrieve the serial numbers
of the stolen laptop from the College of Business inventory management system. Ballard agreed
to do so right away, and added:
I already set up an alert to fire if and when that stolen machine connects to the
Internet. As you know, every time one of our machines is turned on, it will attempt to
reach our auditing servers. It’s a long shot, but if someone turns it on and gets a
network connection, we will know.
“Too bad we can’t remotely wipe laptops,” noted Francesco. “Yeah, although laptops
aren’t constantly connected to a network the way mobile phones are, so the software is not very
effective; definitely not worth the price.”
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A few minutes later, Ballard reported the laptop’s serial number to Francesco, who
reported it to the Rochester police and RIT’s safety office. Francesco then contacted local pawn
shops, to see if anyone had attempted to sell a device with that serial number. Recalling also the
Dean’s statement that the thief “went through the house so quickly, they left the power cord
plugged into the wall!” Francesco called some local computer and electronic stores to see if
anyone had tried to purchase a replacement power cord. No luck there. Later that day Francesco
said to Ballard:
Most likely, the thief immediately reinstalled Windows on the Dean’s laptop. By
now, probably any data stored on that machine is gone. I doubt his files would be of
much use to the average crook.
Meanwhile, Ballard took a close look at the most recently backed up data from the Dean’s
laptop. In conjunction with the ISO office, he ran a software program that, among other tasks,
searched for 9-digit numeric strings (to discover if Social Security numbers or RIT student ID
numbers were stored in the Dean’s files), as well as 16-digit strings (possible credit card
numbers). The search revealed a few “hits,” which Francesco later reviewed with the Dean.
Among the 9-digit strings were some false positives (9-digit numbers that were not personal
identifiers), and a few real Social Security numbers, belonging to the Dean, his wife, and their
children. “Since those are ‘all in the family,’ they are your responsibility; we don’t need to notify
the Attorney General,” Francesco stated. The Dean explained that the 16-digit account numbers
were for personal bank accounts in India. “That’s also your responsibility,” said Francesco.
“Well, I doubt a Rochester thief will try to get access to a bank in Mumbai,” replied the Dean.
“Good thing our other banking information wasn’t there.”

Moving On
Over the next three days, the Dean tackled the daunting task of recovering what data he
could. “Events like this never come at a good time,” he grumbled. Some missing files were
needed for several events scheduled that week, for which he had been preparing. The Dean was
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able to recover some items from attachments stored in his Sent Items folder on the central RIT
email servers. Other missing files, such as budget reports containing salary details of Saunders
employees, were not in his e-mail. Not a problem; he knew who could reconstruct that
information for him.
Next, a search through his jacket pockets and desk drawers yielded a surprising number of
flash drives containing useful files, especially PowerPoint files (the Dean gave many
presentations to fellow deans, faculty, alumni and business leaders. He usually brought a flash
drive along, rather than taking his laptop to such events). He was pleasantly surprised at the
amount of content he was able to recover from these sources.
Unfortunately, he was not able to recover everything. For example, the most recent draft of
his Rochester Business Journal column had to be recreated from memory. This consumed a few
more hours of time that he really did not have to spare. Taking stock of the situation late on
Wednesday evening, The Dean realized that various other documents, spreadsheets and
presentations that he had created since the backup in December, were also irretrievably lost.
Still, considering the many challenges of being a Dean—such as dealing with occasionally
uncooperative faculty, coaxing donations out of prominent alumni, building a business case for
the Saunders College budget—the Dean felt he could quickly put this particular inconvenience
behind him. In challenging times, he relied on his sense of humor and positive outlook on life. So,
by Wednesday evening he was looking forward to having a pleasant dinner with an alumnus who
served on his advisory board and had become a close friend. Checking his calendar (“Good thing
the calendar was stored on the network and not on my machine!”), the Dean realized that soon he
and his wife would host a group of honors students for their annual appreciation dinner—always
an enjoyable weekend event at their Rochester home.
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All’s Well That Ends Well
Dave Ballard was relieved that the ISO concluded that the Dean’s stolen laptop did not
contain personally identifiable information on RIT students, faculty, or staff, and thus expensive
credit monitoring (costing $15 to $20 per affected individual), would not be necessary. The Dean
commented that the theft of his laptop was “a valuable lesson” about the importance of backups,
and he thanked Dave Ballard and Nick Francesco for their efforts.
“I guess all’s well that ends well,” thought Ballard.

Suggested Student Case Preparation Questions
1. Evaluate the steps that Dave Ballard and Nick Francesco took in response to the Dean’s email
informing them that his laptop had been stolen. Which steps were effective, and which steps
needed improvement? Be prepared to justify your reasoning by articulating your own criteria
for effective or ineffective incident response.
2. Consider the role of Dean of the Saunders College of Business, including leader,
spokesperson, fundraiser, and manager. In supporting the many activities the Dean performs
every day, how do digital assets on his laptop help him? What specific categories of
information does he keep on that machine, according to the case? What other information
might he store on his laptop, given the work that he does?
3. What strengths and weaknesses do you see in the COB InfoSec controls and incidentresponse activities? What are lessons the two main players, Dave Ballard and the Dean,
learned from this episode? What other lessons should they have learned?
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Exhibit 1: Excerpt from The Reporter (RIT student-run publication)
More Stolen RIT Laptops: Second major student data breach.
by Alyssa Kenny
With the aroma of turkey on the horizon tickling at their noses, approximately 1,000 students were greeted
over Thanksgiving break with a letter from RIT explaining that their personal information was at risk. On
November 17, “three laptops were discovered stolen from a locked storage area” on the RIT campus, the
letter stated. The laptops were said to contain personal information.
It is believed that the laptops were stolen sometime between November 7 and November 14. It is alleged
that two of the computers contained confidential student information, including some students’ names,
dates of birth, and social security numbers. RIT Public Safety and the Monroe County Sheriff’s office are
currently investigating the theft.
According to the information that RIT sent out to the affected students, the university “is acutely aware of
the need to secure sensitive data. RIT continuously reviews practices in place to protect sensitive data.” To
aid in highlighting the importance of protection as well as to alleviate some of the stress the incident may
have caused, RIT is providing each affected student with a free one-year trial of Experian’s Triple Alert.
Triple Alert is a credit-monitoring product, which will monitor the student’s credit reports at Experian,
Equifax, TransUnion, the three main national credit reporting companies. RIT hopes that the affected
students will take advantage of this opportunity to have the product identify potentially fraudulent use of
their information and ensure their protection from identity theft.
According to a Federal Trade Commission survey, identity theft is the fastest growing crime in America.
Last year alone, 9.9 million victims were reported.
Electronics are a hot commodity at RIT. At a school as electronically dependent and technologically
renowned as RIT, it is imperative for students to protect their electronics and identity from theft and
hacking, and for everyone to guard against potential laptop theft.

Exhibit 2: Excerpt from University News (RIT News and Public Relations Division)
College of Design and Architecture STOLEN LAPTOP
RIT recently discovered that personal information was on a laptop computer stolen from the National
Technical Institute for the Deaf on August 25. The information included names, dates of birth, and
Social Security numbers.
NOTE: Letters were mailed to those affected. This information security alert does NOT affect the
entire RIT community, but a specific population. This includes about 12,700 individuals who have
applied to enroll at the National Technical Institute for the Deaf (dating back to 1968). Another 1,100
members of the RIT community have also been impacted. Again, people affected have been notified
individually.
A toll-free hotline has been established at 1-866-624-8330. You will be able to call this number through
a relay service. The hotline will be available from Tuesday, Sept. 2, through Friday, Sept. 26, and you
may call from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. (Eastern Time) on weekdays, and on Saturdays from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.
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Exhibit 3: RIT Information Security Policy
The information assets of Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) must be available to the RIT
community, protected commensurate with their value, and administered in conformance with federal and
state law. Reasonable measures shall be taken to protect these assets against accident or unauthorized
access, disclosure, modification or destruction, as well as to reasonably assure the confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and authenticity of information. Reasonable measures shall also be taken to reasonably assure
availability, integrity and utility of information systems and the supporting infrastructure in order to protect
the productivity of members of the RIT community, in pursuit of the RIT mission.
Information safeguards are administrative, technical, and physical controls that support the
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of information. Information systems and
supporting infrastructure consists of information in its analog and digital forms and the software,
network, computers, tokens, and storage devices that support the use of information.
Controls depend on the system, its capabilities and expected usage, and anticipated threats against the
information.
•
•
•

Preventive controls include use of encryption, information integrity measures, security
configuration, media reuse, use of antivirus, and physical protection.
Detective controls include network and information access monitoring, and intrusion detection
(host based or network based), manual or automated review of security logs.
Corrective controls include recovery plans for handling isolated information safeguard failure
incidents to business continuity plans.

RIT will take reasonable steps to:
1.

Designate one or more individuals to identify and assess risks to non-public or business-critical
information within RIT and establish a university-wide information security plan.

2.

Develop, publish, maintain, and enforce standards for lifecycle protection of RIT information systems
and supporting infrastructure in the areas of networking, computing, storage, human or
device/application authentication, human or device/application access control, incident response,
applications or information portals, electronic messaging, and encryption.

3.

Develop, publish, maintain and enforce standards for RIT workforce security related to the
irresponsible use of information.

4.

Provide training to authorized university users in the responsible use of information, applications,
information systems, networks, and computing devices.

5.

Develop, publish, maintain and enforce standards to guide RIT business associates and outsources
partners in meeting RIT standards of lifecycle protection when handling RIT information or supporting
RIT information systems and supporting infrastructure.

6.

Encourage the exchange of information security knowledge, including threats, risks, countermeasures,
controls, and best practices both within and outside the university.

7.

Periodically evaluate the effectiveness of information security control in technology and process.
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Exhibit 3: RIT Acceptable Use Policy
Policy Name: CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMPUTER AND NETWORK USE (C8.2)
I. Introduction
The computing, network, and information resources of RIT are intended to support the mission of teaching,
scholarly activity, and service for the University’s students, faculty and staff. Appropriate use of computing
and networking facilities by members of RIT’s academic community should always reflect academic
honesty and good judgment in the utilization of shared resources, and observe the ethical and legal
guidelines of society. This document constitutes RIT’s policy for the proper use of all computing and
network resources.
RIT’s computer and network facilities provide access to a wide variety of on and off campus resources.
This privilege of access requires individual users to act in an ethical manner and as a result imposes certain
responsibilities and obligations. It is the responsibility of every user to respect the rights, privacy, and
intellectual property of others, and abide by all local, state, and federal laws and regulations.
This document outlines the user privileges and responsibilities as well as the guidelines and procedures for
the responsible use of the RIT computer systems and networks. It is intended to allow for the proper use
and management of these facilities, provide protection of users’ rights, ensure reasonable access, and
provide guidelines for accountability. It applies not only to RIT computers and networks, but also to
computers attached to RIT’s networks in any way.
II. Definitions
To avoid ambiguity, the following definitions are supplied:
A.
User - Anyone who uses computing or network facilities.
B.
Authorized University User - Anyone who has followed account application procedures and has
been granted access to any or all of the computing or network resources of RIT for reasons consistent with
the mission of the university, and consistent with this policy.
C.
University Computing Resources - Any computing, network, or software system donated to or
purchased by the University or by a grant that is resident at the University.
D.
University Network - The network of the University comprising the physical components such as
cable, switches, telecommunications equipment, wireless hubs, routers, Virtual Private Network (VPN)
concentrators, dial-up access points, as well as the Internet and Internet2 connection points. The University
network also has logical components such as IP addresses, directory services, routing, and connectivity to
computing resources.
E.
University Network Connections - Any computer or device using an Internet address assigned to
RIT or that is connected to a physical or wireless access point is considered to be connected to the
University network.
F.
Personal Computing Resources - Personal resources such as PCs, networking equipment, etc.
which have been purchased and are owned by an Authorized University User and are connected to the
University network.
G.
Special Access - Access to resources on a system that could be used to alter the behavior of the
system, or to access accounts on the system. Examples are UNIX “root” or Windows “Administrator”.
H.
System Owner - The person with the authority to designate or use special access account
privileges.
I.
System or Network Administrator - The person responsible for maintaining the authentication
used by the system or network, controlling authorized use, and maintaining system and network integrity
and audit trails.
J.
Secure Systems - Any hardware or software system whose use is restricted to a subset of the
community of legitimate RIT users.
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III. Relationship to Other University Policies
A. University Policies - Many issues addressed in this Code of Conduct relate to existing University
policies, including (but not limited to) the University’s policies on privacy, intellectual property, and
prohibition of discrimination and harassment (found elsewhere in this Manual). This Code is intended to
supplement and clarify the guidelines laid out in those policies as they apply to use of computer systems
and electronic resources, not to supersede them.
B. Other Computer Use Policies - Campus units that operate their own computers or networks are
encouraged to add, with the approval of the unit administrator, additional guidelines that supplement, but
do not lessen, the intent of this policy or other University policies. In such cases, the unit administrator will
inform users within the unit and will provide a copy of the unit-level policy to the Chief Information
Officer and to the Information Security Officer.
IV. User Privileges and Responsibilities
A. Privacy - The University’s “Privacy Policy” (C7.0) recognizes that “Individual privacy and security are
highly valued by our society,” but “must be balanced by the other community enumerated values and
needs.” Within this understanding, the RIT community is assured that the privacy of such “personal
property” as “written communications intended by their creator to be private including those transmitted or
preserved in paper, electronic, or other media” will be protected, although it cannot be completely
guaranteed.
The “Privacy Policy” also recognizes that members of the RIT community have a responsibility to
cooperate with authorized searches and seizures in emergencies and in circumstances of probable cause. In
such instances, including those involving RIT computer and network use, the search and/or seizure of
personal property or personal communications will be executed only on the authorization of an official
identified in the “Privacy Policy.” Cooperation with the search or seizure of one’s personal property or
personal communication does not of itself imply one’s own misuse or abuse of RIT computers or network;
the search or seizure may be deemed necessary because of misuse or abuse elsewhere in the RIT system or
in systems to which the RIT system is connected or affiliated. For example, scanning and pattern-matching
of incoming or outgoing e-mail may be necessary to remove computer viruses, to locate the sources of
spam, or to respond to legitimate internal or external requests for investigation. In all instances of
investigation into personal computing and network use, individuals are protected to the extent possible by
the provisions of the “Privacy Policy.”
B. Freedom from Harassment - The RIT “Policy Prohibiting Discrimination and Harassment” (C6.0)
defines “harassment” as unwelcome “conduct, communication, or physical contact” which has the effect of
either “unreasonably interfering with” another’s work, activities, or participation, or of “creating an
intimidating, hostile or abusive environment” for a RIT employee or student. Members of the RIT
community are assured that electronic communications that appear to have one or more of these effects are
prohibited and will be investigated. This prohibition includes all obscene, defamatory, threatening, or
otherwise harassing messages.
Correspondingly, members of the RIT community have the obligation not to use the RIT computing
systems and network in such a way as to be reasonably judged to produce one or another of the above
effects, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Such alleged or real misuse is covered by the provisions of
this Code of Conduct as well as by the “Policy Prohibiting Discrimination and Harassment” (C6.0).
C. Intellectual Property - The RIT policy on “Intellectual Property” (C3.0) deals in a detailed and
exhaustive way with the rights of RIT employees as creators and owners of intellectual property. The
privilege of creating and owning intellectual property as outlined in that policy is fully recognized by this
Code of Conduct.
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However, where a violation of the “Intellectual Property Policy,” or of the intellectual property rights of
creators or owners beyond the RIT campus, is alleged to have occurred through student or employee misuse
of the RIT computing systems and network, such alleged misuse will be investigated and, if proved,
sanctioned.
For example, RIT users must not distribute copyrighted or proprietary material without written consent of
the copyright holder, nor violate U.S. copyright or patent laws concerning computer software,
documentation, or other tangible assets. Users should assume that any software or other electronic materials
or media are copyright protected, unless the author(s) explicitly states otherwise.
D. Freedom of Expression - In general, all members of the RIT community–students and employees
alike–enjoy freedom of expression in the normal course of their activity.
This freedom is both assured by numerous University policies and constrained by specific provisions of
certain RIT policies, such as those noted herein (C3.0, C6.0, C7.0 and C10.0) as well as by specific
provisions of this Code of Conduct. The constraints are, as in civil law, imposed only for the sake of the
common good and the rights of individuals. Consequently, members of the RIT community have the
responsibility to use RIT’s electronic resources in ways that respect the rights of others and permit our
common electronic resources to be equitably shared. Since free and civil discourse is at the heart of a
university community, users should communicate in a manner that advances the cause of learning and
mutual understanding.
RIT reserves the right to restrict or deny access to its computing resources to those whose use of them is
not consonant with the mission of the university.
V. Responsible Use of Resources
In exchange for the privileges associated with membership in the RIT computing community, users assume
the responsibility to use the community’s resources in a responsible and professional manner. The
following paragraphs (A.-G.) highlight a non-exhaustive list of specific responsibilities. Questions about
the appropriateness of any use of resources should be directed to the staff of the Division of Information
and Technology Services or to the systems personnel responsible for the resource in question.
A. Access to Secure Systems
1. Passwords and similar authorization information - Passwords are the primary way in which users are
authenticated and allowed to use the community’s computing resources. One should not disclose one’s
password(s) to any individual, including a faculty or staff member, unless the person is a properly
authorized system administrator performing account maintenance activities for which the password is
required. Similarly, one should not disclose other identifying information (e.g., PIN numbers) used to
access specific system information. Authorized users are held accountable for violations of this Code of
Conduct involving their accounts.
2. Unauthorized use of resources - One must not allow others to make use of one’s account(s) or network
access privileges to gain access to resources to which they would otherwise be denied.
3. Circumventing or compromising security - Users must not utilize any hardware or software in an
attempt to compromise the security of any other system, whether internal or external to the RIT systems
and network. Examples of prohibited activities include (but are not limited to) Trojan horses, password
crackers, port security probes, network snoopers, IP spoofing, and the launching or knowing transmission
of viruses or worms.
B. Self-Protection - Any member of the RIT community who attaches a computer to the RIT network must
take measures to ensure that the computer is protected against compromise by an internal or external attack.
In this context, reasonable measures include the installation and maintenance of virus detection and
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eradication software, care in opening e-mail message attachments, vigilance when visiting web sites and
adhering to published system configuration and management standards.
C. Commercial Activity - No member of the RIT community may use a RIT computing account or any
communications equipment that is owned or maintained by RIT to run a business or commercial service or
to advertise for a commercial organization or endeavor. Use of RIT’s computer systems and networks for
the personal promotion of commercial goods or services is strictly prohibited. RIT employees who are
engaged in professional consulting for-a-fee relationships may use RIT’s computing and network resources
to correspond with existing clients, but not to advertise or promote their consulting practice.
D. Personal Use of RIT Resources - In general, the use of RIT’s computing and network resources to
promote commercially-related activities or events that have no direct relationship to RIT’s mission is not
permitted. Occasional personal use of these resources, for example, to promote a single fund-raising event
or activity, to sell a used item within the RIT community, or to offer RIT colleagues the opportunity to rent
a house may be permitted at the tacit discretion of the Chief Information Officer.
E. Communication with Government Officials - E-mail communications with government officials must
abide by RIT’s guidelines for political activities as outlined in policy C10.0. Individuals wishing to address
a legislative issue on behalf of the university should consult with the Office of Government and
Community Relations before sending such communications using RIT’s network.
F. Harmful Activities - One must not use one’s privileges as a member of the RIT computing community
to cause harm to any individual or to harm any software or hardware system, whether internal or external to
RIT. Examples of harmful activities, in addition to those noted elsewhere in this Code, include:
1. Intentional damage
•
•
•
•

Disabling others’ computers
Compromising security
Disabling or corrupting software systems
Destroying, altering, or compromising data integrity (e.g., student records, personnel information, etc.)

2. E-mail spamming
3. Threatening or intimidating e-mail, newsgroup postings, or web sites.
4. Denial of service attacks (e.g., making it difficult or impossible for others to use the network).
G. Illegal Activities - For the protection of the RIT computing community as a whole, it is imperative that
all members refrain from any conduct that is illegal. Illegal activities that are prohibited include (but are not
limited to):
1.

2.

3.

Copyright infringement, including publishing copyrighted material such as papers, software,
music, musical scores, movies, and artistic works. It is irrelevant whether or not any profit is
made from such distribution; the mere fact of providing uncontrolled access to such material is
illegal.
Divulging information that is confidential or proprietary information.
Misrepresentation of one’s identity to gain access to systems, software, or other services to which
one does not have authorized access.
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Exhibit 4: RIT Information Classifications
Private—a classification for information that is confidential which could be used for identity theft and has
additional requirements associated with its protection. Private information includes:
•
•
•

Social Security Numbers (SSNs), Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), or other national
identification number
Driver’s license numbers
Financial account information (bank account numbers (including checks), credit or debit card
numbers, account numbers)

Confidential—a classification for information that is restricted on a need to know basis, that, because of
legal, contractual, ethical, or other constraints, may not be accessed or communicated without specific
authorization. Confidential information includes:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Educational records governed by the Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act (FERPA) that are
not defined as directory information
University Identification Numbers (UIDs)
Employee and student health information as defined by Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA)
Alumni and donor information
Employee personnel records
Employee personal information including: home address and telephone number; personal e-mail
addresses, usernames, or passwords; and parent’s surname prior to marriage
Management information, including communications or records of the Board of Trustees and
senior administrators, designated as confidential
Faculty research or writing before publication or during the intellectual property protection
process.
Third party information that RIT has agreed to hold confidential under a contract

Internal—a classification for information restricted to RIT faculty, staff, students, alumni, contractors,
volunteers, and business associates for the conduct of University business. Examples include online
building floor plans, specific library collections, etc.
Public—a classification for information that may be accessed or communicated by anyone without
restriction.
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CASE 2:
A HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING CLUSTER UNDER ATTACK:
THE TITAN INCIDENT
Introduction
On the morning of August 12, Margrete Raaum, Computing Emergency Response Team
(CERT) manager at the University of Oslo (Universitetet i Oslo, UiO), sat down to drink a cup of
strong coffee and reflect on the events of the previous two and a half days. Around five o’clock in
the evening on August 9, Raaum had returned to Norway after attending the annual DefCon
security conference in Las Vegas 7 with several colleagues. She was drowsy from jet-lag when her
phone had rung and an engineer in UiO’s research computing operations group told her, “Um, I
think there might have been a break-in on the Titan cluster.”
Raaum now thought, “That may have been the understatement of the year,” as she took
another sip of coffee. UiO was a member of the Nordic DataGrid Facility (NDGF) of the
European Grid Initiative (EGI). Titan, a high-performance computing cluster, was a shared
resource that supported astrophysics research and other scientific initiatives sponsored by NDGF
and/or EGI. The computational power supplied by Titan was essential to molecular biology
research, DNA sequencing analysis, and petroleum reservoir simulations. Many scientists took
advantage of Titan’s extensive computational power by writing their own custom applications for
their research. Ensuring the security of the Titan cluster was one of Raaum’s many
responsibilities, and she was well aware of a troubling worldwide trend: cybercriminals
frequently broke into various organizations’ networks to steal username and password
combinations (credentials) and then (capitalizing on the knowledge that many users re-used their
passwords on other sites) used the stolen credentials to attack higher value targets. So, instead of

7

DEF-CON, a security conference held every summer in Las Vegas, Nevada, is widely attended by security
professionals, researchers, and other individuals with an interest in security issues.
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catching up on her sleep the evening of August 9, Margrete Raaum was jolted into command
mode.
News of the attack had triggered a maelstrom of international activity as Raaum and her
team tried to determine what happened, contain the damage, and plan an orderly return to full
operation. At Raaum’s direction, the Titan master node and login nodes were taken offline at 5:30
pm on August 9. Since then, much had been accomplished but Titan was not yet back on-line.
Numerous scientists had contacted Raaum to learn when they could resume using Titan for their
data calculations; pressure from both the scientific community and university administration was
intensifying. Raaum hoped that by the end of the day it would be possible to bring Titan back
online and put this nasty incident behind her. She took one last sip of coffee before leaving her
office and headed to the “war room.” There she met other members of the UiO incident response
and operations teams to review the details of the attack and discuss what else needed to be done
to return Titan to full operations.

Credentials and Identity Theft
Some attackers used dictionaries of previously identified usernames and passwords,
combined with automated tools, to check for password reuse across web pages, Internet based
services, remote access programs, and databases. On a high-speed network, a typical dictionary
attack could attempt 240 to 250 account combinations per second. Raaum knew that many
amateur attackers were motivated by bragging rights or “lulz” 8. However, other attacks were
financially motivated. Since many people reused their passwords (or used similar passwords) on
multiple sites, cybercriminals could easily check whether stolen credentials were valid on other
online services, such as banking or email. If stolen credentials were found to be valid, an attacker
could use these to perpetrate financial fraud, gain access to sensitive or confidential

8

A variant of lol (“laughing out loud”), “lulz” conveys entertainment at someone else’s expense.
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organizational records, or offer the credentials for sale on the black market. Passwords which
provided access to email systems sometimes also gave attackers further access to other accounts
(for example, by performing a password reset). Other cybercriminals used stolen credentials to
perform reconnaissance that helped them to launch “spear fishing” campaigns or targeted social
engineering attacks.
Raaum was aware of another troubling aspect of credential theft: because a usernamepassword combination for a single account by itself was not worth a lot of money, a stolen
credential was commonly used as an initial attack vector onto a system. Once they gained access,
attackers would then attempt to gain administrative-level privileges in order to “harvest”
additional passwords.
The value of stolen credentials was determined by the number and types of applications the
credentials could access, combined with the attacker’s ability to sell the credentials. A credential
that provided access to personally identifiable information (such as social security numbers or
credit card numbers) reportedly fetched $1 to $3 on the black market. User names and passwords
that granted access to university library resources sold for as much as $20 each—often to students
who otherwise had poor access to useful academic research resources. Black-market sellers also
touted the use of stolen credentials to gain access to connected data storage. A system with high
interconnection speed and large storage capacity could thus be used as a temporary storage area
for stolen source code, databases, or pirated software and movies. Furthermore, compromised
cloud resources or systems with fast Internet connections could be used as platforms from which
to launch attacks against other systems.
Besides the cybercriminal and amateur hacker, there were even more sinister threats to
cyberspace. In speeches supporting the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, United States President
Barack Obama stated that cyber-attacks posed an extremely serious national security
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challenge 9, 10, 11. In light of these concerns, organizations that hosted significant computational
resources (such as cloud or grid computing services) needed to consider the possibility that their
systems could be victims of espionage or have their resources used to conduct attacks on other
targets.

High Performance Computing and Incident Response at UiO
Research organizations often combined multiple systems into a cluster in order to obtain
higher computational and storage capacity. A cluster was a group of computers managed by a
single organization; however, a cluster could also be part of a larger grid computing environment
that shared computational resources with other organizations (as was the case for the Titan
cluster). Because a grid is usually managed by various organizations, they typically run
heterogeneous operating systems at different patch levels. A cluster may or may not be strictly
regulated. All systems in the Titan cluster ran on a Linux-based operating system called CentOS;
however, no standards governed the software levels running on the nodes. Many organizations
that hosted large computational facilities—including some that partnered with UiO—did not have
sufficient resources to test software patches in their lab before patch deployment. Because
network operations teams were understandably concerned that untested patches could have
negative impacts, patches were generally only installed when this was deemed to be absolutely
necessary.
In a cluster computing environment, an end user would first access a login node and then
establish a connection to the master node in order to schedule one or more jobs. Each job was
then dispatched by the master node to any available system in the cluster. A grid operated in a
similar fashion; however, the available systems were usually geographically dispersed. Each

9

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-securing-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure
http://www.dhs.gov/secretary%E2%80%99s-web-address-cybersecurity
11 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444330904577535492693044650
10
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cluster had access to dedicated network-attached storage, as well as network storage outside the
cluster. A representation of a typical computational cluster is shown in Figure 3-5.

Figure 3-5: A Typical Grid Architecture
Titan had two login nodes and one master node, providing access to more than 5000 core
processors capable of performing 40 trillion floating point operations per second. Table 3-7
outlines Titan’s technical capabilities.
Number of Cores
Number of Nodes
Max Floating Point Performance
Total Memory
Total Local Storage
Total Networked Storage

5004
651
40 Teraflops/s
11 TeraBytes
271 TeraBytes
1 PetaByte

Table 3-7: Technical Specifications for the Titan Cluster
Titan was part of several research collaboratives such as the Nordic Data Grid Facility
(NDGF), which was created to serve as a regional computing center to process data generated by
the Large Hadron Collider at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (Conseil Européen
pour la Recherche Nucléaire, CERN). In 2010, NDGF had started participating in the European
Grid Infrastructure (EGI). EGI gave scientists around the world a means to use high-capacity
computational resources for open collaboration, to create models, and process experimental data.
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Other collaborative research initiatives that Titan supported included several multi-university
astrophysics research projects.
UiO’s Computer Emergency Response Team (UiO CERT) was responsible for responding
to security incidents that affected Titan. Raaum was well aware that a Titan security incident
could affect UiO’s international collaboration partners, such as those connected to NDGF or other
research partnerships. In order to support various grids and online collaboration, Titan’s user
database and passwords were synchronized with various UiO partners. UiO was also part of
UniNETT, a Norwegian educational Internet service provider dedicated to supporting research
and education communities in Norway. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 3-6.

Figure 3-6: Geographic Dispersion of Nordic DataGrid Facility Tier-1 Clusters
Margrete Raaum, a computer science graduate of UiO, had been in charge of UiO CERT
since January 2007. Previously, she worked as a network engineer for several organizations,
including the Norwegian National Security Authority and the educational network, UniNETT.
She kept up with best practices in computer security by sitting on the steering committee and
board of directors of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) 12.
As CERT manager, Raaum led a virtual team of ten individuals who worked on security
issues on a part-time, as-needed basis. Although the CERT team was responsible for security of

12

http://www.first.org
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the Titan cluster, they were not responsible for upgrading or patching the systems running on it;
these activities were handled by the UiO network operations team. Raaum believed that although
a grid is a complex environment, it is only slightly more difficult to maintain than smaller
configurations. This is because individual nodes could be taken off-line for system maintenance
activities such as software upgrades without affecting the rest of the cluster.

The Mass Compromise of Multinational Research Accounts
Arriving in the war room, Raaum quickly brought the meeting to order and began the
briefing. Figure 3-7 outlines a complete list of activities conducted during the investigation so far.
Looking down at her notes, she referred to an email from the UiO operations team, dated
November 2010, which notified UiO of the glibc variable substitution vulnerability. The notice
stated that the vulnerability could be used by attackers to gain privileged access. (For more
information on this vulnerability, see Exhibit 1).

Figure 3-7: Investigation and Remediation Activities
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Raaum paused a moment to contain the wave of frustration that swept over her. Why
hadn’t the patch for this vulnerability been installed, she thought, “especially when we knew the
exploit was being used to compromise other grid systems?!” She recalled that the operations team
had noticed suspicious behavior weeks prior to notifying her. Later, they explained that they
thought a researcher must have been conducting an experiment. Irritating thoughts like that would
have to be deferred for a quiet time; at this moment Margrete Raaum needed to focus on what
else needed to be done and if it was safe to reconnect Titan to the data grid.
She continued through the rest of her notes. Shortly after that fateful call on August 9, UiO
CERT verified that Titan’s master and login nodes had been compromised by an attacker. As part
of the cluster, these nodes had access to all of the other computers in the cluster, along with 271
terabytes of shared disk space, supporting research in natural sciences and engineering at the
university. With a huge quantity of valuable information and computational resources at stake,
Raaum had immediately ordered that Titan be disconnected from the Internet.
Shortly after Titan was taken off line, Raaum had received an email from Lief Nixon, a
security officer at the National Supercomputer Center at Linköping University in Sweden (which
was also part of NDGF) asking what happened. She replied “We may have found a modified sshd
binary on one of Titan’s login nodes. Not sure yet.” Nixon then reached out with an offer to help
analyze any evidence her team had collected. He offered to perform binary analysis in his
sandbox, to provided details on how code or tools installed by the attacker functioned. This was a
resource that Raaum did not have readily available, so she eagerly accepted his offer.
Nixon’s email had surprised Raaum, because she was not fully aware of Titan’s
dependencies with NDGF. The various clusters that comprised NDGF were connected to a
national research and educational network, UniNETT. Raaum had not been fully aware that the
outage caused by her decision to take Titan offline at the start of the investigation would be
reported to the university’s grid partners (See Exhibit 2, the UniNETT trouble ticket). Raaum had
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previously met Nixon in 2010, at a FIRST security conference in Miami 13. She knew his technical
capabilities and felt he could be trusted.
Nixon’s work ultimately saved days’ worth of effort, and left Raaum free to focus on other
aspects of the investigation and on operational aspects of cleaning up after the attack. In the last
few days, Raaum and Nixon had communicated almost exclusively through email. Their
correspondence primarily focused on technical issues, such as their interpretations of network
traffic patterns captured during the attack and data in local system logs.
Local systems logs indicated that Titan was compromised about six weeks before the
cluster was taken off-line. UiO investigators discovered that one Titan login node was accessed
by the attacker in the middle of the night on June 23. Within ten minutes of accessing the system,
the attacker had used the C compiler on Titan to exploit the glibc variable substitution
vulnerability. After the attacker gained administrative, or root, level access to the node, they
downloaded software compilation libraries to the system. These libraries allowed the attacker to
create programs and compile a modified version of the secure shell (SSH) program, the primary
means through which users accessed the Titan cluster. The modified SSH was designed to record
the usernames, passwords and SSH access keys of accounts as users accessed the cluster. Since
databases containing account credentials for accessing the grid computers were synchronized
among participating institutions, once Titan was compromised the attacker could use the stolen
credentials to access other systems.
Nixon’s sandbox investigation also revealed that the attacker cleverly inserted a
backdoor—ensuring that the attacker could regain access to the Titan nodes even if all passwords
were reset. Logs of other systems in the cluster further revealed that on June 24, a second login
node had been compromised in the same manner, and that on July 15 the master node was
compromised. Figure 3-8 provides a timeline of events identified during the investigation.

13

http://www.first.org/conference/2010/
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(A) October 2010
Notification of a vulnerability—GNU glibc $ORIGIN Substitution Privilege Escalation—is released.
(B) November 2010 UiO Operation’s team is notified that the glibc vulnerability has been used to compromise grids at other
facilities
(C) June 23, 2011 An attacker accesses one of Titan’s login nodes, using credentials that are later revealed to have been stolen
from a Spanish university. Attacker gains administrative access and recompiles the SSH application.
(D) June 24, 2011 A second login node is compromised.
(E) July 15, 201
Master node is compromised.
(F) August 9, 2011 17:01 Raaum is notified of the attack.
17:30 Titan is taken off-line
17:45 UniNETT is notified of the outage
18:34 Grid partners are notified of the outage
(G) August 12, 2011 22:00 Decision needs to be made: Okay to bring Titan back on line?

Figure 3-8: Timeline of Events
As part of the investigation, the UiO operations and CERT team reviewed the system audit
logs that indicated which user accounts were accessing Titan on June 23—the day of the initial
attack. The team discovered that five users were using Titan at that time; all five were part of an
astrophysics research collaboration involving multiple European universities. Raaum immediately
contacted each university. She had little trouble reaching the users at four Norwegian universities.
Each researcher informed her that they were online and using their accounts for legitimate
purposes at the time when Titan was compromised. She believed them, and for the moment,
eliminated their accounts as the source of the attack. However, Raaum experienced great
difficulty in her attempts to get through to the remaining astrophysicist at a Spanish university.
Raaum phoned the university’s help desk to get contact information for this researcher, but the
help desk staff was not helpful. Raaum resorted to using every “scare tactic” she could think of to
get the information she needed from them, including using charged words like “security”,
“attack”, and “compromised.” At the time Raaum had thought “it’s just a long way from a
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university’s help desk to a researcher in astrophysics”. When she finally reached the Spanish
scientist, she had asked him, “Do you normally work very late at night?” The confusion on his
part, and his assertion that he was not using the Titan cluster at the time of the attack, were all the
confirmation she needed that she had finally found the account that the attacker used.
Although Raaum was now confident that she had identified the source of the attack, she
was uncertain about several next steps. What else should they do in order to prevent Titan from
being compromised again? How could she verify that her team had identified and remediated all
the changes made by the attacker? Should end-users be notified? Should her team reset only those
passwords that had clearly been compromised, or should they reset all user accounts? Has any
user data been affected, and how can they verify that? She also wondered if the university should
issue a press release. If so, what should it say? How much more time and effort should they spend
trying to track down the source of the attack, and what recourse would UiO have even if they
found the attacker?
While the University did not experience lost revenues from the outage, every day the Titan
cluster was down, UiO experienced a reputational cost from the incident. Researchers were not
able to process or access their data and the University was not able to fulfill their obligations to
the NDGF and other partners. The scientific data was probably not of any value to the intruder;
however, if it was tampered with or deleted, it would give rise to significant expense and
inconvenience to the scientists who relied on it. It was imperative that Titan not be compromised
again.
Even if she could verify that Titan contained no vulnerabilities, Raaum was still uneasy
about recommending that the system be brought back on-line. After all, how could she ensure that
the other universities had cleaned up their systems and that Titan would not be accessed with
another compromised account when account synchronization was resumed?
Finally, once this particular incident was resolved, how could Margrete Raaum ensure that
the UiO team would properly identify and remediate future vulnerabilities?
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Suggested Student Case Preparation Questions
1. Who are the major stakeholders associated with the Nordic Data Grid Facility (NDGF)?
What critical information and resources are stored within the system and what concerns
might these stakeholders have regarding this information?
2. To what extent did the behavior of a) employees, b) information security processes, and
c) information security tools contribute to this security breach?
3. If you were asked to advise the manager of the Computing Emergency Response Team
on information security, incident response, and IT governance improvements, what
suggestions would you make?
4. What should Margrete Raaum do now? Should Titan be immediately reconnected to the
computational grid?
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Exhibit 1: Vulnerability Alert

GNU glibc $ORIGIN Substitution Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
VULNERABILITY ALERT

Threat Type:

Unauthorized Access: Privilege Escalation

IntelliShield ID:
Version:

21646
4

Urgency:

Unlikely Use

First Published:
Last Published:

Oct 21, 2010; 12:54 PM EDT
Feb 11, 2011; 10:13 AM EST

Credibility:

Confirmed

Vector:
Authentication:
Exploit:

Local
None
Yes

Severity:

Moderate Damage

Port:
CVE:

Not Available
CVE-2010-3847

CVSS Base:

7.2

CVSS Temporal:

5.8

BugTraq ID:

44154

CVSS Calculator
CVSS Version 2.0

Description

Impact

The GNU glibc contains a vulnerability that could allow a
local attacker to execute arbitrary code on the targeted
system with elevated privileges.
The vulnerability exists because the affected software
does not impose sufficient security restrictions on creation
and execution of hard links by unprivileged users. A local
attacker could exploit this vulnerability by hard linking a
crafted dynamic link library to a privileged application file. If
successful, an attacker could gain elevated privileges on
the system and possibly execute arbitrary code.
Proof-of-concept code that exploits this vulnerability is
publicly available.
The vendor has not confirmed this vulnerability and
software updates are not available. However, third-party
vendor updates are available.

A local attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain
elevated privileges on the system and possibly execute
arbitrary code with root privileges.
Safeguards

Administrators are advised to contact the vendor regarding
future updates and releases or apply the appropriate thirdparty vendor updates.
Administrators are advised to allow only trusted users to
access local systems.
Administrators are advised to use an unprivileged account
for routine activities.
Patches/Software

Warning Indicators

The GNU glibc versions 2.12.1 and prior are vulnerable.

CentOS packages can be updated using the up2date or
yum command.

Copyright © 2011 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Terms and Conditions, Privacy Statement, Cookie Policy and Trademarks of Cisco
Systems, Inc.
http://www.cisco.com.
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Exhibit 2: UniNETT Trouble Ticket
Ticket
Ticket
Ticket
Ticket
Ticket

Number
Type
Status
Summary
Scope

:
:
:
:
:

NORDUNETTICKET-1253
Unscheduled
Closed
Subnet unreachable

Ticket Opened : 20110809 16:07 UTC
Ticket Closed : 20110812 10:32 UTC
Problem Start : 20110809 17:50 UTC
Problem End
: 20110809 18:24 UTC
Affected organisations:
* NDGF
---Description:
* For security reasons, a subnet belonging to the NDGF
facility in Norway has been closed down.
---Impact:
* The following servers are unreachable:
ce01.titan.uio.no
ce02.titan.uio.no
db-atlas-prod01.ndgf.org
db-atlas-prod02.ndgf.org
db-atlas-prod03.ndgf.org
db-atlas-squid.titan.uio.no
se01.titan.uio.no
se02.titan.uio.no
se03.titan.uio.no
se04.titan.uio.no
---Update:
* 20110809 16:53 UTC
The servers are reachable again.
---Final ticket report:
* For security reasons, a subnet belonging to the NDGF
facility in Norway was closed.
The subnet was later unblocked.
----
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CHAPTER 4 FROM INFOSEC INCIDENT RESPONDER CHARACTERISTICS
TO INCIDENT RESPONDER CAPABILITY ARCHETYPES
A version of this chapter appears in the following conference proceedings:
McLaughlin, M., D’Arcy, J., Cram, W. A., Gogan, J. L. (2017). “Capabilities and Skill
Configurations of Information Security Incident Responders” Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), Waikoloa, HI.
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Introduction
Membership growth in professional societies like FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams) suggests that the InfoSec incident response role is more important than ever. By
2016, FIRST’s membership included 345 incident response teams in 74 countries (FIRST 2016a)
– nearly twice as many as in 2006 (FIRST 2016b). Yet, a 2015 survey reported that a quarter of
organizational leaders were not fully confident in their teams’ ability to effectively respond to
InfoSec incidents (ISACA 2016). Among senior managers who felt their teams handled simple
incidents well, only 40% were confident these teams could handle complex incidents, and a
majority of managers reported that fewer than half of new staff were “qualified upon hire” to
handle InfoSec incident response issues. Many managers want to know what characteristics
distinguish strong incident responders; this information would make it possible to articulate
requisite job qualifications and useful selection criteria. Although incident response role
descriptions do exist, a full yet parsimonious set of truly essential characteristics may not yet have
been identified, the relative importance of each characteristic is not yet clear, and how these
characteristics interact to make an individual successful is not yet well understood.
In some organizations, incident response roles have become more specialized (Bejtlich et
al. 2011; Ruefle et al. 2014). These specialists are expensive (Nowruzi et al. 2012); in 2016 the
average salary for an InfoSec analyst in the U.S. was more than $92,600. Growth in demand
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015) will likely push salaries higher.
Response teams perform different jobs in different contexts. For example, at IT vendors
(e.g., Cisco, Intel, Juniper, IBM) incident response teams address vulnerabilities in their products.
Government-created incident response teams (e.g., US-CERT, JP-CERT) coordinate multiorganization efforts to remediate vulnerabilities, whereas incident response teams in many
companies (in financial, manufacturing, retail, and other industries) primarily respond to attacks
against their companies’ systems and data.
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In this study, I aimed to systematically identify characteristics that contribute to an
individual’s InfoSec incident response capability/ies, and to investigate whether groups of
InfoSec incident responders share similar characteristics. Specifically, my goal was to uncover
InfoSec incident response archetypes. The study reported in this chapter yielded findings
suggesting that effective incident responders do possess complementary characteristics that
appear to contribute to an individual incident response capability. I propose that four individual
InfoSec archetypes, representing different combinations of individual characteristics, contribute
to an individual’s incident response capability.
This study is informed by RBV (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984) and the Theory of
Complementary Resources (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Nevo and Wade 2011, 2010; Teece
1986). As discussed in Chapter 3, a fundamental managerial task is to develop or assemble
unique sets of valuable resources (tangible and intangible assets and capabilities), at the
individual, group, and organizational levels. I gathered information about intangible human assets
and capabilities (e.g., know-how, skill), as well as character attributes that interviewees suggested
are important (such as “curiosity” or “passion for their work”). Some researchers consider
character attributes intangible assets while others do not. Here, I use a neutral label –
characteristic – as an umbrella term to describe individual assets, capabilities, and character
attributes.
In an InfoSec incident response team, some characteristics might apply to every team
member, while other necessary characteristics may apply only to one or a few individuals on the
team. Thus, this study addressed the following research questions pertinent to InfoSec response
teams:

123

RQ1:

What individual characteristics are associated with effective
incident response?

RQ2:

What is the relative importance of each individual characteristic?

RQ3:

What sets of characteristics do effective individual responders possess?

RQ4:

How do characteristic sets vary across effective individual responders (that
is, can we identify clusters that can be conceptualized as archetypes)?

This study relied on expert incident responders to describe characteristics which they think
contribute to other responders’ overall InfoSec incident response effectiveness. Similar to a study
by Napier et al. (2013) which identified characteristics of IS project managers, I argue that
identifying characteristics of effective individual InfoSec incident response team members should
(1) help organizations hire or select individuals best suited to InfoSec incident response roles; (2)
aid in the design of incident response policies, practices and structures; (3) help managers
improve career development and training programs to further develop employees’ response
capabilities; and (4) help individuals prioritize their own training and development to advance
their careers.
Like Napier et al. (op cit.), I used the RepGrid research method to systematically explore
experts’ beliefs about this topic. Each expert described characteristics of specific colleagues or
subordinates who they deemed highly effective or rather ineffective in an InfoSec incident
response role. This study identified characteristics of effective incident responders, and evidence
that suggests how characteristics contribute to both an individual incident response capability/ies
and a team’s overall incident response capability. The study findings move us toward clearer
definitions of requisite qualifications for incident responders and point to useful directions for
further research on team and organization InfoSec incident response capabilities.
Next, I review prior research on InfoSec professionals’ requisite characteristics. Then, after
explaining my research method, I present my findings and analysis. I conclude with a discussion
of implications, limitations, and opportunities for further study.
124

Literature Review
Prior InfoSec and Information Systems Research
InfoSec incident response tasks are complex; no manual or textbook fully and clearly
explains how they should be performed (Sundaramurthy et al. 2014). Given the critical
importance of response activities, it is surprising that few empirical studies have closely
examined characteristics of effective InfoSec responders (McLaughlin and Gogan 2014). Chen et
al. (2014) observed that prior studies focused on identifying requisite technical knowledge, skills
and abilities (KSAs) but did not consider the teamwork aspects of these jobs. Based on interviews
conducted with members of three private-sector and one public-sector incident response team,
Chen et al. applied several techniques to identify 11 characteristics helpful for responding to
routine and non-routine InfoSec incidents. Using individual task analysis, they identified (1)
investigative skills, (2) desire to acquire and share new knowledge, (3) ability to problem-solve,
(4) curiosity, and (5) attention to detail. Using multi-team system task analysis, they identified (6)
information-sharing skills, (7) collaboration skills, and (8) a preference for working with others.
Using cognitive task analysis, they identified (9) detect patterns (10) perceive when something is
(or might be) wrong, and (11) rapidly and accurately compare data. Chen et al.’s study was
important because it rigorously identified helpful characteristics, using systematic procedures.
That study did not consider whether members of an incident response team might vary in the sets
of specific characteristics each member possesses, and whether some characteristics interact in
ways that contribute to or detract from an individual’s incident response effectiveness.
Various practitioner organizations have also generated lists, including the Software
Engineering Institute (25 core technical and interpersonal skills); see (SEI 2015), and Gartner (11
skills); see (McMillan and Walls 2016). A FIRST workshop also produced a Top 20 list of “core”
skills (Pfleeger et al. 2015). The 53 skills identified by these four sources, summarized in
Appendix 4-1, differ across the lists. Communication appears on all four lists, Problem Solving is
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on three lists, and four characteristics (Incident Analysis, Maintenance of Incident Records,
Network Applications and Services Knowledge, Knowledge of Network Security Issues) each
appear on just two lists. One characteristic, Adaptive, seems to contradict Ability to Follow
Policies and Procedures. Thus, further study is needed to home in on the essential characteristics
for InfoSec incident responders, and to learn whether some characteristics or sets of
characteristics can be effectively held just by one or a few team members, without compromising
the team’s incident response capability.
Surveyed managers agree that there is a great need for incident responders to “understand
the business” (ISACA 2016, p. 11), yet this characteristic does not appear on any of the abovementioned lists. Other important characteristics might also be missing. As noted above, specialist
characteristics have become more important – including expertise in forensics, data mining,
reverse engineering, countermeasure configuration, and penetration testing (Ruefle et al. 2014).
Variations in the sets of characteristics make IS professionals effective in various roles (Keil et al.
2013), including InfoSec incident response, but how do these characteristic-sets contribute to
individual, team, and organizational incident response capabilities? My study begins to answer
these questions by examining the characteristic-sets at the individual level.

Resources and Complementarity
An organization is conceptualized as a bundle of human, financial, and other resources
(Penrose 1951). Valuable resources which cannot be easily obtained, are difficult or costly to
imitate, and are non-substitutable are strategically important (Barney 1991). IS resources include
tangible assets (e.g., computers, networks), intangible assets (data, software, specialized
knowledge), and capabilities (e.g., an engineer’s ability to quickly detect a security violation is
one capability; her ability to formulate a response plan in another capability).
Given that an organization’s data and systems are strategic assets and given that attacks on
these assets are on the rise, an organization’s overall InfoSec incident response capability is
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certainly a strategically important resource. RBV applies at the individual, group, and
organizational levels, and therefore I propose that an organization’s InfoSec incident response
capability is affected by incident response team capabilities, and that incident response team
capabilities are affected by the individual capabilities of the team members. Other technical,
human and administrative assets and capabilities also affect an organization’s InfoSec incident
response capability. Although those other resources are beyond the scope of the current study, I
propose, consistent with the Theory of Complementarity Resources, that an individual
responder’s incident response capability is more effective if that individual’s set of IR-relevant
characteristics are complementary.
Organizational resources can be conceptualized at various levels of granularity. Human
assets and capabilities embodied in an individual (such as might be embodied in a single brilliant
scientist or highly skilled surgeon), or human, technical, and other assets and capabilities in a
group or organization can confer value, which sometimes leads to temporary strategic advantage
(Barney 1991; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Peteraf (1993) explains how individual expertise in a
specialized area – such as glass technology – can provide a strategic advantage. Glass technology
includes the abilities to shape, cut, color, layer, strengthen, and control breakage, each of which
requires a different skill set. Similarly, the separate tasks comprising incident response might
each require some, many, or all of the characteristics identified in prior literature and listed in
Appendix 4-1. A specific individual attribute – such as integrity, curiosity, or problem solving –
may not, on its own, directly ensure effective incident response, yet it might complement and
strengthen other individual characteristics (such as ability to perform a risk analysis, technical
knowledge, or programming skill). Different incident responders possess different characteristic
sets. Some sets may be more effective than others, and some sets may better fit specific incident
response roles better than others. Thus, it is useful to identify and investigate incident responder
characteristic-set archetypes.
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Considering knowledge as a strategic organizational resource, Nelson and Winter (1982)
observed that individual skills, management quality, and work practices can be complementary
resources, and they may be woven together in ‘interlocking systems’. Other studies report that the
ability to successfully integrate knowledge-based workers possessing varied knowledge and skills
can strongly influence organizational performance (Grant 1996; Pisano 1994). In many IS
domains, no single individual possesses all the needed characteristics, so managers assemble
cross functional-teams in hopes of capitalizing on each member’s expertise (Mäkimattila et al.
2017). To build effective teams, managers attempt to identify individuals possessing desirable
combinations of characteristics, some of which have complementary effects within the individual
(yielding an individual incident response capability). Some of an individual’s specific
characteristics, as well as that individual’s characteristic-set, will presumably complement other
individuals’ specific characteristics and characteristic-sets, contributing to an incident response
team capability. And, human assets and capabilities will also have complementary interactions
with other technical, organizational and institutional resources that managers attempt to harness
and control for strategic value.
Only one prior theory-informed empirical study investigated characteristic requirements
for InfoSec incident response roles (Chen et al. 2014). Others have suggested that new studies are
needed to investigate: “How, why and when do IS assets, IS capabilities and socio-organizational
capabilities affect each other and jointly create internal value?” (Schryen 2013, p. 156). I begin to
answer this question with my study of InfoSec incident response personnel characteristics. Prior
studies identified various characteristics, without verifying whether any list is both complete and
parsimonious, and also without considering their interaction. Yet, both RBV and the Theory of
Complementary Resources suggest that it is insufficient to look at a single characteristic (such as
‘investigative skill’) without considering its interaction with others (such as ‘communication’ or
‘security knowhow’). By grouping individuals judged by experts as effective InfoSec responders
into clusters based on shared characteristics, I begin to consider how individual and team InfoSec
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capabilities arise from sets of (presumably) complementary resources (or sets comprised of some
resources which are complementary and other valuable resources which are neutral with respect
to complementarity).

Research Method
Repertory Grid and Personal Construct Theory
I used the RepGrid method, which is based on Personal Construct Theory (PCT) (G. Kelly
1955; G. A. Kelly 1955), to identify characteristics that experts feel make other InfoSec incident
response responders effective. PCT focuses on “how human beings create systems of meaning…”
(Winter and Procter 2013, p. 145); it claims that individuals continuously create and re-create
personalized views of the world. We make sense of people, objects, and experiences through
bipolar constructs (e.g., good/bad, hot/cold, funny/boring, reliable/undependable, etc.), which are
integrated into unique networks of meaning that help individuals interpret events and anticipate
future events (Alexander and Neimeyer 1989). People are influenced by and share their personal
construct systems with others, and this contributes to interpersonal relationships. By studying
individual perceptions, we can better understand the shared perspectives of the groups or
organizations to which those individuals belong (Weick 1995).
PCT was cited in nearly half of the volumes of the influential Annual Review of
Psychology from 1955 through 2005, largely thanks to many RepGrid studies of individual
perceptions (Walker and Winter 2007) in teams, groups, organizations, and cultures. In business
research, RepGrid has been used to test or extend theories such as value-in-use (Lemke et al.
2011), identify factors that cause users to ignore on-line marketing messages (Müller et al. 2009),
and understand educators’ personal beliefs about learning (Samuelowicz and Bain 2001) and
students’ perceptions about managerial frameworks (Wright et al. 2013). RepGrid studies in IS
consider an epistemic culture (individuals in different organizations work in similar knowledgebased roles (Cetina 2009)). In IS, RepGrid has been used to study perceived work, expectations,
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and values (Curtis et al. 2008). A study of technicians’ expectations about new fingerprint
technology claims that RepGrid “yielded insights into the meaning of fingerprint work that might
not have been revealed by more traditional structured interview techniques” (Davis and Hufnagel
2007, p. 700). Another RepGrid study classified successful IS project managers into four
archetypes (Napier et al. 2009), by clustering individuals with similar skillsets and manually
tallying mentions of each characteristic in each cluster. Similarly, I followed guidance provided
by Kelly (1955) and other influential RepGrid sources (Fransella et al. 2004; Jankowicz 2005),
along with advice on how to adapt RepGrid to IS research (Curtis et al. 2008; Tan and Hunter
2002).
A RepGrid captures an individual’s perception of a phenomenon, in his/her own words.
The RepGrid procedure produces a rating scale that represents how the individual perceives a
human or non-human “element” in comparison with other elements. In this section, I describe
seven aspects that characterize a well-designed RepGrid study:
1. Focus on a well-defined topic.
2. Recruit interviewees sufficiently familiar with the topic.
3. Use theoretically ideal and theoretically incompetent anchor descriptions.
4. Either supply or elicit constructs, depending on study goals.
5. If eliciting constructs, use laddering to clarify the interviewees perceptions.
6. Fill in the ratings for each combination of elements and constructs
7. Use a systematic procedure to assign constructs to thematic categories.
These aspects are supported by four essential components (Figure 4-1) – topics, elements,
constructs, ratings, which are explained next.
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Figure 4-1: Components of a RepGrid
Topic: The interviewer defines and explains the topic of interest; the interviewee must
have sufficient experience with that topic. An interviewee’s vocabulary for describing his/her
perceptions about a topic is revealed through the RepGrid technique. My study topic was incident
responder characteristics (knowledge, skills, attributes). I interviewed experts who had extensive
InfoSec incident response experience and who had worked closely with other incident response
professionals.
Elements: A RepGrid element – an instance of the topic – can be a person (as in my
study), product, process, place, document, etc. During a RepGrid interview, elements are
compared and contrasted in triads. For meaningful comparison, each element needs to be seen as
different from others. The interviewer can either provide element descriptions or elicit them from
the interviewee. I asked each expert interviewee to name six incident responders with whom they
had worked closely, including some individuals who the expert sees as “quite effective,” and at
least one who they see as less effective in the incident response role. I further clarified that the
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expert need not feel obliged to identify a completely unsuitable/incompetent incident responder.
Thus, a given expert could pick six people who all have “deep security knowledge” (of whom, at
least one individual is not a strong InfoSec incident responder). Also, the expert could state that
all six people lack a particular characteristic such as “business acumen,” yet nevertheless he she
might classify several of the six people as “quite effective” InfoSec incident responders.
Constructs: A construct is a term Interviewee uses to describe an element (in my study,
incident responders). It must be bipolar (describable with an adjective and its opposite adjective).
Constructs may be elicited from each interviewee or supplied by the researcher. Kelly (1955)
claimed it is better to elicit constructs, expressed in interviewees’ own words. To do so, the
researcher randomly selects three elements and asks interviewee “How are two of these (in my
study, two InfoSec incident responders) alike but different (per the focal topic) from a third?” By
including a theoretically ideal and incompetent incident response professional as anchors, I
elicited bipolar descriptions of characteristics from experts, even when they saw some responders
as having similar characteristics. When constructs are not immediately evident in an
interviewee’s answers, the interviewer can use laddering to help them define a construct in terms
of a topic. Suppose the topic is “factors important when buying a car.” Asked to compare three
cars, the interviewee may respond that “Two are red and one is blue.” Using laddering, the
interviewer can ask: “What is it about color that influences your decision to buy a car?” A
response such as “Red is more cheerful; blue is just dark” might lead the interviewer to infer that
the interviewee sees car color as “cheerful” or “dark” and these are opposites. The interviewer
can ladder further by asking a clarifying question, such as: “So, a dark color is not cheerful?”
Laddering must be done with care, since researcher bias can influence interviewee answers.
Ratings: RepGrid ratings support analysis and comparison of the interviewee perceptions
of a topic and elements. After describing the focal topic and eliciting or providing elements and
constructs, the interviewer asks the interviewee to rate each element’s constructs on a Likert
scale. Ratings are recorded on a chart for each element, with a low Likert value for each construct
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on the left and a high value on the right. When elements are people (as in my study), the
interviewee describes each person based on a construct such as (on left) non-technical vs (on
right) technical. In this example, on a 6-point Likert scale a person described as highly technical
is rated 6 on this dimension.
Sample Size and Theoretical Saturation: In a RepGrid study data are gathered from a
relatively small number of interviewees, compared with a survey (Tan and Hunter 2002). A
RepGrid study with 10 to 25 respondents is typical (Curtis et al. 2008). Sample size should be
based on theoretical or data saturation. In 13 prior IS RepGrid studies, just three studies claimed
saturation (see Table 4-1). Bowen (2008, p. 140) argues for doing so, and explains how:
“Data saturation entails bringing new participants continually into the study until the data
set is complete, as indicated by data replication or redundancy. In other words, saturation is
reached when the researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns, when nothing new is
being added.”
Saturation may be achieved in as few as 7-10 interviews; and is reached quickly if
participants have similar perceptions about a topic (Reger and Huff 1993).
Study

Fingerprint Technicians
Security Policies
Classification of Text
Mobile User Experience
Business Ethics
Web Site Design
Customer Experience Quality
ERP System Planning
Software Project Managers
Display Blindness
Project Managers
IS Project Success
Technology in Learning
Mean

Citation

(Davis and Hufnagel 2007)
(Dhillon et al. 2015)
(Dillon and McKnight 1990)
(Fallman and Waterworth 2010)
(Fassin et al. 2011)
(Hassenzahl and Trautmann 2001)
(Lemke et al. 2011)
(May et al. 2013)
(Medina and Francis 2015)
(Müller et al. 2009)
(Napier et al. 2009)
(Pankratz et al. 2014)
(Stevens et al. 2014)
17.2

# of
Subjects
24
9
6
18
23
10
40
16
15
17
19
11
16
16.3

Theoretical
Saturation
Not Reported
Not Reported
Not Reported
Not Reported
Not Reported
Not Reported
Not Reported
Not Reported
Not Reported
17
19
Not Reported
12

Table 4-1: Prior Information Systems RepGrid Studies
Aggregating Individual Grids: To compare multiple grids provided by different
interviewees, data are normalized. If an interviewer provides all constructs to interviewees, all
grids will contain the same constructs, so multiple grids can easily be combined (see e.g., Write et
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al. (2013). If an interviewer aims to faithfully capture the interviewees’ perspectives (in their own
words, consistent with Kelly), constructs are elicited rather provided (e.g., Napier et al. (2009).
This reveals the interviewee’s understanding of a focal topic and lets the data do the talking.
Constructs are then classified into categories for analysis. Jankowicz (2005) suggests the
following systematic procedure:
1. If an item is in some way like the first item, place the two together in a single category
created at that very moment.
2. Continue pairwise comparisons. If items differ, assign to separate categories.
3. Remaining items are compared with each category. If an appropriate category exists,
allocate item to it.
4. New categories are created as required, but each time a new category is created, one or
more existing categories might need to be redefined (combined or broken up, with items
reallocated accordingly).
5. This process continues until all items are classified.
6. Up to 5% of constructs may be “unclassifiable,” i.e., a category containing just one item.
Group unclassifiable items in a single “miscellaneous” category.
a. If at first more than 5% of items are classified “miscellaneous,” one or more
other categories should be redefined so that in the end, no more than 5% of
constructs are classified as “miscellaneous.”
b. If many constructs are unclassifiable or “miscellaneous,” researcher should
assume theoretical saturation has not yet been achieved; more interviews should
be conducted.
Assigning constructs to themes: After assigning constructs to categories, grid data are
analyzed. When the interviewer provides constructs, no data manipulation is necessary. When (as
in my study) constructs are elicited and categories systematically created by the researcher (as
described above), some interviews will yield no constructs for a category, while other interviews
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may yield many constructs for a category. Researchers vary in how they rank elicited constructs.
Napier et. al (2009) inferred importance by calculating the percentage of times each theme was
coded in the interview data set. Lekme et al. (2011) calculated average variability of each theme.
Goffin et al. (2006) ranked each within a particular theme based on each construct’s mean rating.

Data Collection Procedure
I recruited senior incident responders who were active participants in industry InfoSec
forums and generally considered to be InfoSec incident response experts. Through phone calls
and emails, I contacted 18 current and former members of FIRST. I did not pre-determine how
many interviews to perform; instead, I attempted to reach theoretical saturation (in which new
constructs did not emerge in interviews with additional experts). All agreed to participate, but I
had difficulty scheduling interview times with four individuals. After 14 interviews were
completed, analysis indicated I had already reached saturation by the 9th interview, so I did not
seek to schedule any more interviews. During further data analysis, I also eliminated one incident
responder from a small company 14.
Semi-structured interviews, approved by Bentley University’s institutional review board,
followed a scripted protocol and were conducted using WebEx MeetingPlace teleconferencing
service. Most interviews lasted about one hour. I first explained the study purpose and stated that
since my study aimed to capitalize on experts’ prior incident response experiences supervising or
working alongside other responders, I wanted each expert to describe incident response
capabilities in his/her own words. I explained RepGrid and informed consent procedures, then
asked Expert about his/her employer, years’ experience in InfoSec incident response, education,
and other background information (see Table 4-2). Company revenue was obtained from public

14 One of the 14 experts worked in a small company (under $50M revenue). Although that expert’s perceptions
were not noticeably different from experts at large companies, we eliminated this interview from our data set
because prior research contends that small companies experience various issues differently than larger
companies.
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sources. All but one expert had a college degree; two had advanced degrees. Two experts were
employed in medium sized businesses ($50M to < $1B in revenue), and 11 worked at companies
with revenues over $1B. Interviewees had 8 to 25 years of relevant experience (average 16.6). An
average of 13 constructs (characteristics) were elicited in each interview (range: 9 to 17).
Title

Gender

Number of
Constructs*

Company
Size**

Level of
Education

Experience
(in years)

Team Lead of incident response team

M

Security Architect

M

14

Large

Masters

17

Security Program Manager

F

12

Large

Bachelors

18

Sr Incident Responder

M

14

Large

Bachelors

16

Network Security Engineer

M

12

Medium

Bachelors

19

Sr Security Engineer

M

12

Large

Bachelors

16

Sr Security Incident Manager

M

13

Large

Bachelors

8

Sr Incident Responder

M

14

Large

High School

19

Staff Info Security Engineer

M

14

Medium

Bachelors

14

Product Security Officer

F

11

Large

Masters

12

Product Security Group
Program Manager
Assistant Director,
Cyber Defense/Response
Incident Manager

F

14

Bachelors

14

M

10

Bachelors

19

M

9

Bachelors

25

Total

13

166

17

Large

Large
Large
Large

Masters

19

16.6

* Characteristics elicited during the interview
** Large: > $1B revenues Medium: $50M to $1B revenue

Table 4-2: Expert Subjects (Interviewees): Demographic Information
I explained that the study aimed to understand the incident response role, not to evaluate
individuals. An Excel spreadsheet was shared over the WebEx session. The expert was asked to
identify six individuals with whom s/he had worked closely, including those who they viewed as
effective in their role and at least one person who they viewed as less effective. I provided
descriptions of ideal (successful) and incompetent (unsuccessful) anchors; see (Stewart et al.
1981). To preserve confidentiality, the expert was permitted to use initials, numbers, colors, or
other codes instead of actual names. Names (or codes) and anchors were listed at the top of the
spreadsheet.
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After the expert listed six incident responders, a new worksheet was displayed. This sheet
listed three randomly-selected responders from the expert’s list of six (along with the two
anchors). I asked the expert to name a specific bipolar characteristic that fits two of the three
people, but not the third. Sometimes, I helped the expert refine constructs by laddering
(narrowing focus of an elicited answer to relate to the topic). Sometimes during the interview, the
expert conflated two unique characteristics and needed to be reminded of the topic. For example,
if they responded that two individuals were “technical” and one was more “managerial,” I would
ask him/her to focus on characteristics that make an incident responder successful in a technical
role and characteristics that make a responder successful in a managerial role. Interviews which
required extensive laddering tended to yield fewer constructs. After I recorded the expert’s
answers on the spreadsheet shared in the WebEx session (visible to both of us), a new set of three
incident responders would appear on screen. The elicitation process was repeated until the expert
could no longer identify any new constructs, or about 45 minutes into the interview (whichever
came first).
After incident response characteristics 15 were elicited (usually, 14 – 17 constructs in about
45 minutes), the expert was asked to rate, on a scale from 1-6, each incident responder according
to each characteristic. A rating of 1 would indicate that a description on the left fit that responder
exactly. A rating of 6 indicated the description on the right fit that responder exactly. This was
repeated so that the expert provided a quantitative value for each incident response characteristic,
as applied to each responder and anchor. This process normally took 20-30 minutes.
In the last step of the RepGrid protocol, the expert was asked to stack-rank each InfoSec
incident responder in terms of that person’s overall success in the role (i.e., who they perceived

15

Our initial intent was to interview experts about knowledge, skills, and abilities. Because most experts
spontaneously brought up personality attributes or character traits, we describe all as “characteristics.”
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was the most effective incident responder, then next most effective, etc., down to least effective
of six responders). Examples of completed RepGrid tables are provided in Appendix 4-2.

Data Analysis
Thirteen expert interviews described 78 InfoSec incident responders. Saturation occurred
after the 9th interview; no new construct emerged in interviews 10, 11, 12, or 13 (see Figure 4-2).
Appendix 4-5 lists characteristics elicited in each interview, with repeated characteristics shaded.

NEW CONSTRUCTS

Saturation Curve
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12 13

INTERVIEW (SORTED BY NEW CONSTRUCTS IDENTIFIED)

Figure 4-2: Theoretical Saturation Curve
Analysis was performed using custom code written by the first author in R, using
OpenRepGrid and principle component analysis libraries. The code was reviewed by a
professional software developer who attempted to find and eliminate errors that might affect the
analysis. The software created individual grids for each expert, as shown in Appendix 4-2. Each
grid includes anonymized InfoSec incident responders at the top; characteristics elicited during
the interview are listed on left and right (negative characteristics on the left, ideal on the right).
This provided a scale in which 6 represents a high association with the most positive value for
each construct. A detailed description of the software used during the analysis is provided in
Appendix 4-7.
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Grid data were displayed similar to Bergin (1974). Characteristics and incident responders
were re-ordered to facilitate clustering. Each cell was shaded to correspond with its score (darker
shading indicates a higher score). Dick (2000) provides further guidance on validating RepGrid
with shading: constructs and elements with similar meanings are shaded similarly. An element
that is almost uniformly light or dark may validly describe a particular elicited comparison, yet
not be useful for general comparison. For example: the expert in interview #12 saw a relationship
between enthusiasm and passion for security work; staying up to date with security trends and
deep technical knowledge; this expert also saw a relationship between attention to detail and
“hunter mentality” (re: incident responder’s investigative characteristics). While I do not attempt
to prove causation in this study, these correlations suggest that while this finding is important to
this expert, it is not useful for distinguishing between these constructs.
In other grids, clusters of characteristics become apparent; the first few characteristics are
highly correlated with individuals who are listed first, and individuals listed last are highly
correlated with characteristics on the bottom. This might represent polarity or a natural
segmentation of individuals. In Interview 11, Isabella, Ava, and Mia are seen as highly technical,
with deep triage skills, and readily available, whereas this expert saw Ethan, Sofia, and William
as focused on security, strategy, and process, and more involved with the security community.
Individual grid data reveals how one expert perceives the incident response role; my aim
was to look across incident response experts’ responses, to identify characteristics and
characteristic-sets that many experts agree on. In order to compare grids, elicited constructs are
uniformly coded. I closely followed published guidance (Fransella et al. 2004; Jankowicz 2005)
for standardizing construct names. After the interviews, I created a consistent list of
characteristics by iteratively grouping items with similar meanings and selecting one item to
represent each group. This process led us to categorize characteristics into five themes, as
follows. Each construct was examined to determine if it was previously identified in an interview
with a different expert. If so, they were grouped together (previously identified items are
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indicated in the “repeats” column of Appendix 4-5). For example, oral communication was first
identified in Interview 1 (characteristic 16). Other experts expressed this idea as leading
conversations, speaking to the press, good communicator, ability to communicate (in Appendix
4-5, these later items are marked as repeating I1-C16). Technical breadth was recorded in
Interview 1 as characteristic 6 (I1-C6). Other experts mentioned highly technical, having
technical acumen, deep technical talent, technical breadth (tagged as I1-C6).
I coded 181 elicited constructs into 55 unique characteristics, then grouped these into five
thematic categories: Character, Cognitive, General Management, Technical, Communication.
Next, all constructs and categories were independently validated by one of my dissertation
committee members (an IS professor and InfoSec researcher). Questions about the similarity of a
characteristic or its assignment to a theme were discussed until we reached consensus. While we
felt some constructs could be collapsed further, we preferred the specificity of having more
constructs, over the risk of being too general.
Table 4-3 lists the categories (alphabetically), number of constructs per category, number
of times each construct was identified in 13 interviews, and weighted importance of specific
characteristics in each category, calculated as the mean of the standard deviations for the stackrank of top performers (mean z-score).
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Theme

Constructs (mapped to characteristic # in Appendix 4-1 list)
Adaptable
Assertive (#8)

2
4

Quickly Empathize

1

Level Headed (#12)

6

Confident

2

Sticking with it (#34)

3

Discrete
Doing Right Thing (# 22)
Engaged
Team Player (#36)
Positive Attitude

3
6
2
4
1

Security Passion

5

Self-improvement (#14)

3

Self-starter (#36, #46?)

1

Willing to Work Hard

1

Attention to Detail (# 15)

7

Multitasking

6

Common Sense

1

3

Culturally Aware (#17)

2

Organization
Organized Thoughts

Distill Info (#16)

6

Root Cause Learning

1

Forming a Plan (#35)

2

3

Lateral Thinking (#18)

6

Threat Hunting
Understand Politics (#17)

Communication
Characteristics
6 constructs
21 mentions
(13%)
Importance: .64

Communicate Risk

2

Listening Skills

1

Documentation

5

Oral Communication (#1)

8

Executive Communication

3

Written Communication (#1)

2

General
Management
14 constructs
35 mentions
(22%)
Importance: .68

Available

Mentor (#30)

4

Big Picture

2
2

Organizational Connections

2

Collaborative

7

Prioritizing Risk

2

Customer Focused
Delegation
Industry Focus

2
2
6

Regulatory Frameworks

1

Strategic Thinker

2

Influence change

1

Team Building (#48?)

1

Legal Awareness

1

Automation

3

Programming (#39)

3

Experience

3

Security Expertise (#19)

4

Triage Skills
Networking

1

Technical Breadth

10

Character
15 constructs
44 mentions
(28%)
Importance: .75

Cognitive
Characteristics
12 constructs
41 mentions
(26%)
Importance: .78

Technical
Characteristics
7 constructs
25 mentions
(16%)
Importance: .49

1

3

1

Table 4-3: Characteristic Themes, Characteristics, and Importance

Cross-Grid Comparison
Assignment of constructs to categories minimized grid dimensions and enabled cross-grid
comparison. Similar to Goffin et al. (2006), I used mean rating for each characteristic in each
category for each incident responder, to calculate an average ranking for each category (e.g., if an
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expert rated a person’s strong documentation characteristics as 4 and executive communication 5,
this yielded a mean score of 4.5 for Communication). If a particular interview did not speak to a
particular category, all incident responders discussed in that interview were assigned a neutral
score of 3.5 for that category. In Appendix 4-2, tthemed grids are shown after individual grids.
All grids were combined into one aggregate grid (Appendix 4-3), which reveals a high
correlation between Cognitive characteristics (attention to detail, seeing the big picture, ability to
distill information), General Management characteristics, and Character attributes. Despite this
high correlation, principle component analysis (Table 4-4) indicates that the five categories define
the data well and do not have significant levels of cross loading.
Type of rotation: varimax
Loadings:
Character
Cognitive Characteristics
Communication Characteristics
General Management
Technical Characteristics

PC3
0.23
0.38
0.92
0.24
0.15

PC2
0.23
0.32
0.15
0.21
0.94

PC4
0.31
0.34
0.21
0.87
0.18

PC1
0.86
0.35
0.20
0.31
0.19

PC5
0.23
0.72
0.21
0.22
0.17

Table 4-4: Principle Component Analysis of Themes

Developing Clusters
Exploratory cluster analysis was performed to group incident responders with similar
characteristic-sets. I examined the sum of squares of the variance within each cluster of a k-means
model. Figure 4-3 illustrates the amount of variance the model has within clusters, against various
number of clusters. If there were only one cluster, there would be substantial variance of data in
that cluster; it would probably be “over generalized.” If number of clusters equaled number of
data points, there would be no variance within each cluster; each group would describe the data
perfectly, but it would be difficult to make meaningful categories for generalization.
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Figure 4-3: Within-Groups Sum of Squares of Incident Responders
To determine an optimal number of clusters, I identified the point where marginal
reduction in variance decreases, by looking for a “bend” or “elbow” in the plotted line. Left of the
bend, variability within the cluster for each division is increased. Right of the bend, the
complexity of the model increases, with little added benefit. In Figure 4-3, the greatest reduction
of variance occurs prior to six clusters, indicating that a five- or six-cluster solution was a good
candidate for categorizing responders. Analysis with six clusters produced two clusters with
similar combinations of characteristics, so I decided on a practical and more parsimonious fivecluster solution. The coefficient of determination (R2), or ratio of explained sum of squares to
total sum of squares of a five-cluster k-means model is 71.5%. These five incident responder
clusters became the foundation to develop archetypes for the incident response role. The scaled zscore for each thematic category was plotted as a dimension of a star chart for each archetype
(shown in Figure 4-4).
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Archetype A
performance 3.1

Archetype B
performance 4.3

Archetype D
performance 1.4

Archetype C
performance 3.6

Archetype E
performance 4.6

Figure 4-4: The 5 Archetypes of the Incident Responders
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I used the average stack-rank for individuals in each cluster, to gauge archetype
performance (figures below). Interestingly, I found no statistically significant difference in
performance of most archetypes. Figure 4-5 shows a box plot of effectiveness for each archetype.
Analysis of variance (in Appendix 4-4) yields a p-value of less than 0.0000; therefore, we reject
the null hypothesis (H0) that mean performances of the archetypes are statistically equal. Posthoc examination of performance data confirms that Archetype D is lower than the other four (pvalues of 0.0113, 0.0001, 0.0019, and 0.0000). Of the remaining groups, only the difference in
perceived performance of Archetypes A and E is statistically significant (p-value: 0.0076).

Figure 4-5: Individuals’ Effectiveness within Archetypes
To tentatively validate my interpretation of the data, I discussed the findings with three
senior incident response team managers of a large managed security service provider (none of
whom had participated in this RepGrid study). After I provided each manager with a copy of my
research method, the archetypes, and my preliminary interpretation of them, I had a conversation
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with each (one in person; one via phone; one via email). In the next section, I discuss my
interpretation of the findings, along with insights suggested by these senior managers.

Character-Sets and Four Archetypes
My study data suggest that InfoSec experts believe that character attributes and cognitive
abilities heavily influence incident responder effectiveness (Table 4-3). Previous studies
mentioned the following character attributes: integrity, time management (SEI 2015),
trustworthiness, work ethic, resilience, persistence (Pfleeger et al. 2015). Of 15 characteristics
mentioned six or more times in my study, “doing the right thing” seems consistent with integrity
and trustworthiness. Two oft-mentioned characteristics in my study were not previously reported:
“being level-headed” and “having a passion for information security.”
Four cognitive characteristics were mentioned six or more times in my RepGrid study, of
which two were previously identified: Attention to detail (identified by Chen (2014) and Pfleeger
et al. (2015) and Ability to distill information (similar to “detect patterns in routine materials or
data” (Chen et al. 2014). Two other cognitive characteristics identified in my study – lateral
thinking and multitasking were not reported in prior studies.
My study revealed five clusters of characteristic-sets, pointing to four incident responder
archetypes (Figure 4-4), which I label balanced high performer, technical leader, project
manager, security technician. I do not see the fifth cluster (lower performer), as an incident
response archetype.
In discussing my findings with senior InfoSec incident response managers, I learned that
they believe some archetypes are more successful in different types of situations. I discuss the
archetypes next (adding comments from my discussions with senior managers as appropriate),
from highest to lowest in terms of mean performance. The archetype labels emerged from
discussing the results with my committee, with academic reviewers, and with practitioners.
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Balanced High Performer (Archetype E): The mean effectiveness ranking for InfoSec
incident responders in this archetype is 4.55 out of 6.0. Most individuals in this cluster attained
above average scores for most categories. A particular responder could have slightly lower than
average scores in one category. For general management, Victoria (interview 12) scored 3.5 and
Penelope (interview 7) scored 3.7 (see Appendix 4-6). Although the mean general management
score for Archetype E was 4.9, my model placed both Victoria and Penelope in this archetype.
Prior research sees all-round “superstars” like my Balanced High Performer as rare. In
reviewing these results, a director of a managed security service provider suggested that in
organizations where security teams have high discretion/authority (e.g., team is allowed to
immediately take a revenue-generating service off-line), “cowboys” like these individuals are
needed, because they are comfortable making decisions quickly and authoritatively. From this
comment, I infer that an individual in this archetype might be especially helpful in responding to
a highly volatile, non-routine event which is not pre-defined in the organization’s response plan.
Technical Leader (Archetype B): Technical Leader is a rather weak communicator, but
has strong technical and management characteristics, strong cognitive abilities, and highly
desirable character attributes. This individual sees the big picture, works hard, has high personal
integrity, and strong investigative capabilities. The mean effectiveness ranking of individuals in
this archetype (at 4.33) is lower than Balanced High Performer (4.55), yet their perceived
effectiveness is not statistically different. So, being a weak communicator is apparently not a
major liability for this contributor. Perhaps Archetype B individuals are particularly effective
dealing with routine incidents, which require sophisticated technical analysis and an ability and
willingness to follow detailed guidance laid out in a playbook. In one RepGrid interview, an
expert explained that their organization’s incident responders also need to be “very technical,”
because they provide much-needed oversight and act as consultants to IT teams which do not
have the same depth of InfoSec experience.
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Project Manager (Archetype C): Project Manager has strong cognitive and
communication abilities, but his/her technical knowledge and skills are weaker than Archetypes
A, B and E. A manager assembling a larger team might consider recruiting one or more people
from this archetype (weak technical, strong communication) and a few people from the Technical
Leader archetype (strong technical and general management, weak communications), since their
characteristic-sets are complementary (one has a characteristic the other doesn’t have). Project
Manager had a mean effectiveness ranking of 3.62, but this performance is not statistically
different from either Balanced High Performer (E) or Technical Leader (B). A Project Manager
might do best in a large organization that assigns specialized incident response roles, or in an
organization with a small centralized incident response team and other responders located
elsewhere in the organization. One expert in my study reported that the incident response role at
their organization was “not technical;” the central team acted as a coordination center, but
technical analysis took place elsewhere.
Security Specialist (Archetype A): Security Specialist has strong technical
characteristics; other characteristics were rated about average. This group’s mean performance
(3.09) is statistically lower than Balanced High Performer (E), but not statistically different from
Project Manager (C) or Technical Leader (B). This is somewhat surprising, given that Security
Specialist has lower scores on investigative abilities, passion for security, discretion, and
communication. Since experts in the RepGrid study identified some highly successful individual
responders in this group, I infer that some responders’ technical characteristics are highly
specialized (digital forensics, malware analysis, etc.), and these specialized knowledge and skills
might not be part of the repertoires (characteristic-sets) of individuals in other archetypes.
Lower Performer (“Archetype16” D): Each expert identified some people who were not
effective InfoSec incident responders, yielding a Lower Performer cluster. These people were

16

Again, we do not view this as an archetype in the sense of an ideal performer.
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rated weak on many characteristics, and their mean effectiveness ranking is very low: 1.36 out of
6.0. This supports the theory that an individual with weak incident response characteristics is less
effective in an incident response role. This is a distinct group; it does not include poor performers
from other archetypes (as reflected in performance ratings). Possibly some individuals in this
group are generalists who could contribute effectively in a different InfoSec role, but they do not
possess a sufficiently strong characteristic set for an incident response role.

Discussion and Implications
My RepGrid study answered the questions ‘What individual capabilities contribute to
effective incident response?’ (RQ1) and ‘What is the relative importance of each individual
InfoSec incident response characteristic?’(RQ2). Many of the 54 characteristics identified by the
experts in my study (Table 4-3) would be useful in many jobs beyond InfoSec incident response –
especially the top ten most-mentioned characteristics (described by six or more experts):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Technical Breadth
Oral Communication
Collaborative
Attention to Detail
Ability to Distill Information
Ability to multitask
Lateral Thinking
Industry Focus
Doing the Right Thing
Level Headed

(mentioned by 10 experts)
(mentioned by 8 experts)
(mentioned by 7 experts)
(mentioned by 7 experts)
(mentioned by 6 experts)
(mentioned by 6 experts)
(mentioned by 6 experts)
(mentioned by 6 experts)
(mentioned by 6 experts)
(mentioned by 6 experts)

Each characteristic can be helpful in other jobs, but perhaps few other jobs would require
an individual to possess all ten characteristics (this assertion could be tested in future studies, as I
will discuss in the next section). For example, a cost accountant needs great attention to detail,
but perhaps not impressive lateral thinking (a form of creativity more useful for new product
design or advertising jobs). Certainly, it is not realistic to expect that any one individual would be
strong in all 54 characteristics identified in my study.
I grouped characteristics into five categories (Character, Cognitive, Communication,
General Management, Technical), counted how many experts mentioned characteristics in each
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category, and calculated the extent to which each effective incident responder exceeded the mean
value for each category (Table 4-4). Highly effective incident responders were judged especially
strong in Character (importance .75) and Cognitive (importance .78) characteristics. However,
my study also suggests that individuals who are weaker on these characteristics yet have strong
technical knowledge and skills can still succeed in an incident response role.
Combining these findings with raw counts of unprompted expert mentions of each
characteristic, I tentatively suggest that being level-headed and doing the right thing are
especially important Character attributes; having a passion for security and being an assertive
team player are also important. Attention to detail, ability to multitask, ability to distill
information and lateral thinking may be especially important cognitive characteristics for incident
responders, yet they would also likely be useful for many other IT tasks. Technical breadth, oral
communications, and collaboration are also useful in many roles beyond incident response.
My study provided tentative answers to ‘What characteristic-sets do effective individual
incident responders possess?’ (RQ3) and ‘To what extent do incident response characteristic-sets
vary across effective individual responders?’ (RQ4). A key contribution was the five archetype
that emerged from the clusters, identified using k-means clustering. My analysis identified a
statistical difference in the effectiveness rankings of the Security Specialist and Balanced High
Performer, but not between any other roles. This supports prior studies that claimed that the
incident response role has become much more specialized. This finding also led us to further
consider the roles individuals in these architypes might be suited for, by discussing the
characteristic sets with senior managers of incident response teams. Many characteristics appear
in all four archetypes, including being level headed, doing the right thing, and having a passion
for security. These non-technical traits may be especially important to incident response but less
so for other IT roles – a good proposition to test in future studies.
Some characteristics appear in multiple archetypes, and my data also hint that some
characteristics are better suited to specific roles. Most effective responders (as identified by the
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expert interviewees) exhibited some characteristics in each of five categories (Character,
Cognitive, General Management, Technical, Communication). Very few responders were seen as
possessing all characteristics in any particular category – for example, many individuals in the
Balanced High Performer Archetype were slightly weaker in one category. Luckily, initial
evidence indicates that one size does not fit all when it comes to building an incident response
team and individuals fitting different architypes can be successful as incident responders.

Implications for Theory
Drawing on RBV, I conceptualized InfoSec incident response as an individual, group, and
organizational capability. An organization’s overall incident response capability is comprised of
multiple complementary capabilities, each formed by combining relevant human assets and
lower-level capabilities with other technical, organizational and institutional resources. An
effective individual responder possesses valuable characteristics (knowledge 17, skills, character
attributes), and uses one or several of these when performing particular InfoSec incident response
tasks. Note that RBV proposes that a resource is strategically important to the extent that it is
valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and non-substitutable. Since prior studies report that qualified
InfoSec specialists are in short supply (ISACA 2016), an overall InfoSec capability is Rare. Since
average salaries of InfoSec incident responders are high (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015), this
capability is presumably Valuable. My study also offered some evidence regarding imitability and
substitutability, discussed next.
Some individuals classified as Low Performers (Archetype D) possessed above-average
characteristics in one category but did not have a set of characteristics that might have helped the
individual be more effective in the incident response role. This group’s performance score was

17 Terminology changes over time. Early work on the Resource-Based View saw knowledge as an intangible
asset; recent work sees data and information as intangible assets and sees knowledge as a capability. Whether an
asset or a capability, and whether at an individual, team, or organizational level, knowledge is a potentiallyvaluable resource.
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low, which points to evidence that effective individual capability-sets are difficult to imitate; an
individual needs a coherent combination of characteristics to perform effectively in some incident
response roles. Still, a manager can adjust role requirements, processes, and other aspects to
complement team members’ strengths. While Balanced High Performer (E) seems to be an ideal
candidate for an incident-response team, my data suggest that Technical Leader (B) and Project
Manager (C) might also be quite effective, in certain response scenarios. So, the identified sets of
characteristics for each archetype may be only partially non-substitutable.
By viewing personal characteristics as potentially-strategic resources, we begin to
understand why complementarity is important at the group (team) level. To my knowledge, this is
the first study that has investigated complementary individual assets, capabilities and character
attributes in IS research. While common sense tells us that communication skills help individuals
succeed in many ICT roles and also that communication skills should be combined with technical
skills in specific contexts, no prior IS study has unpacked this relationship.
An individual’s characteristic-set directly influences his or her effectiveness in carrying out
specific tasks. Managers may attempt to hire individuals with characteristic sets that complement
their organizations’ incident response practices. When unsuccessful in finding an ideal candidate,
managers might need to prioritize their training efforts based on the importance of each
characteristic, both on its own and in combination with others.

Implications for Practice
With incident volume and severity on the rise (such as the 2017 Equifax data breach that
affected more than 143 million people, as well as news, in October 2017, that Yahoo’s 2013
breach affected 3 billion people) many organizations have established security operations centers,
populated with incident response professionals. This study supports the claim that InfoSec staff
need to understand important business drivers that affect their own organizations. Still, line
managers need clear guidance regarding specific sets of characteristics that contribute to the
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development of effective individual and team incident response capabilities. Without this
guidance, some managers might rely on inappropriate heuristics when they hire individuals for
incident responder jobs. I contribute two important steps forward in providing this guidance.
First, as seen in Table 4-3, I provide evidence of the weighted importance of different
characteristics associated with effective incident responders. When hiring individuals for incident
response roles, managers can apply similarly-weighted evaluation criteria to recruiting and
candidate selection processes. My study finds that elements of character and cognitive
characteristics are highly correlated with incident response effectiveness, and many of these
competencies are difficult to develop.
This brings us to the second implication for practice. I found that different incident
responder archetypes exist and that no archetype is overwhelmingly more successful than the
others. This finding supports the claim that as response teams have become more prevalent, the
incident responder role has become much more specialized; different characteristic-sets are
needed in different specialized roles and under different contextual conditions. In addition to
distinguishing between routine and non-routine InfoSec incidents, mangers should also consider
how varying levels of urgency might call for different incident response characteristics.
For consistently carrying out routine tasks and executing processes defined in an incident
response playbook, a manager might recruit Technical Leaders (Archetype B), whereas a Security
Specialist (Archetype A) might be better suited to forensics investigation, reverse engineering, or
other specialized tasks. Large security events often require coordination among different parts of
an organization (such as legal, public relations, and operations teams). A Project Manager
(Archetype C) may be well suited to organize a large incident response team. However, because
individuals in this archetype lack some technical knowledge and skills, individuals possessing
complementary characteristics should also be recruited to the team.
My analysis suggests that particular sets of characteristics are better suited to different
types of InfoSec incidents. When creating an incident response team or security operations center,
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a manager should consider the contributions individuals in each archetype can make. This
manager needs to be able to assure the executive team that the incident response team can
respond to any type InfoSec incident.

Validity and Reliability
RepGrid is grounded by personal construct theory (PCT), which examines an individual’s
perceptions at a given time, as explained by Hadley:
The repertory grid procedure by design has a high level of internal validity. The
technique is specifically designed to identify the bipolar constructs of groups or
individuals… Provided that an appropriate level of rigor is applied, research shows
that rep grids are both reliable and valid as a research instrument. (Hadley, 1996 p.
11).
I closely followed published guidance for conducting a rigorous RepGrid study, and I have
provided a detailed description of my data collection and analytic procedures so that others can
evaluate my method. The raw data are stored in a Bentley University archive as part of the data
retention policy of the University.
Because I designed my interpretive study to elicit constructs from the interviewees (so as
to identify and understand experts’ beliefs about characteristics associated with effective and lesseffective incident responders), it would be inappropriate to claim internal reliability based on
correlation between characteristics via a split-half method. Had I conducted a positivist RepGrid
study, instead of eliciting constructs, I would have provided constructs to interviewees (based on
prior literature). I would then have been able to claim internal reliability based on correlated
constructs. I chose to conduct an interpretive study with expert incident responders, because this
approach captures interviewees’ own perceptions of the phenomenon without limitations from a
priori constructs that may be present in a positivist study.
Each interviewee described a unique set of incident responders with whom he or she had
worked. Thus, in this interpretive RepGrid study it is not possible to judge if each interviewee
accurately evaluated each individual incident responder (by comparing an interviewee’s
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descriptions of each incident responder with other interviewees’ descriptions of the same incident
responders). I can claim that each interviewee accurately described his/her perceptions of the
incident responders that he or she described and (by virtue of being a highly experienced incident
responder) that each interviewee focused on characteristics that he or she considers important.
Their perceptions are likely accurate, since these interviewees were senior incident responders,
with 8-25 years of experience in information security roles (average 16.6 years; see Table 4-2).
I argue that I reached theoretical saturation, since no new constructs were identified after
the 9th interview (see Figure 4-2, which shows the number of new constructs identified during
each interview). However, I cannot claim that interviewees’ perceptions completely represent all
characteristics associated with all effective incident responders, since my interviewees all worked
at large organizations and were members of FIRST. This was by design; I sought out experts who
could discuss several incident responders, and thus needed to interview experienced incident
responders who worked in large incident response teams). So, this study's findings do not
necessarily fully apply to incident responders working in small organizations.
The RepGrid method is widely acknowledged as capturing highly valid interviewee
perceptions (Hunter and Beck 2000). Bannister and Fransella (1966) experimentally validated
reliability by repeatedly interviewing subjects; the resulting RepGrids had acceptable levels of
test-retest reliability. However, it is important to note that one’s perceptions of other individuals
can change over time, and if so, this change in perception will result in different grids (McCoy
1983). Bannister et al. (1971) addressed this possibility by arguing that personal construct theory
“sees man as a form of motion. Our aim should be to understand the meaning of change, not to
regard it as an irritating interference with ‘reliability’.” (p. 76) Thus, in my judgment, it was not
necessary to measure external reliability by repeatedly interviewing interviewees. In that spirit, I
acknowledge that – due to changing attacker tactics and other factors – future RepGrid studies of
incident responder characteristics, by similarly-experienced experts, could yield different results,
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and those results should cause researchers to consider what might have changed in the intervening
years, and the implications for hiring members of InfoSec incident response teams.
In this interpretive RepGrid study I did not attempt to measure inter-rater reliability (to
determine how much variation in elicited categories was due to variation between coders (Novick
and Lewis 1966). Instead, differences in coding were resolved through discussion until consensus
was reached. I did statistically validate the results of my coding, using principal component
analysis. Table 4-4 identified how well the categories uniquely describe characteristics of incident
responders. The goal of this analysis, similar to Cronbach’s alpha, is to achieve a score greater
than 7.0 in one component while minimizing the loading in other components. If I did not
appropriately group the characteristics elicited during interviews, I would have found that one
theme would have a value over 0.5 in multiple columns. Likewise, if my coded categories were
not appropriately dissimilar, I would find that two or more groups would have a value over 0.5 in
the same column. Due to the lack of cross-loading, the results indicate that coding was
appropriate and that any errors in my coding did not have a material impact on the results. Thus, I
judge that the coding was reliable. However, interpretation is a necessarily subjective and
tentative process, and it is thus possible that one or more constructs are not yet optimally labeled.

Limitations and Future Directions
Study Limitations
Every study brings both strengths and limitations. A well-executed RepGrid study reveals
new constructs for further investigation, yet this method also has important limitations. My study
relied on the judgments of 13 InfoSec incident response experts, and I was able to make a strong
claim of achieving theoretical saturation from within this group (given that the last four
interviews yielded no additional constructs). All of the expert interviewees in my study are
members of FIRST and the median number of years employed in InfoSec roles is 17, so I am
confident that they are experts. However, I cannot claim that they represent a broader population
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of incident response experts. Industry and organizational context also likely influence InfoSec
incident response challenges, processes, and teams, yet my interviewees are employed by a few
organizations, in a few industries. Thus, we cannot generalize broadly from this one study (in the
same sense that one cannot generalize broadly from any one experiment or case study).
I also cannot yet claim that all important individual incident response characteristics have
been identified. For example, “knowledge about current hacking events” is likely important to an
InfoSec incident responder, yet this characteristic was not suggested by any interviewee. Perhaps
experts in my sample take for granted that anyone in a responder role (whether very effective or
less effective) will possess this basic knowledge. Use of an “incompetent” anchor mitigates this
methodological limitation to some extent but does not completely eliminate it.
I also acknowledge that my findings and insights are subject to my skill in interpreting the
RepGrid data. During each semi-structured interview, I subjectively judged if an expert’s
response was sufficiently specific and on-topic; if not, laddering was used. To subsequently
aggregate individual grids, I interpreted experts’ responses (by choosing names for characteristics
and classifying them into the five groups). I closely followed published guidance for eliciting
constructs (G. Kelly 1955) and standardizing construct names (Fransella et al. 2004; Jankowicz
2005), and I provide a sufficiently transparent description of my data collection and analytic
procedures to offer the reader a strong basis to conclude that my findings are evidence-based.
However, I welcome discussion of alternative interpretations, which can be a useful way to move
this research stream forward.

Foundation for Future Research
I have illustrated how the RepGrid technique can reveal individual characteristics that
expert responders believe contribute to effective InfoSec incident response, group them into
characteristic-sets, and measure the relative value of specific characteristics and sets of
characteristics. I believe this is the first IS study to identify archetypes through exploratory cluster
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analysis on RepGrid interview data, and the first IS study to link incident response archetypes to
their internal value by aggregating evaluation measures taken from interviews.
Thanks to its flexibility and structure, RepGrid is used to a great extent in other academic
disciplines. An important strength is that it allows an interviewer to hear how a person thinks
about a topic, expressed in Interviewee’s own words. Thus, RepGrid is an ideal method for
exploring topics not yet supported by a large evidence base (such as characteristics of effective
individual InfoSec incident responders). I see strong potential for RepGrid to be adopted more
widely by IS researchers, to study other phenomena. Indeed, thanks to newer analytic techniques
that can be incorporated into a RepGrid study, I believe this research method has just begun to
reveal its true potential in IS research. For example, free open-source software packages like
OpenRepGrid can be used to manipulate grids in order to analyze the data using statistical
packages like random Forest, kohonen (self-organizing maps), neuralnet (artificial neural
networks), etc.
In my earlier pilot study, conducted in one large high-tech organization, experts viewed
technical characteristics as especially important. In the current study, experts working in a variety
of organizations indicated that technical knowledge and skills were sometimes less important than
project management knowledge, skills and character attributes. These differences might reflect
different social norms in the pilot organization versus in the organizations represented in this
study, or differences in how incident response roles and teams are defined and implemented in
different organizations. Future studies can focus on how the organization and governance of the
InfoSec response function interacts with responder characteristics.

Suggestions for Further Research
As previously noted, more research is needed to determine “how, why, and when do IS
assets, IS capabilities and socio-organizational capabilities affect each other and jointly create
internal value?” (Schryen 2013, p. 156). My study has laid a helpful foundation for further work
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addressing this question. An important direction for future studies is to identify how InfoSec
incident responder characteristics complement and/or are complemented by organizational
resources (such as processes, tools, and decision rights) and why specific individual knowledge,
skills, and character attributes are enacted in specific InfoSec incident response contexts. For
example, do specific triggers – such as an attack not pre-specified in an InfoSec response
playbook – necessitate specific incident response capabilities? RepGrid is a useful research
method for further study on this topic, as are case research, critical incident technique (Bogen et
al. 2008; Flanagan 1954; Gogan et al. 2014) and other methods that support interpretive analysis.
Future studies can also build on these findings by comparing incident response teams in larger
versus smaller organizations, stable versus volatile environments, and context in which
information systems play vital roles versus those contexts in which IS plays a useful (but not
vitally important) support role.
Other studies could investigate InfoSec responders in other contexts, such as government
teams, which coordinate across many organizations to share information about emerging threats
and successful defenses. Also, in new RepGrid studies the researcher can validate constructs
identified here by providing them for the interviewees to consider (instead of eliciting constructs
as was done in my exploratory investigation). This approach would make it possible to discover
and analyze relationships between constructs identified in my study and those constructs in
practitioner lists (such as those noted in Appendix 4-1). Eventually, it should be possible to
validate an InfoSec incident response capability instrument by means of large-N surveys tapping
the perspectives of expert responders, novice responders, senior managers, and individuals who
have been affected by InfoSec incidents. Such a survey could provide further evidence relevant to
the prioritization of characteristics, and further empirical evidence that the categories I used to
code the characteristics are valid. Surveys might be particularly useful for investigating InfoSec
capabilities in small companies, where a RepGrid study is infeasible (since each expert needs to
be able to compare several incident responders). A large-N positivist study, using a well-validated
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survey instrument, could test relationships between particular capabilities and individual and
organizational performance in various contexts.

Conclusion
My approach, informed by RBV, supports that organizations derive value from enterprise
systems by implementing them in resource bundles consisting of processes, staff characteristics
and other resources. Since InfoSec incident response teams must be capable of carrying out a
variety of diverse tasks, it follows that each team should include individuals whose own complex
characteristic-sets contain complementary assets and capabilities. Also individuals’ characteristicsets should complement other team members’ characteristic-sets. My results are consistent with
the argument that InfoSec incident response teams are becoming more specialized (Bejtlich et al.
2011; Ruefle et al. 2014) and that organizations should strategically assemble resource bundles
for effective InfoSec incident response (McLaughlin and Gogan 2014).
If my findings are borne out by further studies, there are implications for InfoSec curricula.
While technical knowledge about InfoSec tools and techniques, networking and other topics are
certainly important, courses that develop communication skills and that consider legal and
cultural aspects of InfoSec may also be of value.
This paper is an important first step in recognizing that specific configurations of
characteristics contribute to individual incident response effectiveness, with possible implications
for coping with the current shortage of cyber security professionals. This is important because,
unlike project management, software engineering, accounting, law, and other professions,
InfoSec incident response practices are maturing. While prior research has yielded some guidance
to help organizations prevent and detect incidents, less guidance is available for helping
organizations effectively respond to incidents when they nevertheless occur. A multi-study,
multi-method program of research on InfoSec incident response is needed to continue to
investigate this important topic.
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APPENDIX 1-1: APPROVAL LETTERS
I sent the following message to the individuals identified in the Titan study:
You previously authorized publication of the teaching case titled "A High Performance
Computing Cluster Under Attack: The Titan Incident", based on interviews I conducted
with you as well as other information you were able to provide me. The case was
published by Journal of Information Technology-Teaching Cases and is now in the
Harvard Business School Publishing case collection for use in information security
classes at undergraduate, graduate and executive programs at Harvard and elsewhere.
I did not initially anticipate that the case would also be a part of my dissertation, but
since my final dissertation topic was Information Security Incident Response, my
advisor suggested that it should be included in the dissertation, along with another case
study and an empirical study of knowledge, skills and characteristics of effective
information security incident responders.
My purpose in writing you today is to formally request your permission to include
the case in my Bentley University dissertation. Your reply to that effect will be
included as an appendix to the dissertation.
On 23 February 2018, Leif Nixon replied:
You are welcome to use any and all data I've shared with you, in any form you require.
On 1 March 2018, Margrete Raaum replied:
Of course it's ok, and congratulations!
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175 Forest Street
Waltham, Massachusetts 02452

March 19, 2014
Mark-David McLaughlin
PhD Student, IPM Department
Bentley University
175 Forest Street
Waltham, Massachusetts 02452
Re: Teaching Case: The Case of the Dean’s Stolen Laptop
Dear Mr. McLaughlin:
This letter is written in response to materials forwarded to the Bentley Institutional Review Board, including the
Research Review form, study design, informed consent document, and letter of approval from the dean of the Saunders
College of Business (Dean and Professor dt ogilvie) to conduct the study at Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT).
The letter from Dean ogilvie is an integral part of this letter and is hereby incorporated by reference. The letter from
Dean ogilvie states that the research will be conducted by you and Dr. Sean Hansen of RIT, that Dean ogilvie has
received relevant IRB documents from you and Dr. Hansen, and that the participation of the Saunders College
members will occur during standard working house or at other times if deemed necessary and mutually acceptable.
You have stated in your IRB Research Review From that “[t]he risks associated with this study are quite limited [and]
there is no danger involved.” You have also indicated that you will provide a copy of this letter and other relevant IRB
documents to Heather Foti, MPH Associate Director, Human Subjects Research Office (HSRO) at RIT. You have
stated that you will inform the participants of the study about your data retention policy, and that you will receive a
signed and dated informed consent form from each study participant. The informed consent form is an integral part of
this letter and is hereby incorporated by reference.
Bentley University’s Institutional Review Board has approved this project under an expedited review (in collaboration
with former IRB chairperson Professor Tony Buono) as long as you follow the protocols noted in your initial
submission under NSF’s 45 CFR 46.110 (A)[7]:
Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception,
cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research
employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality
assurance methodologies.
This approval is good for one year, with the understanding that a Research Progress and Review Form be filed at the
end of the first year or completion of the project, whichever comes first.
It is understood that you will contact us and file an Adverse Event Form within 72 hours if any problems emerge
while using human subjects.
Thank you for working with your IRB – and best wishes for success with the project.
Sincerely,

William Wiggins
Chair, Institutional Review Board

Bentley College IRB#1: FWA00007335

cc: Mary Louise Pauli, Director of Sponsored Programs and Institutional Review Board Administrator
Professor Tony Buono, Management Department
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175 Forest Street
Waltham, Massachusetts 02452

February 26, 2014
Mark-David McLaughlin
PhD Student
Information and Process Management Department
Bentley University
175 Forest Street
Waltham, Massachusetts 02452
Re: Collective Cognition of Security Incident Response Engineers: A Repertory Grid Investigation
Dear Mark-David:
This letter is written in response to materials forwarded to the Bentley Institutional Review Board including the
Research Review Form and study design.
Bentley University has determined this project to be exempt from further review unless there is a substantial change to
the documents specified above, or to your planned protocol. Our Institutional Review Board exempted the proposal
under NSF 's Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 CFR Part 46.101 [b] (2):
Research involving the use of educational tests, survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of
public behavior. It is understood that (1) the information obtained will be recorded in such manner that the human
subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (2) any disclosure of the human
subjects’ responses outside the research would not reasonably place the subject under risk of criminal or civil liability
or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation.
You have indicated that should you decide to have the interviews transcribed by a third party you will take the
necessary protective measures to assure the confidentiality of the data and the protection of the identity of the subjects
of your study.
Due to the project’s exempt classification, you do not have to submit any additional paperwork to the IRB unless there
is a change to the protocols noted in your submission or if there is a problem with any of your subjects. In the event of
a change in the study, you are required to submit a Research Progress & Review Form noting the changes and
requesting a continuation of the research. It is also understood that you will contact us and file an Adverse Event form
with 72 hours if any problems emerge while using human subjects.
Thank you for working with your IRB – and best wishes for success with the project.
Sincerely,

William Wiggins
Chair, Institutional Review Board

Bentley College IRB#1: FWA00007335

cc: Mary Louise Pauli, Director of Sponsored Programs and Institutional Review Board Administrator
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APPENDIX 2-1: INFOSEC IS A SECONDARY TOPIC IN THESE SCHOLARS
BASKET PAPERS
Author/s
Kapoor, et al.
Khalifa and Liu
Yao and Murphy
Zhu et al.
Carter and Belanger
Lee and Rao
Ramesh et al.
Tsai et al.
Xu et al.,
Sutton et al.
Kim and Ahn
Arora and Forman
Benlian et al.
Fang et al.
Kim
Wakefield
Hahn et al.
Iivari and Huisman
Li et al.
Pavlou, et al.
N=20

Journal and Citation Details "secur" in keyword list?
EJIS 18(6): 526-533. Dec 2009
No
EJIS 16(6): 780-792. Dec 2007
No
EJIS 16(2): 106-120. Apr 2007
No
EJIS 15(6): 601-616. Dec 2006
No
ISJ 15(1): 5-25. Jan 2005.
No
ISJ 22(4): 313-341. Jul 2012
No
ISJ 20(5): 449-480. Sep 2010.
No
ISR 22(2), June 2011
No
ISR 23(4), Dec 2012
No
JAIS 9(3-4): 151-174. 2008
No
JIT 22(2): 119-132. Jun 2007
No
JMIS 24(2): 73-102. Fall 2007
No
JMIS 28(3): 85-126. Win 2011.
No
JMIS 22(3): 123-157. Win 2005.
Perceived Security
JMIS 24(4): 13-45. Spr 2008
No
JSIS 22(2): 157-174, June 2013
Internet Security
MISQ 33(3): 597-616. Sep 2009
No
MISQ 31(1): 35-58. Mar 2007
No
MISQ 36(1): 179-203. Mar 2012
No
MISQ 31(1):105-136,Mar 2007
Information security
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APPENDIX 2-2: 2004-2016 INFOSEC STUDIES
Authors

Abbasi et al.
Abbasi et al.
Anderson and Agarwal
Arora et al.
August and Tunca
August, Niculescu, & Shin
Backhouse et al.
Boss et al.
Boss et al.
Brinton-Anderson et al.
Bulgurcu et al.
Cavusoglu et al.
Cavusoglu et al.
Cavusoglu et al.
Chatterjee, Sarkar & Valacich
Chen & Zahedi
Chen et al.
Chen, et al.
Choudhary & Zhang
Cremonini and Nizovtsev
Culnan and Williams
D'aubeterre,
D’Arcy et al.
D’Arcy, Herath, Shoss
D’Aubeterre et al.
Dey et al.
Dhillon and Torkzadeh
Dinev and Hu
Dinev et al.
Djekic and Loebbecke
Fernandez-Medina, et al.
Foth
Gal-Or and Ghose
Galbreth and Shor
Garfinkel and Gopal
Goel and Chengalur-Smith
Goldstein et al.
Gordon et al.
Guo et al.
Guo, Cheng, Kelley
Gupta and Zhdanov
Hedstrom et al.
Herath and Herath
Herath and Rao
Herath et al.
Herath et al.
Ho et al.
Hsu
Hsu et al.
Hsu et al.
Hsu, Backhouse, Silva
Hu et al.
Hu, West, & Smarandescu
Hua and Bapna
Hui et al
Ji, Kumar & Mookerjee
Johnson

Partial Citation
JMIS 31(4): 2015
MISQ 34(3): 2010
MISQ 34(3): 2010
ISR 21(1): 2010
ISR 19(1): 2008.
ISR 25(3): 2014
MISQ 30(3): 2006
MISQ 39(4): 2015
EJIS 18(2): 2009
EJIS 25(4): 2016
MISQ 34(3): 2010
ISR 16(1): 2005
ISR 20(2): 2009
JMIS 25(2): 2008
JMIS 31(4): 2015
MISQ 40(1): 2016
JMIS 29(3): 2012
MISQ 35(2): 2011
ISR 26(4): 2015
JMIS 26(3): 2009
MISQ 33(4): 2009
EJIS 17(5): 2008
ISR 20(1): 2009
JMIS 31(2): 2014
JAIS 9(3): 2008
JMIS 29(2), 2012
ISJ 16(3): 2006
JAIS 8(7): 2007.
ISJ 19(4): 2009
JSIS 16: 2007.
EJIS 16(4): 2007
EJIS 25(2): 2016
ISR 16(2): 2005
MISQ 34(3): 2010
ISR 18(1): 2007
JSIS 19(4): 2010
JAIS 12(9): 2011
MISQ 34(3): 2010
JMIS 28(2): 2011
JMIS 33(1): 2016
MISQ 36(4) 2012
JSIS 20(4): 2011
JMIS 25(3): 2008
EJIS 18(2): 2009
ISJ 24(1): 2014
ISJ 24(1): 2012
JMIS 33(2): 2016
EJIS 18(2): 2009
ISR 26(1): 2015
ISR 23(3): 2012
JIT 29(1): 2014
JSIS 16(2): 2007
JMIS 41(4): 2015
JSIS 22 (2): 2013
JMIS 29(3), 2013
ISR 27(2): 2016
JMIS 25(2): 2008
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Johnston and Warkentin
Johnston et al.
Johnston, Warkentin, Siponen
Karjalainen and Siponen
Katos and Adams
Keith et al.
Kim & Kim
Kolkowska Karlsson, Hedström
Kumar et al.
Kwon & Johnson
Kwon and Johnson
Lee et al.
Lee, Geng, Raghunathan
Li & Sarkar
Li and Sarkar
Li and Sarkar
Li et al.
Liang and Xue
Liang and Xue
Liang, Xue, & Wu
Lowry & Moody
Lowry et al.
Majchrzak and Jarvenpaa
Melville and McQuaid
Mitra & Ransbotham
Mookerjee et al.
Myyry et al.
Njenga and Brown
Oetzel & Spiekermann
Png and Wang
Png et al.
Posey et al.
Posey, Roberts & Lowry
Puhakainen and Siponen
Ransbotham and Mitra
Ransbotham et al.
Salmela
Sen and Borle
Siponen and Vance
Siponen et al.
Smith et al.
Spears and Barki
Stahl et al.
Steinbart, Keith & Babb
Sun et al.
Temizkan et al.
Tow et al.
Tsohou et al.
Vaast
Vance et al
Vance et al.
Vance, Lowry & Eggett
Vuorinen and Tetri
Wang et al.
Wang et al.
Wang, Gupta & Rao
Wang, Xiao & Rao
Warkentin et al.
Warkentin et al.
Willison and Backhouse
Wong et al.
Wright and Marrett

MISQ 34(3): 2010
EJIS 25(3):2016
MISQ 39(1): 2015
JAIS 12(8): 2011
JSIS 14(3): 2005
JAIS 10(2): 2009
JMIS 31(4): 2014
JSIS 26(1): 2016
JMIS 25(2): 2008
MIQS 38(2): 2014
JMIS 30(2): 2013
ISR 24(2): 2013
ISR 27(1): 2016
MIQS 38(3): 2014
ISR 17(3): 2006
ISR 22(4): 2011
ISJ 24(6): 2014
JAIS 11(7): 2010
MISQ 33(1): 2009
ISR 24(2): 2014
ISJ 25(5): 2015
ISJ 25(3): 2015
JMIS 27(2): 2010
ISR 23(2): 2012
ISR 26(3): 2015
ISR 22(3): 2011
EJIS 18(2): 2009
EJIS 21(6): 2012
EJIS 23(2): 2014
JMIS 26(2): 2009
JMIS 25(2): 2008
MISQ 37(4): 2013
JMIS 23(4): 2015
MISQ 34(4): 2010
ISR 20(1): 2009
MISQ 36(1): 2012
JIT 23(3): 2008
JMIS 32(2): 2015
MISQ 34(3): 2010
JAIS 7(11): 2006
MISQ 34(3): 2010
MISQ 34(3): 2010
ISJ 22(1): 2012
ISR 27(2): 2016
JMIS 22(4): 2006
JMIS 28(4): 2012
JIT 25(2): 2010
EJIS 24(1): 2015
JSIS 16(2): 2007
JAIS 39(2): 2014
JMIS 29(4), 2013
MISQ 39(2): 2015
JAIS 13(9): 2012
ISR 19(1): 2008
ISR 24(2): 2013
MISQ 39(1): 2015
ISR 26(3): 2015
JAIS 17(3): 2016
EJIS 20(3): 2011
EJIS 15(4): 2006
ISJ 22(1): 2012
JMIS 27(1): 2010
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Wright et al.
Yayla and Hu
Yue and Cakanyildirim
Zahedi, Abbasi & Chen
Zhang et al.
Zhao et al.

ISR 25(2): 2014
JIT 26(1): 2011
JMIS 24(1): 2007
JAIS 16(6): 2015
EJIS 18(2): 2009
JMIS 30(1): 2013
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APPENDIX 4-1: COMBINED LIST OF INCIDENT RESPONSE
CHARACTERISTICS IDENTIFIED IN PRIOR LITERATURE

Ability to Follow Policies/Procedures (1)
Adaptive (2)
Ambiguity Tolerance (2)
Collaborative problem-solving (2, 3)
Communicating Policies (1)
Communication (Written/Oral) (1,2,3,4)
Copes with Stress (1)
Decision-making Competence (2)
Desire to acquire/share knowledge (3)
Detail Oriented (2, 3)
Detect patterns in routine material or data (3)
Diplomacy (1)
Divertive Curiosity (2)
Host/System Security Issues (1)
HR Management (4)
Incident Analysis (1,4)
Incident Supervision (4)
Integrity (1)
Intelligence (2, 4)
Investigative Skills (2, 3, 4)
Knowing One's Limits (1)
Law Enforcement Liaison (4)
Learning ability (2)
Legal and Compliance (4)
Maintain Incident Records (1)
Malicious Code (1)
Mentor/coaching ability (2)
Motivated to work on behalf of team (2)

Network Applications & Services (1, 4)
Network Protocols (1)
Network Security Issues (1)
Perceive something wrong/likely to go wrong(3)
Perseverance (2)
Planning and Evaluation (4)
Preference for working with others (3)
Presentation Skills (1)
Proactive (2)
Problem Solving (1, 2, 3)
Programming Skills (1)
Public Relations and Media Management (4)
Rapidly compare data accurately (3)
Resilient (2)
Risk Analysis (1)
Security Principles (1)
Security Vulnerabilities/Weaknesses (1)
Self-motivated (2)
Specific Curiosity (2, 3)
Team Skills (1)
The Internet (1)
Time Management (1)
Trustworthy (2)
Understand/Identify Intruder Techniques (1)
Work Ethic (2)

1: Carnegie Mellon: SIE (SEI 2015)
2: GMU: Top 20 (Pfleeger et al. 2015)
3: Chen (Chen et al. 2014)
4: Gartner (McMillian and Walls 2016)
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APPENDIX 4-2: SELECT INDIVIDUAL REPERTORY GRIDS
Interview 7
Title:
Security Experience:
IR Experience:
Company Size:

Senior Security Incident Manager
8 yrs
8 yrs
Large
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Interview 12
Title:
Security Experience:
IR Experience:
Company Size:

Assistant Director for Cyber Defense and Response
19 yrs
16 yrs
Large
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APPENDIX 4-3: AGGREGATE GRID
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APPENDIX 4-4: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF
ARCHETYPE PERFORMANCE
Analysis of Variance Table
Response: Stack Rank
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value
Pr(>F)
Group 4 84.58 21.146 10.65 7.44e-07 ***
Residuals 73 144.90 1.985
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Post Hoc Tests
diff
1.2464
0.5284
-1.7233
1.4585
-0.7179
-2.9697
0.2121
-2.2517
0.9301
3.1818

lower
-0.3031
-0.8390
-3.1680
0.2833
-2.4268
-4.7410
-1.3472
-3.8662
-0.4485
1.7266

upper
2.7958
1.8959
-0.2786
2.6337
0.9909
-1.1984
1.7715
-0.6373
2.3087
4.6371

p adj
0.1734
0.8157
0.0113
0.0076
0.7654
0.0001
0.9955
0.0019
0.3334
0.0000

B-A
C-A
D-A
**
E-A
**
C-B
D-B
**
E-B
D-C
**
E-C
E-D
***
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
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APPENDIX 4-5: CONSTRUCTS IDENTIFIED IN EACH REP GRID INTERVIEW
Interview 1
Item Characteristic
1

Attention to Detail

Interview 2
Characteristic

Interview 4
Characteristic

Repeats

2

Industry Focus

Threat Hunting

Written Communication

Technical Acumen

I1-C6

3

Customer Focused

Prioritizing Risk

Persistence

I1-C17

Thorough

I1-C1

4

Collaborative

I1-C14

5

Big Picture

Communicate Tech
Details
Objective

Thorough

I1-C1

Honest

I1-C16

I2-C2

Oral Communication to
technical audience

I1-C14

Regulatory
Framework

6

Technical Breadth

Remove Emotions

Level Headed

I2-C6

Common Sense

7
8

Security Expertise
Mentor

Continuous Learning
Lateral Thinking

I1-C12

Analysis Capabilities
Resiliency/Sticking
with it

I1-C13

9

Legal Awareness

Delegation

Building Consensus

10
11

Discretion
Available

12

Document

Mentoring
Finding Simplest
Solution
Communicate Risk

13

Distill Info

Multitasking

14

Oral
Communication
Security Passion
Doing Right Thing
Engaged

Community
Involvement

Confidence
Technical
Documentation of
Problem
Organization: Task
management
Personable
General Security
Knowledge
Programming
Languages General
Software Development
Methodologies
Knowledge
Executive
Communication

15
16
17

Highly Technical

Repeats
I1-C6

I1-C8

I1-C2

Interview 3
Characteristic

Networking Protocols

Repeats

I1-C7

I3-C12

Industry Knowledge

Technical:
Computer
Science
Organize their
thoughts
Not afraid to
speak their mind
multitasking

Repeats
I3-C12

I2-C13
I1-C2

I1-C4

Participate in
outside security
functions
Make a call and
go with it
Self Confidence
Talk to Upper
Level
Management
Active listener

Organized
Passion

I3-C9
I1-C15

Socialize Issues
Hacker Mentality

I1-C4
I2-C8

Time Management

I2-C13

Influence change
w/o power
Understand
power hierarchy

I1-C16

quickly
understand

Adaptable
Integrity
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I1-C2

Interview 5
Characteristic

Shaded Boxes represents a repeated construct
Black Text represents a new construct

I4-C8
I3-C7
I3-C14

I1-C13

Interview 6
Item Characteristic
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Get
Importance/Seriousness
Security Expert
Careful Communication
Strategic Thinker
Root Cause Learning
Versed with Security
Community
Takes Things in Stride
Organizational
Connections
Team Player
Come up with Ideas
In−depth Triage Skills
Deep Technical Talent
Available When Needed
Automation

Repeats
I1-C16
I1-C7
I1-C10
I4-C10
I1-C2
I4-C13

I2-C8

I1-C7
I1-C11

Interview 7
Characteristic
Experience
Prioritization
Speak to Press
Team Creation
Lead by Sharing Vision
Meticulous
Documentation
Handling with Finesse
Calming Influence
Actively Involved in
Community
Leading Conversations
Highly Technical
Willing to Work Hard
Loves Their Job

Repeats
I2-C13
I1-C14
I1-C4
I1-C12
I3-C6
I3-C6
I1-C2
I1-C14
I1-C6
I1-C15

Interview 8
Characteristic
Collaborative
Directing
Communication
Calm
Innovator
Culturally Aware
Tree Shaker
Quickly Empathize
Ability to Document
Analysis of
Complex Problems
Wide Circle of
Contacts
Recognition of
Confidential Info
Technical Ability
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Interview 9
Repeats Characteristic
I1-C4

I7-C10
I3-C6
I2-C8
I5-C3

I1-C12
I1-C13
I6-C8
I1-C10
I1-C6

Highly Technical
Understand Politics
Dissect the
Problem
Innovative
Big Picture
Focused on Org
Priorities
Good Time
Management
Doing the Right
Thing
Collaboration
Communicate
Impact
Assess
Impact/Risk
Perfectionist

Repeat
I1-C6

5-C13
I1-C13
I2-C8
I1-C5
I5-C13
I2-C13
I1-C16
I1-C4
I2-C12
I2-C3
I1-C1

Interview 10
Characteristic
Forming a Plan
Written
Communications
Keeps People
Informed
Automation
Clear/Transparent
Troubleshooting
Mentoring
Quality
Deliverables
Technical
Accuracy
Morale Building
Level−headed
Drilling Down into
Tech Details
Customer Focus

Repeats
I2-C11
I3-C2
I1-C4
I6-C14
I1-C12
I1-C8
I1-C1
I1-C1
I5-C10
I3-C6
I1-C13
I1-C3

Item

Interview 11
Characteristic

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Positive Attitude
Strategic Thinker
Experience
Good Communicator
Self−Motivated
Organized
Technical
Culturally Diverse

1
2
3
4

Passion for Work
Tries New Things
Gets Along with Others

Interview 12
Repeats Characteristic
I1-C15
I2-C8
I5-C10
I6-C4
I7-C1
I1-C14
I3-C9
I1-C6
I8-C5

Hunter
Attention to Detail
Educated/Certifications
Deep Technical Background
Staying up to Date
Multitasking
Code/Automate
Passion for Work
Enthusiasm
Ability to Communicate

Interview 13
Repeats Characteristic
I2-C2
I1-C1
I2-C7
I1-C6

I2-C7
I3-C9
I6-C14
I1-C15
I1-C17
I1-C14

Security Knowledge
Doing Right Thing
Assertive
Get What They
Want/Need
Experienced
Focuses on People
Speak to Policy Makers
Technical
Delegates
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Repeats
I1-C7
I1-C16
I5-C3
I5-C3
I7-C1
I1-C8
I3-C14
I1-C6
I2-C9

APPENDIX 4-6: INCIDENT RESPONDER VECTORS BY ARCHETYPE
Name

Cluster

Rank

Character

Cognitive

Communication

Andrew

1

2

5

4.9

5

6

6

Emma

1

2

5

4.7

5.5

5.2

6

Aria

1

3

5

5.1

5

4.5

5

Evelyn

1

3

4

5.4

5.5

4.5

6

Liam

1

3

5

5.3

6

5

5.5

Dave

1

4

6

6

6

6

6

Mason

1

4

4

5.3

4.5

4

5

Penelope

1

4

4.5

5

5

3.7

5

Victoria

1

4

5

4.3

5

3.5

6

Adam

1

5

5.2

5.5

5

4.6

6

Ethan

1

5

5

6

5

4.4

5.2

Logan

1

5

5

5

6

5.2

6

Mark

1

5

6

6

6

6

6

Michael

1

5

5

5

5

5

6

Noah

1

5

5

5.3

5.5

4.2

6

Aiden

1

6

4.5

5.4

5.5

4.8

6

Emily

1

6

5.2

5

5

5.5

6

Jacob

1

6

5

5

5.5

5.2

5

Lorelai

1

6

5.8

6

6

5.3

6

Martin

1

6

5.5

5.2

5

4.3

5

Oliver

1

6

5.8

5.3

5

3.5

5.5

Riley

1

6

5.5

6

5.7

6

5.5

Tim

1

6

6

6

6

6

6

Arthur

2

1

4

3.5

5

4

3.3

Frank

2

2

4

3.5

5

4.5

3.3

Hunter

2

2

4.5

5

5.7

5.3

4

Lucas

2

2

4.5

4.2

6

5.2

4

Sam

2

2

5

4

6

3.5

3

Avery

2

4

5

5.4

4.5

3.5

4

Blake

2

4

4

4.7

3.5

3.5

2.2

Eli

2

4

3

4.8

5.5

3.7

2

William

2

4

5

3

4

4.2

2.5

Ella

2

5

4.8

4.7

4

3.5

3

Isaac

2

5

4.5

5

5.3

5.3

4

Hannah

2

6

4

5.3

5

5

4

Sophia

2

6

4.7

5

6

4.4

3
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General
Technical
Management

Name

Cluster

Rank

Character

Cognitive

Communication

General
Management

Technical

Abigail

3

1

3.2

3.3

4

3

4

Ivonne

3

1

2

3.4

2

3.5

6

Lily

3

1

3.7

4.8

3.5

4

4

Victor

3

1

2.5

2.7

4

2

4

Alex

3

2

3

3.7

4

2.7

5

Betty

3

2

3.7

3.7

3.2

3.5

3.5

Charlotte

3

2

4

4

3

4

6

Ron

3

2

3.4

3.2

3.5

3.3

4

Alice

3

3

3.3

3.3

3.2

3.5

4

Andrew

3

3

4.2

4

3.7

3.3

5

Bertha

3

3

4

3.5

4

4

4.3

Grace

3

3

4.5

4.3

4

3.5

4.5

Jim

3

3

3.5

4

4.5

3.1

4.5

Tony

3

3

4.5

3.8

5

3.3

5

Ann

3

4

3.2

4

3.5

4

3

Luke

3

4

2

4.1

5

4

4

Nellie

3

4

4

3.5

3

3.5

3.7

Steve

3

4

4.2

3.5

3

2.7

4

Martha

3

5

4.3

3.5

4

3.5

4.3

Rick

3

5

4

3.7

3.2

3.5

4

Carrie

3

6

4

3.5

3

3

4.7

Jane

3

6

4

3.3

4.5

3.5

5

Bill

4

2

5.7

4.3

4

5

6

Natalie

4

2

4.7

3.8

3.5

5

5

Alexander

4

3

4

5.3

3.5

4.5

6

Dan

4

3

5.2

4

4

5.3

5

Dylan

4

3

4.7

3.4

3.5

5

3.5

Will

4

3

4.8

4.2

3.5

4.3

5

Addison

4

4

4.3

3.6

3.5

6

4

James

4

4

4.5

4.3

3.5

4

6

Brook

4

5

6

5.4

4

4

5

Carter

4

5

5.7

4.8

3.5

6

4

Mary

4

5

5.2

4.4

3.5

5

5

Tammy

4

5

6

5

3.5

5.3

5

Ryan

4

6

5.4

5

3.5

5.7

4

Zoey

4

6

6

5.8

3.5

6

4.5
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Name

Cluster

Rank

Character

Cognitive

Communication

Chloe

5

1

1.5

1.6

4

Isabella

5

1

1.7

1

Jake

5

1

2

Joseph

5

1

Olivia

5

Randy

General
Technical
Management
2.2

2

1

2.2

4.8

1.7

1

1.7

2

2.2

1.3

3

3.5

3

1

4

1.3

1.5

1.8

2.5

5

1

2.2

2

1.5

2.6

2.5

Rob

5

1

2.7

2

2

3.5

1.2

Sebastian

5

1

3

1

1.3

1.3

3

Tom

5

1

3

1.4

3.5

1.3

1

Mia

5

2

2

4

2

2.6

2.8

Sue

5

2

1.8

2

2.5

1.7

2.5

Ava

5

3

2.7

2

3

3.2

2.8
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APPENDIX 4-7: A TUTORIAL ON ANALYZING REPGRIDS WITH R
Overview
My use of the RepGrid technique in this study entailed the creation of original
programming statements, using the R statistical programming language, for processing and
analyzing the data obtained from the interviews. The programming is mostly specific to this
study, and therefore is not currently in a form that is easily modified for general purpose use.
However, to help other information system researchers conduct RepGrid studies, I have included
this appendix detailing the steps conducted during the analysis, providing source code segments,
and output from the code segments. I also created a repository in github to store a more
generalized version of the software (https://github.com/mdmcl/is-repgrid). The latest version of
this tutorial will be located in that location and I will upload any software after I have a chance to
put it into format useful to others.
Figure 4-6, shown on the next page, outlines the general steps that I took to analyze the
RepGrid data in my dissertation. All code and output were written in the R statistical
programming language.
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Figure 4-6: RepGrid Flow Diagram
I took a three-phase approach to collecting and processing the RepGrid interview data,
which is further described below. First, the interviews were conducted over WebEx Meeting
Center and the content of the interviews was captured real time in Excel spread sheets. Next, data
from the RepGrid interviews were put into a machine-readable format and saved in a data file.
Finally, the machine-readable data was analyzed and the output was used to create images used in
my dissertation.
This tutorial will describe the steps performed in each stage and the resulting output.

Conduct the Interviews
This section of the appendix describes the steps that were taken before the data was
processed. During the interviews, the names of the incident responders, attributes that describe
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them, expert rankings (grid data), and an effectiveness ranking were elicited. This data and the
results from my qualitative analysis were used as inputs into the program.
Chapter 4 of my dissertation describes how the RepGrid interviews were conducted and
how Excel spreadsheets were used to capture the grid data. Figure 4-7 shows the completed
spreadsheet for one of the interviews.

Figure 4-7: Excel Spreadsheet of a Completed During a RepGrid Interview
The anchors were then qualitative coded as described in Chapter 4 into 5 categories:
Character, Cognitive Skills, Communication Skills, General Management, and Technical Skills.
These were hard coded in the program as constants so that they could be easily used later as
shown in Figure 4-8:

Figure 4-8: Constants Describing the Qualitative Categories
A version of this data was then created replacing the anchors with the category they fell
into as shown in Figure 4-9:
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Figure 4-9: Excel Spread Sheet Representing Qualitative Categories
The next step was to format this data so that it could be processed by the scripts.

Format the Data
This section of the tutorial describes the steps taken to create the RepGrid data files from
the Excel Spreadsheets. The high-level steps are shown in Figure 4-6.

Step 1: Initializing the Grids
The individual grids in the excel sheet must be put into a format suitable for further
processing. This was done manually, but a function could be created to process a well formatted
Excel file. Figure 4-10 illustrates how the data in Figure 4-9 above is entered as a RepGrid Object
and the scale is set.

Figure 4-10: Creation of Variables to Represent the Interview Data in the Excel Spreadsheet
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Step 2: Align by Ideal
The grid is then reordered so that so that the elements that best describe the “ideal” person
are on the right. This is needed if during the interview attributes most describing the ideal anchor
are distributed in the left and right columns. The individual grids must be constructed similarly in
order to combine them. The function to reorder the grids is shown in Figure 4-11 below:

Figure 4-11: Aligning the Grid by Ideal Anchor
The resulting grid is shown below in Figure 4-12:

Figure 4-12: Software Representation of Grid

Step 3: Construct Qualitative Theme Grid
I created the following function to create a grid to represent the coded values. This allows
the grids from the different interviews to be combined and analyzed. Notice that this function
shown in Figure 4-13 eliminates the ideal and incompetent anchors and handles missing values.
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Figure 4-13: Function to Create Thematic Grid
And the individual grid is passed to this function in Figure 4-14, specifying the coding
from Figure 4-13 above.

Figure 4-14: Passing the Interview Data to the Theme Grid Function
The resulting “Theme Grid” is shown below in Figure 4-15:

Figure 4-15: Software Representation of Coded Grid
The coded theme grids are then combined as shown below in Figure 4-16:
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Figure 4-16: Combining the Interview Data into One Aggregate Grid
The following image shows the combined themed grid in Figure 4-17:

Figure 4-17: Completed Grid Containing Data from All the Interviews

Step 5: Store Stack Rankings
The individual rankings are then saved for each individual described during the interviews
as shown in Figure 4-18 below:

Figure 4-18: Saving the Performance Rankings Provided During the Interviews
In my interview, the most successful person was described with a “1”. However, in order
to give them a “high score”, I swapped the rankings so that “6” describes the most ideal
individual and “1” is the least effective in their role. This is done with the following function
shown in Figure 4-19:
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Figure 4-19: Function to Rank Highest Performing Individual with a High Value
And the above function is called on the rank data in Figure 4-20.

Figure 4-20: Calling the Function to Rank Individuals
Resulting in the following array shown in Figure 4-21:

Figure 4-21: Final Variable Containing All Individuals and Their Effectiveness Ranking

Step 5: Save the Data
The interview data is now in a format that it can be processed. The individual grids,
aggregate theme grid, and rank data are now saved to a file for analysis shown in Figure 4-22.

Figure 4-22: Saving the Data After it is in a Machine-Readable Format
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Analyze the Data
The goal of this phase is to analyze the RepGrid data and obtain results that can be
included in research papers.

Step 1: Print Individual Grids
After loading the data into the analysis program, the individual grids and the aggregate grid
are saved as a PDF so that they can be analyzed and included in a research paper. The following
function shown in Figure 4-23 is called for each individual grid in order to create a printable
version of the grid:

Figure 4-23: Saving the Individual Grids as PDFs
And the following code in Figure 4-24 saves the aggregate grid in a printable format:

Figure 4-24: Saving the Aggregate Grid as a PDF
These two steps result in the following images shown in Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26:
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Figure 4-25: Saved Induvial Grid

Figure 4-26: Saved Aggregate Grid
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Step 2: Reliability and Validity
Next the correlation between the elements of the themed grid are examined and principle
component analysis is performed to provide a reliability factor for the coded themes. The
following functions shown in Figure 4-27 are called:

Figure 4-27: Correlation of Constructs and Principal Component Analysis on the Grids
Returning the following output shown in Figure 4-28 and Figure 4-29:

Figure 4-28: Output Showing Correlation of Constructs

Figure 4-29: Output Showing Principal Component Analysis of Grid Constructs.

Step 3: Extract RepGrid Data for Analytics
The RepGrid Library uses data structures that are specific to the library. These are not
compatible with other libraries. In order to use other analytics libraries, I must create a matrix
from my RepGrids as shown in Figure 4-30 below:
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Figure 4-30: Extracting the RepGrid Data for Processing
This results in the following matrix shown in Figure 4-31:

Figure 4-31: General Matrix Representing the RepGrid Data

Step 4: Determine Number of Archetypes
I then attempt to determine the number of archetype clusters by examining a within sum of
squares plot for several k-means models. I calculate the within sum of squares values for a 1
cluster solution and continue to 78 (a cluster for every individual in my data set). The code to do
this is shown in Figure 4-32 below.
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Figure 4-32: Plotting the WSS for Grid Clusters
This results in Figure 4-33 which must be interpreted by the researcher before the program
can continue.

Figure 4-33: Within Groups Sum of Squares of Grid Data
At this point, we are looking for a parsimonious solution, one which balances the within
groups sum of squares (wss) with the number of clusters. The wss can be thought of as a
description of how well the model describes the clusters. The lower the wss value, the lower
variance is between the elements in the cluster; therefore, lower values better describe the
elements in each cluster. Eventually, when there is a cluster for every data point, the model fits
perfectly with a wss of 0. However, this does nothing to help us cluster the individuals and create
general categories. In my data, I saw the reduction of the variance described by the wss start to
level off after 5 or 6 clusters. I performed the rest of the steps in this appendix with a 5 cluster and
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a 6-cluster solution and interpreted them both. I found there was no interpretable difference
between 2 of the clusters in the 6-cluster solution. Therefore, a 5-cluster solution was chosen as it
is more parsimonious.
While I chose to perform a wss analysis in my dissertation, a scree plot using Eigen values
may be helpful for determining the number of factors in a correlation matrix. This can be done
with the following function shown in Figure 4-34:

Figure 4-34: Using a Scree Plot to Examine Eigen Values

Step 5: Clustering
Any clustering algorithm can be used to analyze the data. Here, I illustrate the two I used:
hierarchical clustering (used in my pilot study) and k-means clustering (used in the dissertation).
The k-means model is created with the function shown in Figure 4-35:

Figure 4-35: Creating a k-Means Model
The output from the 5 and 6 cluster solutions is shown below in Figure 4-36 and Figure
4-37:

Figure 4-36: Five Cluster Solution Representing the RepGrid Data
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Figure 4-37: Six Cluster Solution Representing the RepGrid data
The hierarchical clustering solution is calculated with the following function in Figure
4-38:

Figure 4-38: Alternative Model Using Hierarchical Clustering
And the 5 and 6 cluster solutions are shown below in Figure 4-39 and Figure 4-40:

Figure 4-39: Five Cluster Solution of a Hierarchical Cluster
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Figure 4-40: Six Cluster Solution of a Hierarchical Cluster
In the 6-cluster solution above, one group has just 2 members. This would lead us to
believe a 5-cluster solution might be better in the hierarchical clusters. Other distance algorithms
can be used and should be evaluated, but in this data set, they yielded similar results.
I then created sets of individuals in each cluster as shown in Figure 4-41:

Figure 4-41: Creating Data Sets from Clustering Models
The following result in Figure 4-42 is an example of the first cluster produced by the kmeans model.

Figure 4-42: Data Contained in the First Cluster
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Step 6: Analyze Rankings
Sets representing the effectiveness ranking of each individual are then created, and I
combined them as shown in Figure 4-43 below:

Figure 4-43: Creation of Variable to Store Effectiveness by Group
The 5 datasets (one for each cluster), A-E are combined into a group I called Test. The first
few rows of this Test group are shown below in Figure 4-44:

Figure 4-44: Content of Variable to Store Effectiveness by Group
I then used this test dataset to determine if there is a statistical difference in the means of
the group rankings. The code to produce a boxplot is shown in Figure 4-45:

Figure 4-45: Code to Create a Box Plot of Group Effectiveness
The boxplot is shown in Figure 4-46:
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Figure 4-46: Box Plot of Group Effectiveness
The data is analyzed by performing an ANOVA (analysis of variance) and Tukey post-hoc
tests with the following functions in Figure 4-47:

Figure 4-47: Code to Run ANOVA and Post-hoc Tests
The results from the ANOVA in Figure 4-48 reveals there is a statistical difference
between the groups:

Figure 4-48: ANOVA of Effectiveness of Archetypes
And the post-hoc tests in Figure 4-49, help us identify which values are different (looking
for p-values below my desired confidence level).
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Figure 4-49: Post-Hoc Test of Effectiveness of Archetypes
In this analysis, group D is different from every other group and E and A are also different
at a 0.01 confidence level. The next closest p-value is .173 which is I did not feel was at the
significance level I required in my study.
I save the mean effectiveness ranking for each cluster as shown in Figure 4-50:

Figure 4-50: Saving the Mean Ranks of Each Archetype

Step 7: Calculate Archetype Parameters
Since there is no cluster that clearly stands out as the highest ranking, I next create another
dataset of the “top performers” in Figure 4-51.

Figure 4-51: Creating a Data Set of Top Performers
This dataset represents the most effective individual identified in each of my 13 interviews
as shown below in Figure 4-52:
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Figure 4-52: Data Set of Top Performers
In order to compare the individuals, I calculated the z-score (how many standard deviations
the individual is from the mean) for each person as shown below in Figure 4-53:

Figure 4-53: Saving the Standard Deviations for Each Characteristic
The first few lines of this data set are shown below in Figure 4-54:

Figure 4-54: Data Showing How Many Standard Deviations an Individual is From the Mean of
Each Characteristic
I then used the average z-score for the individuals in each archetype (and the top
performing group) as shown below in Figure 4-55:

Figure 4-55: Saving off the Average Z-Score for Each Archetype
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The results identified how much (on average) the individuals in each group are above or
below the mean ranking for each category. A positive score means the group is above the mean
and a negative score indicates they are below the mean.
I used the values for the “top performers” to assign weights to the individual categories of
characteristics as shown in Figure 4-56.

Figure 4-56: Output Showing the Z-scores for the Top Performers
I next used the values for each archetype to illustrate the differences. One of the archetype
values is shown below in Figure 4-57:

Figure 4-57: Output Showing the Z-scores for One Archetype
These were then plotted on a spider graph using Adobe Illustrator. There are various ways
to illustrate this; one is by using the mean value as the midpoint on the graph and marking each
value above or below the midpoint as indicated by the z-score. I did this for the pilot data and
found this to be a bit problematic as the z-score really has no deterministic limits. For the pilot
data, I decided to scale the results from 0-10 and plot those values on the charts as shown in the
following code segment Figure 4-58:

Figure 4-58: Scaling the Results for Plotting
For the dissertation data, I used the k-means model instead of hierarchical clusters. The kmeans function returns cluster centers, one for each input point. This better describes the nature
of the cluster than how much the group deviates from the standard deviation of the performance.
The code to find the cluster centers is shown in Figure 4-59:
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Figure 4-59: Determining the Center of the K-Means Model
The k-means center values for the archetypes are identified in the Figure 4-60:

Figure 4-60: Centers of the K-means Models
These centers were scaled and rounded so that they could be easily plotted. The results are
shown in Figure 4-61:

Figure 4-61: Scaling K-Means Centers for Plotting
For the dissertation data, these were the values used to plot the graphs using Adobe
Illustrator.

Conclusion
There are several choices made during any analysis that affects the final representation of
the data. I believe that a k-means model is an advanced clustering technique that yields more
accurate results than hierarchical clustering. This is because k-means uses an iterative refinement
technique to converge on an optimal solution. The k-means model also identifies centers of each
cluster which are useful for describing archetypes.
K-means models (like most clustering algorithms) are also influenced by the order of the
data and the centers of the clusters. K-means uses a random number generator to determine the
starting centroids of the clusters. This means that each time the model is run, individuals may be
put into different groups which yield slightly different results. I ran the model several times and
didn’t notice any differences in the final clusters that changed the results. However, some
individuals did end up in different groups in successive runs. Therefore, I set a random seed to
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make sure the cluster centroids started with the same values. This guarantees that every time the
analysis was run that consistent results would be returned. Other advanced clustering techniques
such as self-organizing maps or random forests are alternative clustering techniques that might
yield clusters that more accurately group individuals. In my study, the goal was to describe the
clusters and not to accurately place an individual in a group. Therefore, the cluster centers
represented on the graphs better illustrate the nature of the clusters in a multidimensional space.
However, if a researcher is attempting to better fit individuals into clusters an alternative
algorithm is likely to yield better results.
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